From Measurement to Mitigation: Quantifying and Reducing Identity Leakage in Image Representation Encoders with Linear Subspace Removal

In this paper, we investigate the impact of adversarial attacks on identity encoders within a realistic de-identification framework. Our experiments show that the transferability of attacks transfers from an external surrogate model to the system model (e.g., CosFace to ArcFace) allows the adversary to cause identity information to leak in a sufficiently sensitive face recognition system. We present experimental evidence and propose strategies to mitigate this vulnerability. Specifically, we show how fine-tuning on adversarial examples helps to mitigate this effect for distortion-based attacks (i.e., snow, fog, etc.), while a simple low-pass filter can attenuate the effect of adversarial noise without affecting the de-identified images. Our mitigation results in a de-identification system that preserves its functionality while being significantly more robust to adversarial noise.

Privacy-preserving face recognition (PPFR) and face anonymization have different goals, but both must retain some identity-related information for their intended use. We show that an adaptive attacker can learn this information. We propose FaceLinkGen, a simple distillation-based attack that trains a face recognition model to map protected inputs back to standard face embeddings. FaceLinkGen applies to keyless PPFR systems and perception-preserving face de-identification (De-ID) systems. For PPFR, the recovered embeddings can be used to regenerate faces that match the original person. Across MinusFace, PartialFace, and DecoyFace, the regenerated faces achieve acceptance rates of 81.0--99.4% on Face++ and 74.9--99.6% on Amazon. For De-ID, FaceLinkGen links protected faces to unprotected images of the same person, reaching Recall@1 values of 48.4--89.6% in the one-side-protected setting across the evaluated methods. FaceLinkGen exposes identity leakage across all evaluated methods, including DecoyFace and WDP, whose protection resists the tested U-Net attacks on face recovery and protected-to-unprotected linkage, respectively. The attack also remains effective when trained with limited paired data. Code is available at https://github.com/weathon/FaceLinkGenRelease.

Modern face recognition (FR) owes much of its success to deep neural networks that learn to extract compact identity embeddings from face images. These models are typically trained for identity discrimination, producing embeddings that are highly effective for biometric matching but largely opaque to semantic interpretation. In contrast, foundation models, pretrained on broad visual or vision--language tasks, provide rich interfaces for describing, retrieving, generating, and organizing visual content. This contrast raises a natural question: what capabilities become available when face embeddings from domain-specific FR models are made interoperable with foundation models? Building on recent work on embedding compatibility across models, we use simple pre-computed linear transformations, estimated from paired embeddings alone, to connect existing FR models with off-the-shelf foundation models. Once aligned with a foundation model, a face embedding can be 'unmasked' in multiple ways, without training or modifying either model: it can be read in natural language, enabling free-form text queries over a gallery of FR embeddings; rendered into a face image that recovers a person's appearance, using an unmodified diffusion decoder; and converted to a name, enabling identification even in the absence of an enrolled face gallery. In effect, one linear transformation turns an identity embedding into a rich embedding for web-scale foundation models. This interoperability exposes face embeddings as semantically and visually rich biometric representations, with direct implications for interpretability, retrieval, reconstruction, and template security.