In biometric systems, it is a common practice to associate each sample or template with a specific individual. Nevertheless, recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of generating "morphed" biometric samples capable of matching multiple identities. These morph attacks have been recognized as potential security risks for biometric systems. However, most research on morph attacks has focused on biometric modalities that operate within the image domain, such as the face, fingerprints, and iris. In this work, we introduce Time-domain Voice Identity Morphing (TD-VIM), a novel approach for voice-based biometric morphing. This method enables the blending of voice characteristics from two distinct identities at the signal level, creating morphed samples that present a high vulnerability for speaker verification systems. Leveraging the Multilingual Audio-Visual Smartphone database, our study created four distinct morphed signals based on morphing factors and evaluated their effectiveness using a comprehensive vulnerability analysis. To assess the security impact of TD-VIM, we benchmarked our approach using the Generalized Morphing Attack Potential (G-MAP) metric, measuring attack success across two deep-learning-based Speaker Verification Systems (SVS) and one commercial system, Verispeak. Our findings indicate that the morphed voice samples achieved a high attack success rate, with G-MAP values reaching 99.40% on iPhone-11 and 99.74% on Samsung S8 in text-dependent scenarios, at a false match rate of 0.1%.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Illustration of TD-VIM morphing: Initially we apply pre-processing to make both signal of equal length. Subsequently we select four different portions of second signal in the signal selection block and average only the selected portion with the first speaker’s signal. This averaged signal is final morphed signal which is used to verify both the subjects
Figure 2: Illustration of signal selection of second speaker, based on the time samples we have selected 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of the second speaker
Devices
No of speakers
No of sessions
No of morphed files
iPhone 11
103
1
103×102×3×4×3=378,216
Samsung S8
103×102×3×4×3=378,216
Total=2,269,296
Table 1: Table showing exhaustive list of number of morphed files generated for 2 devices for 3 sentences for 1 sessions using 4 different types of morphing technique for 3 different languages
MAVS Database
SVS
Languages
English
Hindi
Bengali
x-vector [ 18 ]
0.56
1.43
1.60
RawNet3 [ 5 ]
0.57
1.44
1.75
Verispeak [ 21 ]
0.35
1.75
1.83
Table 2: Performance of the speaker verification systems in terms of EER (%) for MAVS database
Figure 3: The diagram showing M25 , M50 , M75 and M100 signal passed onto the x-vector and RawNet3 to get 512-dimensional and 256-dimensional embeddings respectively
Morphing Factor
Language
G-MAP with Multiple probe attempts
iPhone11
Samsung S8
Gender Pair
Gender Pair
FF
MM
Combined
FF
MM
Combined
M25
English
23.76
24.74
48.54
67.36
68.16
67.76
Hindi
23.78
24.80
48.58
69.73
69.36
69.54
Bengali
22.2
23.69
45.89
67.37
68.26
67.81
Table 3: Vulnerability analysis for MAVS database using G-MAP with multiple probe attempts on x-vector
Morphing Factor
Language
G-MAP with Multiple probe attempts
iPhone11
Samsung S8
Gender Pair
Gender Pair
FF
MM
Combined
FF
MM
Combined
M25
English
97.21
91.09
94.15
97.52
96.30
96.91
Hindi
98.11
90.68
94.39
98.78
97.65
98.21
Bengali
99.12
91.58
95.35
99.68
98.87
99.27
Table 4: Vulnerability analysis for MAVS database using G-MAP with multiple probe attempts on RawNet3
Morphing Factor
Language
G-MAP with Multiple probe attempts
iPhone11
Samsung S8
Gender Pair
Gender Pair
FF
MM
Combined
FF
MM
Combined
M25
English
50.21
51.09
50.65
51.52
51.30
51.41
Hindi
53.11
53.68
53.39
52.78
52.65
52.71
Bengali
51.12
50.58
50.84
50.68
52.87
51.77
Table 5: Vulnerability analysis for MAVS database using G-MAP with multiple probe attempts for the Verispeak commercial speaker verification system
Morphing factor
Language
G-MAP with Multiple probe attempts with multiple SVS
iPhone11
Samsung S8
Gender Pair
Gender Pair
FF
MM
Combined
FF
MM
Combined
M25
English
23.76
24.74
48.54
51.52
51.30
51.41
Hindi
23.78
24.80
48.58
52.78
52.65
52.71
Bengali
22.2
23.69
45.89
50.68
52.87
51.77
Table 6: Vulnerability analysis for MAVS database using G-MAP with multiple probe attempts with multiple SVS
G-MAP(%)
iPhone-11
Samsung S8
52.08
56.61
Table 7: G-MAP (with full capacity) for iPhone-11 and Samsung S8
Figure 4: The speaker verification match score distribution comprises several comparisons: non-morph genuine pairs versus non-morph impostor pairs, as well as morph (across all four types) versus non-morph genuine pairs. This analysis employs Rawnet on iPhone-11 for English language and x-vector (on iPhone-11 for Hindi language).
Voice Authentication Systems (VAS) use unique vocal characteristics for verification. They are increasingly integrated into high-security sectors such as banking and healthcare. Despite their improvements using deep learning, they face severe vulnerabilities from sophisticated threats like deepfakes and adversarial attacks. The emergence of realistic voice cloning complicates detection, as systems struggle to distinguish authentic from synthetic audio. While anti-spoofing countermeasures (CMs) exist to mitigate these risks, many rely on static detection models that can be bypassed by novel adversarial methods, leaving a critical security gap. To demonstrate this vulnerability, we propose the Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA), a novel method that strategically manipulates inaudible frequency regions of AI-generated audio. By altering the voice in imperceptible zones to the human ear, SMIA creates adversarial samples that sound authentic while deceiving CMs. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our attack against state-of-the-art (SOTA) models across multiple tasks, under simulated real-world conditions. SMIA achieved a strong attack success rate (ASR) of at least 82% against combined VAS/CM systems, at least 97.5% against standalone speaker verification systems, and 100% against countermeasures. These findings conclusively demonstrate that current security postures are insufficient against adaptive adversarial attacks. This work highlights the urgent need for a paradigm shift toward next-generation defenses that employ dynamic, context-aware frameworks capable of evolving with the threat landscape.
Kamel Kamel, Hridoy Sankar Dutta, Keshav Sood +1
School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Australia
Advancing face morphing attack techniques is crucial to anticipate evolving threats and develop robust defensive mechanisms for identity verification systems. This work introduces DCMorph, a dual-stream diffusion-based morphing framework that simultaneously operates at both identity conditioning and latent space levels. Unlike image-level methods suffering from blending artifacts or GAN-based approaches with limited reconstruction fidelity, DCMorph leverages identity-conditioned latent diffusion models through two mechanisms: (1) decoupled cross-attention interpolation that injects identity-specific features from both source faces into the denoising process, enabling explicit dual-identity conditioning absent in existing diffusion-based methods, and (2) DDIM inversion with spherical interpolation between inverted latent representations from both source faces, providing geometrically consistent initial latent representation that preserves structural attributes. Vulnerability analyses across four state-of-the-art face recognition systems demonstrate that DCMorph achieves the highest attack success rates compared to existing methods at both operational thresholds, while remaining challenging to detect by current morphing attack detection solutions.
Tahar Chettaoui, Eduarda Caldeira, Guray Ozgur +3
Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics Research IGD, Germany · TU Darmstadt, Germany · Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway
Face morphing attacks are widely recognized as one of the most challenging threats to face recognition systems used in electronic identity documents. These attacks exploit a critical vulnerability in passport enrollment procedures adopted by many countries, where the facial image is often acquired without a supervised live capture process. In this paper, we propose a novel face morphing technique based on Arc2Face, an identity-conditioned face foundation model capable of synthesizing photorealistic facial images from compact identity representations. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach by comparing the morphing attack potential metric on two large-scale sequestered face morphing attack detection datasets against several state-of-the-art morphing methods, as well as on two novel morphed face datasets derived from FEI and ONOT. Experimental results show that the proposed deep learning-based approach achieves a morphing attack potential comparable to that of landmark-based techniques, which have traditionally been regarded as the most challenging. These findings confirm the ability of the proposed method to effectively preserve and manage identity information during the morph generation process.
Nicolò Di Domenico, Annalisa Franco, Matteo Ferrara +1
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Bologna, Italy