Current LLM-based services typically require users to submit raw text regardless of its sensitivity. While intuitive, such practice introduces substantial privacy risks, as unauthorized access may expose personal, medical, or legal information. Although prior defenses strived to mitigate these risks, they often incur substantial computational overhead and degrade model performance. To overcome this privacy-efficiency trade-off, we introduce Privacy-Preserving Fine-Tuning (PPFT), a novel training pipeline that eliminates the need for transmitting raw prompt text while maintaining a favorable balance between privacy preservation and model utility for both clients and service providers. Our approach operates in two stages: first, we train a client-side encoder together with a server-side projection module and LLM, enabling the server to condition on k-pooled prompt embeddings instead of raw text; second, we fine-tune the projection module and LLM on private, domain-specific data using noise-injected embeddings, allowing effective adaptation without exposing plain text prompts and requiring access to the decoder's internal parameters. Extensive experiments on domain-specific and general benchmarks demonstrate that PPFT achieves a striking balance between privacy and utility, maintaining competitive performance with minimal degradation compared to noise-free upper bounds.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: While conventional services expose plain text prompts to the server, PPFT transmits only obfuscated embeddings to prevent prompt inference and mitigate privacy risks.
Figure 2: Overview of PPFT. Stage 1 aligns pooled client-side embeddings with the decoder to enable text-free inference. Stage 2 performs domain adaptation using noise-injected embeddings to improve robustness against reconstruction.
Backbone
Method
Average
Pri-DDX
Pri-NLICE
Pri-SLJA
Llama-3.1-8B
dχ -privacy Feyisetan et al. (2020)
0.2750 ( ↓ 0.6541)
0.2311
0.3477
0.2462
Paraphrase Utpala et al. (2023)
0.3757 ( ↓ 0.5534)
0.4648
0.2892
0.3731
PrivacyRestore Zeng et al. (2025)
0.6343 ( ↓ 0.2948)
0.5784
0.5415
0.7829
PPFT (Ours)
0.7314 ( ↓ 0.1977)
0.5915
0.6979
0.9049
PPFTw/o stage2 (Lower Bound)
0.3545
0.3460
0.3138
0.4036
PPFTw/o noise (Upper Bound)
0.9291
0.9275
0.9049
0.9466
Table 1: Main results on downstream tasks. PPFT ( k=4 ) refers to our model adapted with noise in Stage 2. Lower/Upper bounds indicate performance without domain adaptation and without privacy noise, respectively.
Original Prompt
A 27-year-old male has a history of chronic pancreatitis, diabetes, obesity, pancreatic cancer in family members, smoking.
The 27-year-old male presents the symptoms of diarrhea, fatigue, nausea, pain, pale stools and dark urine, skin lesions, underweight.
What is the likely diagnosis?
Reconstructed by Inversion Attack (same ϵ as inference)
A 28 -year-old woman has a history of asthma, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack, asthma attack.
The 28 -year-old woman presents the symptoms of cough, wheezing, shortness of breath, shortness of breath, wheezing, shortness of breath, shortness of breath with deep breathing.
Table 2: Qualitative reconstruction example under noisy-embedding transmission. Blue indicates spans that exactly match the original prompt, whereas red indicates mismatched content.
Figure 3: Results of embedding inversion attacks and attribute inference attacks across all baselines under varying privacy budgets ϵ on Pri-DDX.
Method
Age
Sex
Symptom
Antecedent
PrivacyRestore
-
0.5642
0.3552
0.3317
PPFT (Ours)
0.0071
0.5894
0.1001
0.0115
Table 3: Fine-grained reconstruction error on the Pri-DDX dataset under inference-level privacy budgets.
Backbone
Method
CSQA
SQuAD
Llama-3.1-8B
dχ -privacy
0.1819
0.0174
Paraphrase
0.0649
0.0125
PPFT (Ours)
0.5278
0.7085
PPFTw/o noise
0.6086
0.8930
Llama-3.2-1B
dχ -privacy
0.1210
0.0313
Paraphrase
0.0470
0.072
Table 4: Performance on general domains.
Metric
Pooling Size (k)
4
8
16
Score ↑
0.9049
0.8363
0.7630
ROUGE-L ↓
0.4050
0.3553
0.3241
Table 5: Ablation study on pooling size k . ROUGE-L is measured on the Pri-SLJA test set.
Figure 9
Appendix figures & tables7 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Hyperparameter
Value
General Settings
Backbones
Llama-3.2-1B / 3.1-8B
Precision
bfloat16
Max Sequence Length
512
LoRA Configuration
Rank ( r )
16
Appendix
Table 6: Hyperparameters used for training Llama-3.2-1B and Llama-3.1-8B models across Stage 1 and Stage 2.
Dataset
n
Dmax
ϵdχ=nDmax150
τ=1502n
Pri-DDXP
106.00
1.64
0.863
1.413
Pri-NLICE
72.00
1.39
1.499
0.960
Pri-SLJA
193.00
1.45
0.536
2.573
SQuAD
178.78
1.70
0.494
2.384
CSQA
48.43
1.68
1.844
0.646
Appendix
Table 7: Dataset-specific hyperparameters aligned to budget B=150 . n : max token length used for accounting. Dmax : an upper bound on per-token embedding distance in the metric space used by the dχ baseline. ϵdχ and τ are adjusted per dataset to maintain fixed B .
Pooling size
ϵ=0.01
ϵ=0.46
ϵ=0.86
ϵ=2.01
ϵ=2.29
ϵ=17.2
ϵ=22.93
ϵ=75.0
4
0.02974
0.03045
0.03178
0.03487
0.03373
0.16013
0.24380
0.43974
8
0.05506
0.05554
0.05525
0.05920
0.06266
0.09974
0.15784
0.33750
16
0.05039
0.05177
0.04938
0.04910
0.05055
0.14032
0.15935
0.17990
Appendix
Table 8: Noise-aware inverse attack results (ROUGE-L). The attacker is trained with noisy representations while we report reconstruction quality under different privacy budgets at inference.
Ex.
Ground truth
Reconstruction (blue=same, red=different)
1
A 46-year-old male has a history of chronic pancreatitis, diabetes, obesity, pancreatic cancer in family members. The 46-year-old male presents the symptoms of cough, diarrhea, nausea, pain, pale stools and dark urine, skin lesions, underweight. What is the likely diagnosis?
A 6 -year-old woman has a history of smoking, diabetes, high blood pressure, obesity, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, smoking. The 6 -year-old woman presents the symptoms of cough, fever, fatigue, pain, shortness of breath, skin lesions. What is the likely diagnosis?
2
A 45-year-old woman has a history of chronic pancreatitis, diabetes, obesity, pancreatic cancer in family members, smoking. The 45-year-old woman presents the symptoms of diarrhea, fatigue, nausea, pain, pale stools and dark urine, skin lesions, underweight. What is the likely diagnosis?
A 22 -year-old man has a history of alcohol addiction, smoking, alcohol addiction, heart failure, heart valve issue. The 22 -year-old man presents the symptoms of chest pain, shortness of breath, pain, fatigue, shortness of breath with exertion, …
Appendix
Table 9: Qualitative examples for the noise-aware inverse attack. Blue indicates spans that exactly match the original prompt, whereas red indicates mismatched or hallucinated content, including medically salient details.
Ex.
Ground truth
Reconstruction (blue=same, red=different)
1
A 57-year-old male has a history of antipsychotic medication usage, nausea, stimulant drug use. The 57-year-old male presents the symptoms of involuntary eye movement, jaw pain, muscle spasms, muscle spasms in neck, ptosis, shortness of breath. What is the likely diagnosis?
The diagnosis of the 57-year-old male who has been experiencing symptoms of eye jumping, unknown button, joint pain and muscle spasms in neck , is psychosis. What is the diagnosis?
2
A 8-year-old woman has a history of active cancer, deep vein thrombosis, hormone intake, immobility for > 3 days, surgery within last month. The 8-year-old woman presents the symptoms of coughing up blood, loss of consciousness, pain, shortness of breath, swelling. What is the likely diagnosis?
The patient has been in the hospital for over 3 weeks, with intravenous drug use, migraine, intake of bed, surgery . The patient’s symptoms are cough, fever, pain , swelling . What is the likely diagnosis?
Appendix
Table 10: Qualitative examples for the Stage-1 aligned inversion attacker. Blue spans exactly match the original prompt, while red spans differ. Even with a stronger attacker aligned to the encoder space, reconstructions often preserve only partial lexical overlaps rather than medically faithful recovery.
Figure 6: Inversion attacks on PPFT using a Stage-1 aligned model (stronger attacker) under varying privacy budgets ϵ . For comparison, we also report inversion results from a GPT-2 Medium model (weaker attacker).
Figure 7: Reconstruction quality across iterations for the pooled-embedding (Experiment 1) and single-embedding (Experiment 2) settings.
With the widespread deployment of public large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, protecting user prompt privacy has become an increasingly critical issue. Existing privacy-preserving inference methods sacrifice either utility or efficiency, and often require model-specific modifications that limit their compatibility. In this paper, we propose SharedRequest, a model-agnostic framework for privacy-preserving LLM inference that reformulates privacy protection at the batch level rather than the individual-prompt level. The key idea is to obscure sensitive information by mixing original prompts with noisy variants, while grouping semantically equivalent instructions to amortize the inference cost over a large batch of queries with minimal impact on LLM response quality. This design is independent of the LLM architecture, requiring no access to model parameters or architectural modification. Empirical results demonstrate that SharedRequest achieves over 20% higher utility compared to prior differential privacy baselines, and its shared-prompt mechanism reduces query cost by up to 5× compared to non-batched inference.
Peihua Mai, Xuanrong Gao, Youlong Ding +3
1National University of Singapore (Chongqing) Research Institute · 2Chongqing Key Laboratory of Trusted Perception and Interaction Technology for Intelligent and Connected Vehicles, Chongqing, China · 3National University of Singapore +3
Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on proprietary records enables domain adaptation but introduces two challenges: (i) privacy leakage of memorized private data, such as personally identifiable information (PII), and (ii) balancing private data removal with utility preservation. Existing defenses, including data sanitization and differential privacy, often degrade performance, while privacy-neuron editing lacks a PII-free reference to distinguish identity-specific neurons from those supporting useful text. We propose JEPA-Prune, a post-hoc neuron pruning framework guided by a model trained exclusively on PII-free views. Alongside the fine-tuned private model, JEPA-Prune, trains a public model on surrogate and masked views of the same records using a joint-embedding predictive architecture (JEPA), capturing domain knowledge without identifiers. A cross-model representation probe quantifies deviations between private representations of leaked records and this PII-free reference. Integrated gradients and a scale-invariant specificity score then identify PII-responsive neurons, which are pruned without retraining. Experiments show that pruning just 1.6% of neurons reduces PII inference accuracy by up to 7.4x and PII extraction recall by up to 13.9x, while keeping unseen-text perplexity within 16% of that of the unpruned model for most LLMs. In contrast, privacy-neuron editing increases perplexity by at least 26x.
Mohamed Shaaban, Mohamed Elmahallawy
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Washington State University, Richland, WA 99354, USA
Large Language Models (LLMs) inevitably internalize substantial amounts of sensitive or private information during pre-training, while LLM unlearning aims to selectively erase specific knowledge to prevent privacy leakage with minimal loss of model utility. However, existing methods struggle to balance forget quality with utility, and typically incur substantial computational costs due to parameter fine-tuning. To address this, we propose Nullify, a training-free, non-destructive activation steering method for LLM unlearning. Nullify employs steering vectors during inference to redirect privacy-related activations away from their memorized answers, while satisfying a null-space constraint that leaves retained-query activations essentially unaffected to maintain utility. Evaluations on TOFU and MUSE show that Nullify matches or surpasses established baselines in forget quality while achieving near-lossless preservation of model utility. By avoiding weight updates entirely, Nullify serves as an efficient, plug-and-play inference-time intervention framework.
Wei Zhai, Xiang Liu, Qiang Huang +6
College of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, Fudan University · BEDI Cloud · School of Electrical and Information Engineering, Tianjin University +3