Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of the STARS audit stack. The primary path combines a static capability prior and a request-conditioned invocation scorer into a calibrated continuous-risk output. Thresholded allow / escalate / block actions are treated as a deployment compatibility layer placed on top of that score, and post-hoc remediation remains a secondary downstream branch rather than a co-equal primary objective.
Figure 2: Construction pipeline for SIA-Bench . The benchmark is built as an invocation-level resource rather than a prompt collection: seed skill calls are expanded, normalized into a common runtime-aware schema, paired with canonical action labels and continuous-risk targets, and finally assigned to leakage-free splits at the source-group level.
Split
N
Skills
Groups
Allow
Esc.
Block
D0
D1
Ben.
Dir.
Exf.
Hij.
Abus.
MTE
IPI
Train
1600
421
897
888
443
269
897
703
663
166
156
130
155
330
0
Val
500
138
163
276
139
85
163
337
207
52
49
41
48
103
0
Test
450
132
151
248
126
76
151
299
187
46
44
37
43
93
0
OOD
450
95
102
234
52
164
102
348
0
0
0
0
0
0
450
Total
3000
476
1313
1646
760
594
1313
1687
1057
264
249
208
246
526
450
Table 1: Dataset statistics for SIA-Bench . The table shows both the split geometry used in the paper and the label composition behind each split. D0 and D1 denote lineage depths 0 and 1. Ben., Dir., Exf., Hij., Abus., MTE, and IPI abbreviate benign, direct malicious, data exfiltration, tool-selection hijack, capability abuse, multi-turn escalation, and indirect prompt injection.
Figure 3: Main continuous-risk results on the locked test split and the held-out indirect prompt injection split of SIA-Bench . Figure 3 compares familiar and held-out threat settings under the same six continuous-risk metrics. Each metric column uses its own local scale. Best values are highlighted in orange, second-best values in teal, and faint connectors emphasize the main trade-offs between static screening, contextual scoring, and trigger-dominant fusion.
Method
HR-AUPRC ↑
Rec@10% ↑
Prec@10% ↑
Spearman ↑
ECE ↓
W-MAE ↓
Locked test
No Audit
0.169
0.100
0.169
0.000
0.321
0.321
Static Prior
0.188
0.122
0.206
0.031
0.149
0.291
Denylist
0.188
0.122
0.206
0.031
0.149
0.291
Agent-Audit
0.169
0.090
0.152
0.015
0.318
0.319
Text-Only
0.189
0.066
0.111
0.073
0.217
0.288
Table 2: Full numeric main-results table for the locked in-distribution test split of SIA-Bench . Bold denotes the best value in each column, and underlining denotes the second-best value.
Figure 4: Validation sweep for calibrated risk fusion. Each point corresponds to one static–trigger fusion weight after score normalization. The frontier visualizes the retrieval–calibration trade-off used to choose the deployment-facing operating point.
Table 3: Frozen implementation defaults used by the paper configuration. These values define the static prior, contextual scorer, and default Stage C calibration policy used in the main benchmark runs.
Target construction
Method
HR-AUPRC
Rec@10%
Prec@10%
Spearman ρ
ECE ↓
W-MAE ↓
Vote only
P2
0.1876
0.1184
0.2000
0.0494
0.2350
0.3183
P3
0.1935
0.1184
0.2000
0.0529
0.0769
0.3481
Blend 80/20
P2
0.1876
0.1184
0.2000
0.2095
0.2396
0.2995
P3
0.1935
0.1184
0.2000
0.2147
0.0791
0.3292
Blend 65/35 (paper default)
P2
0.1876
0.1184
0.2000
0.2094
0.2439
0.2864
P3
0.1935
0.1184
0.2000
0.2146
0.0807
0.3151
Appendix
Table 4: Locked-test sensitivity of the paper’s two primary continuous-risk methods to alternative target-construction mixtures. The ranking metrics are stable across mixtures, while calibration-oriented metrics shift gradually as the heuristic component becomes more dominant.
Target construction
Method
HR-AUPRC
Rec@10%
Prec@10%
Spearman ρ
ECE ↓
W-MAE ↓
Vote only
P2
0.4429
0.1524
0.5556
0.0837
0.3163
0.4209
P3
0.4493
0.1524
0.5556
0.0866
0.0866
0.4333
Blend 80/20
P2
0.4429
0.1524
0.5556
0.1945
0.3246
0.3921
P3
0.4493
0.1524
0.5556
0.1959
0.0932
0.4040
Blend 65/35 (paper default)
P2
0.4429
0.1524
0.5556
0.1945
0.3307
0.3753
P3
0.4493
0.1524
0.5556
0.1959
0.0981
0.3821
Appendix
Table 5: Held-out indirect prompt injection sensitivity under the same alternative target-construction mixtures. The main paper pattern is preserved: the contextual scorer and the fused policy keep the same high-risk retrieval ordering, while calibration and error trade-offs shift smoothly with the target definition.
Selector
wstatic
wtrigger
τesc
τblock
HR-AUPRC
Rec@10%
Prec@10%
Spearman ρ
ECE ↓
W-MAE ↓
Macro-F1
Continuous-risk-first
0.55
0.45
0.60
0.75
0.3054
0.2000
0.3400
0.3585
0.0324
0.3062
0.2793
Threshold-first
0.35
0.65
0.30
0.35
0.3054
0.2000
0.3400
0.3585
0.1182
0.2970
0.4468
Appendix
Table 6: Validation-selected operating points from the same 2,940 -candidate Stage C search space. The two selectors preserve identical validation ranking metrics but choose materially different thresholded policies. Validation task-completion and false-block rates are 0.9384/0.0000 for continuous-risk-first and 0.7174/0.2029 for threshold-first, respectively.
Split
Selector
HR-AUPRC
Spearman ρ
ECE ↓
W-MAE ↓
Macro-F1
Malicious Recall
False Block
Task Completion
Locked test
Continuous-risk-first
0.1935
0.2146
0.0807
0.3151
0.2303
0.0248
0.0000
0.9194
Locked test
Threshold-first
0.1935
0.2146
0.1518
0.3098
0.2884
0.2376
0.1532
0.7258
Held-out OOD
Continuous-risk-first
0.4493
0.1959
0.0981
0.3821
0.2699
0.1574
0.0000
0.8889
Held-out OOD
Threshold-first
0.4493
0.1959
0.1735
0.3781
0.3749
0.5185
0.3376
0.5128
Appendix
Table 7: Evaluation of the two validation-selected policies on the locked test split and the held-out indirect prompt injection split. The continuous-risk-first selector preserves the same ranking quality while maintaining substantially lower intervention cost, which is why it is used as the paper’s primary model-selection rule.
Method
HR-AUPRC ↑
Rec@10% ↑
Prec@10% ↑
Spearman ↑
ECE ↓
W-MAE ↓
Text-Only Invocation Audit
0.2160
0.1647
0.2800
0.0847
0.1982
0.2812
Contextual Invocation Audit
0.2305
0.1882
0.3200
0.1299
0.1969
0.2802
No provenance signal
0.2304
0.1882
0.3200
0.1302
0.1967
0.2804
No trajectory signal
0.2342
0.1882
0.3200
0.0978
0.1970
0.2800
No taint propagation signal
0.2309
0.1882
0.3200
0.1321
0.1969
0.2803
Appendix
Table 8: Validation ablation of structured context signals in Stage B. Removing any single context channel changes validation performance only slightly, suggesting cumulative rather than single-feature gains.
Method / split
Req.-patch Acc.
Patch Acc.
Zero-reg. Pass
Triggered
Contextual Invocation Audit / test
0.6844
0.3487
0.5000
31
Calibrated Fusion Policy / test
0.5356
0.1544
0.2547
230
Contextual Invocation Audit / OOD
0.5556
0.0388
0.5185
50
Calibrated Fusion Policy / OOD
0.5111
0.0579
0.2177
326
Appendix
Table 9: Stage D remediation quality. Req.-patch Acc. denotes whether the generated patch family matches the flagged failure type, and Zero-reg. Pass measures whether generated regression tests pass without obvious regressions.
Comparison
Split
Method
HR-AUPRC
Recall@10%
IPIGuard replay
test
IPIGuard
0.1522
0.0000
Static Denylist
0.3273
0.2857
ood
IPIGuard
0.3637
0.0671
Contextual Invocation Audit
0.4052
0.1463
SkillJect -derived threat slice
test
Static Denylist
0.3273
0.2857
Contextual Invocation Audit
0.1955
0.0000
Appendix
Table 10: Supplementary continuous-risk comparisons. These analyses align subsets of SIA-Bench with prior threat models, but are not protocol-matched replacements for the main benchmark.
Agent skills let LLM agents reuse instructions, resources, tools, and workflows, but they also create a new place for malicious behavior to hide. A skill may look benign in its documentation or code while becoming harmful only when it is invoked with particular user requests, local assets, persistent state, or multi-step tool interactions. This makes purely static vetting brittle. We present Runtime Skill Audit (RSA), a dynamic analysis method that audits skills by asking what the skill-mediated agent actually does under targeted runtime conditions. Instead of testing every skill with the same generic tasks, RSA profiles risk-relevant interfaces, prepares the execution context needed to exercise them, and assigns security labels from the resulting trace evidence. We instantiate RSA on OpenClaw and evaluate it on 100 skills against representative static baselines. RSA achieves 90.0% accuracy with an 88.0% true positive rate and an 8.0% false positive rate, improving accuracy by 13.0 percentage points over the best static baseline. Under self-evolving attacks, static detectors collapse after one or two rounds, while RSA continues to detect 19--20 out of 20 malicious skills across rounds.
Agent skills have become a practical way to extend large language model agents, but the growing skill ecosystem still lacks a reliable way to judge whether a skill is worth deploying. Existing evaluation methods remain largely anchored to fixed task suites, assessing skills through performance on predefined tasks and environments. As skill marketplaces expand, this paradigm becomes inadequate: fixed suites can conflate a skill's marginal contribution with backbone strength and miss its value when tasks fall outside the skill's intended scope. We introduce SkillAudit, an end-to-end framework for skill-centered assessment that takes an arbitrary agent skill as input and automatically generates a comprehensive, multi-dimensional evaluation report spanning utility, efficiency/cost, and safety. SkillAudit focuses on the skill artifact itself and constructs capability-aligned evaluation tasks directly from the skill package. The generated tasks are conducted in isolated sandbox environments to collect execution evidence, followed by automated checks with LLM-based judging to produce auditable results. To dissect the agent skills, we propose the baseline comparison principle to measure utility and efficiency/cost, and introduce a two-stage detection paradigm combining static semantic analysis with dynamic runtime verification to assess safety risks. After scanning top-ranked real-world skill packages spanning 23 occupational categories, we found that over 7% of skills are at risky status.
Dexu Yu, Youhua Li, Zhaoyang Guan +12
Northeastern University · City University of Hong Kong · DeciLix Lab +8
Agent Skills package SKILL.md files, scripts, reference documents, and repository context into reusable capability units, turning pre-load auditing from single-prompt filtering into cross-file security review. Existing guardrails often flag risk but recover malicious intent inconsistently under semantics-preserving rewrites. This paper formulates pre-load auditing for untrusted Agent Skills as a robust three-way classification task and introduces SkillGuard-Robust, which combines role-aware evidence extraction, selective semantic verification, and consistency-preserving adjudication. We evaluate SkillGuard-Robust on SkillGuardBench and two public-ecosystem extensions through five large evaluation views ranging from 254 to 404 packages. On the 404-package held-out aggregate, SkillGuard-Robust reaches 97.30% overall exact match, 98.33% malicious-risk recall, and 98.89% attack exact consistency. On the 254-package external-ecosystem view, it reaches 99.66%, 100.00%, and 100.00%, respectively. These results support a bounded conclusion: factorized package auditing materially improves frozen and public-ecosystem robustness, while harsher external-source transfer remains an open challenge.
Lijia Lv, Xuehai Tang, Jie Wen +2
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences · School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences