FEDBUD: Joint Incentive and Privacy Optimization for Resource-Constrained Federated Learning

In federated learning (FL), a center trains a shared model from updates that clients compute on their private data. Collecting and training on data is costly, so a strategic client may contribute little data and free-ride on the model trained by the others. We study mechanisms that incentivize data contribution and learn the model at the same time. Our first mechanism, UPBReD, updates the clients ' contributions and the model jointly, and converges at a geometric rate to a Nash equilibrium of the contribution game together with the welfare-maximizing model for those contributions. This equilibrium can involve under-contribution, so our second mechanism, 2P-UPBReD, adds budget-balanced transfers that make full contribution a dominant strategy, after which training converges to the optimal model; we also give conditions under which every client prefers to participate. Both mechanisms trust what clients report about the data they use and the gradients they compute. We show that no payment rule can reward unverifiable contributions unless something the center observes depends on the data actually used. Building on this, T-2P-UPBReD checks each client's reported contribution against the other clients ' realized valuations of the trained model, and prices gradient reports with a budget-balanced charge. It elicits truthful contribution reports, makes gradient reports approximately truthful, still reaches full contribution and the optimal model, and never runs a deficit. Experiments on CIFAR-10, FEMNIST, and Twitter show that 2P-UPBReD matches the welfare of FedAvg trained on all data, while strategic clients without incentives lower the welfare of the learned model.

Differentially private federated learning faces a fundamental tension: privacy protection mechanisms that safeguard client data simultaneously create quantifiable privacy costs that discourage participation, undermining the collaborative training process. Existing incentive mechanisms rely on unbiased client selection, forcing servers to compensate even the most privacy-sensitive clients ("privacy stragglers"), leading to systemic inefficiency and suboptimal resource allocation. We introduce JSAM (Joint client Selection and privacy compensAtion Mechanism), a Bayesian-optimal framework that simultaneously optimizes client selection probabilities and privacy compensation to maximize training effectiveness under budget constraints. Our approach transforms a complex 2N-dimensional optimization problem into an efficient three-dimensional formulation through novel theoretical characterization of optimal selection strategies. We prove that servers should preferentially select privacy-tolerant clients while excluding high-sensitivity participants, and uncover the counter-intuitive insight that clients with minimal privacy sensitivity may incur the highest cumulative costs due to frequent participation. Extensive evaluations on MNIST and CIFAR-10 demonstrate that JSAM achieves up to 15% improvement in test accuracy compared to existing unbiased selection mechanisms while maintaining cost efficiency across varying data heterogeneity levels.

Federated learning (FL) is a communication-efficient collaborative learning framework that enables model training across multiple agents with private local datasets. While the benefits of FL in improving global model performance are well established, individual agents may behave strategically, balancing the learning payoff against the cost of contributing their local data. Motivated by the need for FL frameworks that successfully retain participating agents, we propose an incentive-aware federated averaging method in which, at each communication round, clients transmit both their local model parameters and their updated training dataset sizes to the server. The dataset sizes are dynamically adjusted via a Nash equilibrium (NE)-seeking update rule that captures strategic data participation. We analyze the proposed method under convex and nonconvex global objective settings and establish performance guarantees for the resulting incentive-aware FL algorithm. Furthermore, under a merely monotone game setting, we consider a welfare loss minimization framework and establish asymptotic convergence of the scheme. Numerical experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets demonstrate that agents achieve competitive global model performance while converging to stable data participation strategies.