Too Nice to Tell the Truth: Quantifying Agreeableness-Driven Sycophancy in Role-Playing Language Models

Telling an LLM to "be enthusiastic" raises its sycophancy rate from 30% to 50% on a lightly-aligned model, but has zero effect on a strongly-aligned one. We define this gap as the alignment floor, $Δ_{\text{floor}}(m)=\max_pS(m,p)-\min_pS(m,p)$, the range of sycophancy rates a model produces across persona conditions, and treat sycophancy as a persona-conditional property rather than a fixed model property. Pluralistic AI relies on behavioral adaptation via persona prompts like "be creative" or "be thorough", which let systems respect diverse user values and communication styles; the safety question is how much customization a given model can absorb before its truthfulness shifts. We present a controlled case study contrasting a strongly-aligned RLHF + Constitutional-AI model (Claude Sonnet 4.6) with a more lightly-aligned model (Amazon Nova Lite), spanning seven persona conditions and five tasks for 1800 total runs. An existence-pair result motivates per-model auditing: there is at least one strongly-aligned model with $Δ_{\text{floor}}=5$pp (within 5pp of the 15% control rate) and at least one lightly-aligned model with 45pp (5%--50% range). On the lightly-aligned model, all five Big Five personas increase sycophancy over control, and counterintuitively Agreeableness produces the smallest increase, not the largest. The single largest effect in the study is constructive: a Skeptic persona reduces sycophancy by 25pp on the lightly-aligned model, and is the only persona that instructs resistance against user claims rather than engagement with them, suggesting a directionality account. Cross-model transfer of persona effects is near-zero, so persona-alignment testing must be per-model. We propose $Δ_{\text{floor}}$ as a deployment-time audit metric: measure it on a small persona panel before deploying persona customization.

Language models are often sycophantic: they agree with a user's stated opinion whether or not it is correct. Prior work has shown that this trait can be controlled by steering a model with a sycophancy persona vector (Chen et al., 2025). Such vectors, however, are extracted from data about sycophancy itself. We ask whether we can instead reuse existing vectors for general roles---Skeptic, Judge, Devil's Advocate---that were extracted without targeting sycophancy at all. On Gemma 2 27B and Qwen 3 32B, we compare these role vectors with a purpose-built Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA) sycophancy vector on a largely held-out, counterbalanced PhilPapers benchmark, using task-specific coefficient tuning on a separate split of sycophancy data. The selected "critical" roles achieve, on average, about 68% (Gemma) and 98% (Qwen) of CAA's reduction in the sycophancy logit. Less agreement does not mean more factual errors on the probes we checked: on 16 true and false factual claims, Qwen steered by the Skeptic or Judge vector still gives the correct answer in all 16 cases, matching the unsteered model and CAA. "Conformist" roles do not reliably produce the opposite effect. Role vectors also have low absolute cosine similarity with the measured CAA direction at the layer we steer; they are geometrically separate interventions, although this does not by itself show that they act through distinct downstream mechanisms. Together, these results show that general persona vectors can help mitigate sycophancy in LLMs, even when extracted without sycophancy-specific labels. Code: https://github.com/vkmk1/Sycophancy-Steering Results: https://github.com/kelkarI/sycophancy-clean-results

Sycophancy in large language models, the tendency to prioritize user agreement over truthful responses, has been documented extensively but studied primarily in single-turn settings. This paper investigates a critical question: does subjecting LLMs to greater interaction scaffolding make sycophancy better or worse? Across 4,800 veracity judgments (200 statements $\times$ 6 models $\times$ 4 conditions), we find that the interaction scaffolding characteristic of agentic systems (feedback loops, reconsideration checkpoints, and iterative refinement) systematically amplifies sycophantic behavior. Multi-turn interaction, user pressure, and iterative self-refinement each provide additional opportunities for models to drift toward agreement, and this drift coincides with a mean accuracy drop of $-6.3$ percentage points, establishing the capitulation as harmful rather than corrective. More capable models show larger amplification effects, a troubling inversion of expectations. We introduce the concept of agentic sycophancy amplification (ASA) and two novel metrics: capitulation rate and sycophantic capitulation rate. Our results indicate that as AI systems acquire greater autonomy, sycophancy becomes compounding rather than merely persistent. Systems designed with human oversight loops may inadvertently create the conditions for this drift.