LLMs for Qualitative Data Analysis Fail on Security-specificComments in Human Experiments

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, but their security reliability remains inconsistent across languages and prompting strategies. Existing prompt engineering improves functional correctness but rarely ensures consistent security outcomes. We introduce the Mitigation-Aware Chain-of-Thought (MA-CoT) framework, which embeds task-specific CWE mitigation guidance and language-aware safeguards to reduce recurring vulnerabilities in generated code. We evaluate MA-CoT across three LLMs (gpt-5, claude-4.5, gemini-2.5), three programming languages (C, Java, Python), and four prompting strategies (Vanilla, Zero-shot, CoT, MA-CoT) on a 200-task primary dataset, with external validation on LLMSecEval. Using static analysis with expert validation, MA-CoT reduces total security findings from 92 to 39 (57.6%) on the primary dataset and from 73 to 4 (94.5%) on LLMSecEval. High-severity findings (Blocker + Critical) drop from 90 to 39 (56.7%) and from 45 to 2 (95.6%), respectively. Across both datasets, MA-CoT is the only strategy that consistently improves security reliability; Zero-shot and CoT are less reliable and may increase vulnerability, especially in C. We further introduce a strict layered attribution of vulnerability drivers (language-core vs. stack layers) and show that residual risk concentrates in hardening-oriented patterns (e.g., OS- and toolchain-dependent), motivating secure-by-construction primitives alongside prompting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, yet their security behavior in realistic development workflows remains underexplored. Existing benchmarks often rely on explicitly specified security requirements, failing to capture real-world scenarios where prompts are frequently ambiguous or incomplete. In this paper, we adopt a developer-centric perspective and identify three representative risk scenarios that commonly lead to security vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code: Ambiguous Requirements, Under-Specified Operational Context, and Security--Functionality Conflict. Based on these scenarios, we construct a large-scale benchmark comprising 2,700 test cases, enabling fine-grained evaluation of LLM security under realistic conditions. Extensive evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that all models exhibit average vulnerability rates exceeding 56% across risk scenarios. We further demonstrate that security-aware prompting can substantially mitigate these risks, achieving up to 45% improvement.

In this paper, we show that LLM and human coding are observationally equivalent in terms of annotation quality: recent LLMs agree with expert coders at rates comparable to those observed among experts themselves. We demonstrate this through replications of text-classification tasks from 14 peer-reviewed political science studies, in which ten LLMs, three human experts, and 165 crowdsourced workers independently classify the same texts using identical codebooks. We find that this equivalence is driven by ambiguity in the texts and coding rules. When LLMs disagree with experts, experts are also more likely to disagree with one another, and clarifying coding rules reduces disagreement among both experts and sufficiently capable LLMs. Thus, there is little empirical basis for preferring human coding on the basis of annotation quality alone, while LLMs offer substantial advantages in speed and cost. We therefore argue that the central challenge of text annotation is no longer choosing between human and machine coders, but developing coding rules that minimize ambiguity and accounting for the ambiguity that remains. To this end, we propose using disagreement across LLMs to identify difficult cases and refine codebooks, and we develop ambiguity-aware bounds for downstream inference when a unique annotation cannot be defined for every text.