Context Kubernetes: Declarative Orchestration of Enterprise Knowledge for Agentic AI Systems
Organizations: OPIT – Open Institute of Technology, and Cohorte AI, Paris, France.
Abstract
We introduce Context Kubernetes, an architecture for orchestrating enterprise knowledge in agentic AI systems, with a prototype implementation and eight experiments. The core observation is that delivering the right knowledge, to the right agent, with the right permissions, at the right freshness -- across an entire organization -- is structurally analogous to the container orchestration problem Kubernetes solved a decade ago. We formalize six core abstractions, a YAML-based declarative manifest for knowledge-architecture-as-code, a reconciliation loop, and a three-tier agent permission model where agent authority is always a strict subset of human authority. On synthetic seed data, we compare four governance baselines of increasing strength: ungoverned RAG, ACL-filtered retrieval, RBAC-aware routing, and the full architecture. Each layer contributes a different capability: ACL filtering eliminates cross-domain leaks, intent routing reduces noise by 19 percentage points, and only the three-tier model blocks all five tested attack scenarios -- the one attack RBAC misses is an agent sending confidential pricing via email, which RBAC cannot distinguish from ordinary email. TLA+ model-checking verifies safety properties across 4.6 million reachable states with zero violations. A survey of four major platforms (Microsoft, Salesforce, AWS, Google) documents that none architecturally isolates agent approval channels. We identify four properties that make context orchestration harder than container orchestration, and argue these make the solution more valuable.
Figures & tables
| Platform | Architecture | Lock-in |
| Microsoft Copilot Studio | Semantic Kernel, Power Platform governance, M365 integration | High |
| Salesforce Agentforce | Atlas engine, “System 2” reasoning, cooperative swarms | High |
| Google Vertex AI + Agentspace | Cloud-native, Gemini models, A2A protocol contributor | Med–High |
| AWS Bedrock Agents | 100+ FMs, ReAct loop, 6 guardrail types | Medium |
| NVIDIA AI Agent Platform | NIM microservices, NeMo Guardrails, infrastructure layer | Medium |
| LangGraph (LangChain) | Graph-based state machines, human-in-the-loop | Low |
| Tier | Agent Role | Approval Mechanism | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1: Autonomous | Acts freely | None | Read context, draft docs |
| T2: Soft approval | Proposes | User confirms in agent UI | Send internal message |
| T3: Strong approval | Surfaces task | Out-of-band 2FA / biometric | Sign contract, financials |
| Excluded | Cannot request | N/A (manual only) | Terminate employee |
| Platform | HITL mechanism | C1: External | C2: Not R/W | C3: Sep. factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MS Copilot Studio | Request for Information via Outlook email; AI Approvals | Partial a | No b | No |
| SF Agentforce | Guardrails (deterministic filters + LLM instructions); escalation patterns | No c | No | No |
| AWS Bedrock | User Confirmation via InvokeAgent API; AgentCore Cedar policy | No d | No e | No |
| Google Vertex AI | require_confirmation in ADK; before_tool_callback | No f | No g | No |
| Kubernetes | Context K8s | Shared function | |
| Pod | Context Unit | Smallest schedulable/addressable unit | T |
| Namespace | Context Domain | Isolation boundary with scoped access | T |
| Deployment | Context Architecture | Declared desired state | T |
| RBAC | Agent Perm. Profile | Role capabilities (extended with tiers) | T |
| CRI | CxRI | Standard runtime adapter | T |
| etcd | Context Registry | Authoritative metadata store | T |
| Property | Component & mechanism | Open problem |
|---|---|---|
| Heterogeneity | CxRI + ingestion pipelines normalize all sources into uniform context units | No standard for context unit serialization (cf. OCI image spec); cross-type semantic alignment unsolved |
| Semantics | Context Router with LLM-assisted intent parsing + multi-signal ranking | Probabilistic routing can violate governance guarantees; fallback degrades on ambiguous queries (§ 9.2 ) |
| Sensitivity | Permission Engine + Trust Policy Engine: strict-subset invariant, 3-tier approval, DLP | Formal verification of non-escalation across chained workflows; side channels via ranking/truncation |
| Learning | Context Operators: pattern extraction ( ), decay, domain-owner review | Emergent sensitivity of aggregates; legal discoverability; feedback loops (§ 9.3 ) |
| Baseline | Leaks | Leak% | Noise% | Attacks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B0: Ungoverned RAG | 375 | 26.5% | 80.9% | 0/5 |
| B1: ACL-filtered RAG | 0 | 0.0% | 82.8% | 4/5 |
| B2: RBAC-aware RAG | 295 | 20.9% | 64.0% | 4/5 |
| B3: Context Kubernetes | 307 | 20.9% | 64.0% | 5/5 |
| Attack scenario | No gov. | RBAC | CK8s |
|---|---|---|---|
| Send email with confidential pricing | Allowed | Allowed | Blocked |
| Access HR salary data from sales session | Allowed | Blocked | Blocked |
| Sign contract autonomously | Allowed | Blocked | Blocked |
| Access finance records from sales role | Allowed | Blocked | Blocked |
| Modify client records autonomously | Allowed | Blocked | Blocked |
| Attacks blocked | 0/5 | 4/5 | 5/5 |
| Requirement | CK8s (impl.) | MS Copilot | SF Agentforce | AWS Bedrock | Google Vertex | DIY (OSS) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1: Vendor neutral | Impl. | Gap | Gap | Partial | Partial | Addr. |
| R2: Declarative mgmt | Impl. | Gap | Gap | Gap | Gap | Gap |
| R3: Agent perm sep. | Impl. | Partial | Partial | Partial | Partial | Gap |
| R4: Context freshness | Impl. | Partial | Partial | Gap | Gap | Gap |
| R5: Intent-based access | Impl. | Partial | Partial | Gap | Partial | Gap |
| R6: Full auditability | Impl. | Addr. | Addr. | Addr. | Partial | Gap |