Reckoning with the Political Economy of AI: Avoiding Decoys in Pursuit of Accountability

AI accountability at scale is an institutional problem: who can observe, verify, and change deployed systems. We develop a sequential political-economy model in which an AI vendor chooses auditability and substantive mitigation, a deployer monitors after adoption while facing switching costs, and enforcement depends on verifiable evidence. Anticipating the deployer's monitoring response, the vendor may stop at an observable procurement floor while mitigating below the social first best, producing a proxy-compliance equilibrium. We characterize the unique interior equilibrium and the corner in which harm is fully mitigated. Independent audit rights raise enforcement exposure directly; portability restores deployer leverage; incident reporting adds a regulator-visible evidence channel; and outcome-linked liability creates incentives that do not depend on vendor-controlled detection. The results explain why documentation and standardized evaluations can coexist with persistent post-deployment harms, and generate testable implications for monitoring, mitigation, and the gap between formal compliance and operational outcomes.

Every major framework for governing artificial intelligence presupposes an identifiable entity -- a developer, deployer, or operator -- who can be held responsible and compelled to comply. Decentralized AI (DeAI) dissolves this presupposition. We analyze DeAI as a six-layer decentralizing stack -- model, training, compute, harness, identity, and ownership -- and show how partial decentralization across layers compounds into what we call the \emph{governance vacuum}: a condition in which AI systems are consequential enough to require governance but lack the properties that existing frameworks presuppose in their targets. This vacuum takes two analytically distinct forms: an \emph{accountability gap}, where no addressable principal can be identified, and an \emph{incapacitation gap}, where even an identified principal cannot alter the running system. We demonstrate that these failures are not merely jurisdictional but defeat every presupposition of governance through normative address -- the communication of rules to a comprehending, responsive agent. Drawing on Lessig's modalities of regulation and Searle's distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, we argue for a shift in the locus of governance from policy to protocol, from normative address to architectural constraint. Protocol-based constitutive governance does not address the agents operating within a system but shapes the substrate that determines what kinds of actions are possible within it. We identify four ethical conditions -- legitimacy, contestability, transparency, and non-domination -- that such governance must satisfy to avoid degenerating into unaccountable technocratic power, and we argue that the central political challenge of governing AI in a decentralized world is reconstructing forms of democratic authorization for architectural choices that persist after the ordinary chain of policy has broken down.

Artificial intelligence is transforming scientific research - not merely as a more powerful instrument, but as an autonomous participant in the research cycle itself. This transition constitutes, in the most precise sense of the term, the industrialization of research: a shift from a craft model, in which knowledge, method, and judgment are embedded in the researcher, to a pipeline model, in which these steps are decomposed, automated, and supervised. The US Department of Energy's Genesis Mission is the most ambitious current instantiation of this shift, but the fundamental questions it raises extend far beyond any single program. This essay examines seven such questions: the erosion of the intergenerational transmission of scientific competence; the growing opacity of AI-generated theories; the collapse of peer evaluation under a flood of machine-generated output; the unproven capacity of AI for paradigm-shifting discovery; the capture of the scientific agenda by political and industrial actors; the compounding of systematic errors in closed-loop pipelines; and the structural bifurcation of the global research community into incommensurable tiers. These concerns do not constitute an argument against AI-driven science - whose demonstrated potential is real and significant. They constitute the conditions under which that potential can be responsibly pursued.