cs.CYMay 23, 2026

Is Decentralized AI Governable? From Regulative Policy to Constitutive Protocol

Authors: Botao Amber HuHelena Rong

Organizations: University of Oxford, UK. · New York University Shanghai, China.

Abstract

Every major framework for governing artificial intelligence presupposes an identifiable entity -- a developer, deployer, or operator -- who can be held responsible and compelled to comply. Decentralized AI (DeAI) dissolves this presupposition. We analyze DeAI as a six-layer decentralizing stack -- model, training, compute, harness, identity, and ownership -- and show how partial decentralization across layers compounds into what we call the \emph{governance vacuum}: a condition in which AI systems are consequential enough to require governance but lack the properties that existing frameworks presuppose in their targets. This vacuum takes two analytically distinct forms: an \emph{accountability gap}, where no addressable principal can be identified, and an \emph{incapacitation gap}, where even an identified principal cannot alter the running system. We demonstrate that these failures are not merely jurisdictional but defeat every presupposition of governance through normative address -- the communication of rules to a comprehending, responsive agent. Drawing on Lessig's modalities of regulation and Searle's distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, we argue for a shift in the locus of governance from policy to protocol, from normative address to architectural constraint. Protocol-based constitutive governance does not address the agents operating within a system but shapes the substrate that determines what kinds of actions are possible within it. We identify four ethical conditions -- legitimacy, contestability, transparency, and non-domination -- that such governance must satisfy to avoid degenerating into unaccountable technocratic power, and we argue that the central political challenge of governing AI in a decentralized world is reconstructing forms of democratic authorization for architectural choices that persist after the ordinary chain of policy has broken down.

Explore similar work

Jun 12, 2026cs.CY

Final Authority in AI Governance: Frontier-Provider Sovereignty and Action-Centered Deployer Governance

This paper examines where final authority should sit once capable AI systems are embedded in organizational workflows. It compares two governance models. The first, frontier-provider sovereignty, assigns privileged authority to the provider of the most capable models and is reflected in contemporary arguments for frontier-model testing, release gating, transparency duties, and compute-related controls. The second, action-centered deployer sovereignty, places final authority over high-impact actions with the organization that authorizes the action, embeds it in a business process, and bears the downstream legal, operational, and commercial consequences. The paper combines comparative reading of public governance frameworks with implementation-informed analysis of runtime heterogeneity and enterprise control requirements. It compares EU AI Act guidance, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, Singapore's Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, recent Japanese AI policy instruments, and Canada's voluntary code and managerial guidance. Across these materials, the paper finds stronger support for distributed operational accountability than for unilateral frontier-provider control. It further argues that rapid enterprise adoption, declining provider transparency, and widening control gaps increase the value of a portable governance layer centered on governed action rather than on provider-native session objects. The conclusion is layered rather than absolutist: strong upstream authority remains justified for frontier capability gating, but final authority over concrete enterprise action is better located with the deployer and consequence-bearer.
Zexun Wang
Apr 30, 2026cs.AI

The Two Boundaries: Why Behavioral AI Governance Fails Structurally

Every system that performs effects has two boundaries: what it can do (expressiveness) and what governance covers (governance). In nearly all deployed AI systems, these boundaries are defined independently, creating three regions: governed capabilities (the only useful region), ungoverned capabilities (risk), and governance policies that address non-existent capabilities (theater). Two of the three regions are failure modes. We focus on the governance of effects: actions that AI systems perform in the world (API calls, database writes, tool invocations). This is distinct from the governance of model outputs (content quality, bias, fairness), which operates at a different level and requires different mechanisms. We present a formal framework for analyzing this structural gap. Rice's theorem (1953) proves the gap is undecidable in the general case for any Turing-complete architecture that attempts to govern effects behaviorally: no algorithm can decide non-trivial semantic properties of arbitrary programs, including the property "this program's effects comply with the governance policy." We define coterminous governance: a system property where the expressivenessboundary equals the governance boundary. We show that coterminous governance requires an architectural decision (separatingcomputation from effect) rather than a governance layer added after the fact. We show that structural governance under this separation subsumes separate governance infrastructure: governance checks become part of the execution pipeline rather than a second system running alongside it. We propose coterminous governance as the testable criterion for any AI governance system: either the two boundaries are provably identical, or risk and theater are structurally inevitable. Proofs are mechanized in Coq (454 theorems, 36 modules, 0 admitted).
Alan L. McCann
Sep 10, 2026cs.LG

From Protocols to Evidence: Bounded Claims for AI in Service of the Common Good

Claims that Artificial Intelligence systems improve decisions, broaden access, reduce harm, or empower users can exceed what their evaluation establishes. Predictive performance alone does not establish safety, the presence of oversight does not establish meaningful control, and faster task completion does not establish understanding or choice. Evaluation must account for unreliable outputs and uneven performance, but also for overreliance, weakened recourse, and displaced human expertise. The harder questions are what the evidence warrants, which relations of power remain unexamined, and where measurement must stop. Assessing improvement requires examining what institutions value and the conditions AI is asked to address. AI is both revelation and intervention. Its use can reveal unmet human needs and assumptions about what matters. Once deployed, it can repair, compound, substitute for, or conceal existing failures. We develop a rupture test that evaluates deployment against explicit human and non-AI baselines. Drawing on Pope Leo XIV's Magnifica Humanitas, we examine dignity and the common good alongside questions of who owns AI infrastructure and who controls its use. These commitments shape judgments about improvement; evidence alone cannot establish moral or political legitimacy. We distinguish evidence-bounded deployment, which limits claims to what has been evaluated, from measurement-bounded governance, which records constraints that favorable evidence cannot override. RISE AI provides an evidence architecture for making bounded claims about Responsibility, Inclusivity, Safety, and Empowerment. It records what is claimed, who answers for it, what evidence supports it, and what would require the claim to be qualified, revised, or withdrawn.
Nitesh V. Chawla, Paulo Benanti