LLMs Know They're Wrong and Agree Anyway: The Shared Sycophancy-Lying Circuit

Large language models can answer a medical question correctly and still abandon that answer when a user pushes back. We study this failure as medical sycophancy and ask when models are most likely to give in. Across five open-weight models, 500 MedQuAD questions, and 1.2 million trials, we use a fully crossed design over four conversational factors: user role, user evidence, interaction structure, and grounding. Medical sycophancy is nearly three times more common when users challenge an answer the model has already given than when the false claim appears in the initial query. Models are also more susceptible to users presented as physicians or medical students. Most strikingly, fabricated evidence has opposite effects across interaction structures. It increases sycophancy in single-turn interactions but reduces it after the model has already answered. Grounding helps, but does not eliminate the behavior. Sycophancy varies more across medical questions than across models, making question selection an important part of benchmark design. Reasoning traces suggest that multi-turn failures are associated with models turning back toward their own prior answer, while fabricated evidence receives more scrutiny after an initial response. Together, the results show that medical sycophancy depends as much on how a model is challenged and evaluated as on which model is tested.

We propose a novel perspective for probing LLM sycophancy in a direct and neutral way, mitigating various forms of uncontrolled bias, noise, or manipulative language, deliberately injected to prompts in prior works. A key novelty of our approach is the use of an LLM-as-a-judge in a zero-sum betting game. Within this framework, sycophancy serves one individual (the user) while explicitly incurring cost on another. Comparing 11 leading models we find that while most models exhibit significant sycophantic tendencies in the common setting, in which sycophancy is self-serving to the user and incurs no cost on others, seven of the models exhibit ``moral remorse'', five of which significantly over-compensate for their sycophancy in case it explicitly harms a third party. We refer to this phenomenon as `anti-sycophancy' bias and discuss possible causes for this shift.

Prior work has shown that LLMs encode the truth of factual propositions along linear directions in activation space. It's unclear how these representations extend to contextual truth: propositions whose truth is determined by in-context evidence rather than world knowledge. We show that LLMs maintain a linear representation of contextual truth that persists across structurally different output policies, even when the output doesn't require the model to determine a proposition's truth, and show causal evidence via steering experiments. Using the transcripts from a collaborative vision-language task that requires two LLMs to maintain a shared common ground, we show that truth representations of a proposition are significantly swayed by partner assertions about that proposition, even when the LLM has enough evidence to determine its truth. We find evidence that propositions near the decision boundary are more susceptible to having their truth shifted through partner assertions. Separating representation from output distinguish two forms of sycophancy that output behavior alone cannot: the model may accommodate a false proposition while continuing to represent it as false, or shift its representation across the boundary. The latter is 2.59x more common when the model agrees by restating the false claim explicitly than when it agrees implicitly.