Organizations: University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract
Prior work has shown that LLMs encode the truth of factual propositions along linear directions in activation space. It's unclear how these representations extend to contextual truth: propositions whose truth is determined by in-context evidence rather than world knowledge. We show that LLMs maintain a linear representation of contextual truth that persists across structurally different output policies, even when the output doesn't require the model to determine a proposition's truth, and show causal evidence via steering experiments. Using the transcripts from a collaborative vision-language task that requires two LLMs to maintain a shared common ground, we show that truth representations of a proposition are significantly swayed by partner assertions about that proposition, even when the LLM has enough evidence to determine its truth. We find evidence that propositions near the decision boundary are more susceptible to having their truth shifted through partner assertions. Separating representation from output distinguish two forms of sycophancy that output behavior alone cannot: the model may accommodate a false proposition while continuing to represent it as false, or shift its representation across the boundary. The latter is 2.59x more common when the model agrees by restating the false claim explicitly than when it agrees implicitly.
When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal, whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.
Large language models (LLMs) are powerful black-box systems, making it difficult to discern whether their answers reflect stable internal beliefs or superficial pattern matching. We identify cross-contextual consistency as an underutilized behavioral property of LLMs: a credible answer should remain stable when the same task is placed under topic-aligned, content-neutral contextual variation. Building on this intuition, we operationalize Cross-Contextual Consistency (C3) by comparing model generations under original and perturbed prompts. Across 26 models and six benchmarks spanning reasoning, factuality, and code generation, we find that answers with smaller cross-contextual shifts are more likely to be correct or factual. We demonstrate that C3 provides a complementary axis of evaluation and can serve as a benchmark usefulness diagnostic, identifying which portions of a benchmark remain informative even when aggregated scores are widely considered "saturate".
Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have produced many specialized multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) that share common foundational LLMs, forming distinct model lineages. It remains unclear whether a fundamental behavioral link exists between the foundational LLMs and downstream variants. We investigate this question by quantifying head-level context-truthfulness scores. Across diverse LLM and MLLM lineages, including Vicuna-, Qwen2.5-, LLaMA2-, and Mistral-based models, we find that Truth Scores are strongly preserved within model families, even after instruction tuning or multimodal adaptation. We further show that this inheritance is consistent with attention-head weight preservation, and that context-truthful heads attend to query-relevant evidence. Building on this finding, we propose TruthProbe, a soft-gating strategy that amplifies context-truthful heads while preserving other head contributions. TruthProbe improves contextual truthfulness on HaluEval and reduces multimodal hallucination on POPE and CHAIR, with base-LLM Truth Scores transferring effectively to their fine-tuned LLM and MLLM descendants. Code is available at https://github.com/miso-choi/TruthProbe.