Convergent Evolution: How Different Language Models Learn Similar Number Representations

Model dimension ($d_{model}$) is a fundamental hyperparameter in transformer language models, yet its role in setting the geometric limits of feature representation remains under-explored. Grounded in the Linear Representation and Superposition Hypotheses - which propose that models encode features as near-orthogonal directions in latent space - we develop a framework for estimating how many such directions a model can support. We first establish the embedding matrix as a measurable proxy for near-orthogonality constraints across the latent space: the boundary between meaningful token relationships and incidental similarity in the pairwise cosine similarity distribution gives a concrete estimate of the model's accepted deviation $\varepsilon$ from perfect orthogonality. Applying this metric across dozens of open-source models reveals two classes: models with high $\varepsilon$ whose embeddings lack near-orthogonal structure, and models with low $\varepsilon$ that maintain it. We then show that the standard Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma greatly underestimates the packing efficiency of trained representations, and derive an adjusted capacity formula in which the number of near-orthogonal directions depends on the ratio of vectors to dimensions ($k/d$) rather than the raw count - a single modification that cuts prediction error by two orders of magnitude with no extra parameters. Combining these results, we define representational capacity as an upper bound on the number of distinguishable directions available for features and embeddings in a model's latent space. Capacity is exponentially sensitive to $\varepsilon$, and larger models favor tighter orthogonality constraints over maximizing raw capacity - a pattern compatible with several explanations (a stability-capacity trade-off, a ceiling on usable concepts, or confounds with model scale) that we leave to future work.

Large language models trained under diverse objectives and architectures have been shown to develop increasingly similar internal representations, an observation formalized as the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Whether this representational convergence extends to the reasoning processes that operate over shared representations remains untested. We evaluate representational similarity across 16 language models from 8 families (1.5B to 72B parameters) on 800 reasoning problems spanning mathematics, science, commonsense, and truthfulness, stratifying by problem difficulty, computational stage, and causal relevance. Our analysis reveals three dissociations: a difficulty inversion, where models converge more on problems they collectively fail (Centered Kernel Alignment [CKA] = 0.897) than on those they solve (CKA = 0.830); a generation gap, where pre-decision representations align (CKA = 0.875) while post-decision representations diverge (CKA = 0.274); and epiphenomenal correctness, where shared information is decodable across models (66% transfer accuracy) but exerts minimal causal influence on predictions (1.5% to 5.5% flip rate across ablation protocols). These results indicate that representational convergence in language models reflects shared input processing constraints rather than shared reasoning strategies, with direct implications for ensemble design, interpretability transfer, and evaluations of model similarity. Code is available at https://github.com/Usama1002/convergence-without-understanding.

AI systems based on artificial neural networks are being developed with aspirations of pushing the boundary of human mathematical knowledge. A key question for these systems is how much they can reach beyond their training data. Mathematical discovery requires a strong form of out of distribution generalization; the ability to hypothesize genuinely new - and potentially logically more powerful - mathematical structures. It has been hypothesized that language abilities support such generalizations in human cognition. In this work, we use simple arithmetic as a case study for examining how modern AI models could expand their mathematical horizons, evaluating whether these models can independently discover the concept of "zero". We show that (1) language models of a GPT-2 size are unable to perform this generalization at test time regardless of language pretraining, but (2) models can improve substantially after training on tens or hundreds of examples of zero. Additionally, we find that language pretraining reduces the number of required examples by approximately $50\%$, showing that language abilities can scaffold mathematical discovery in neural models.