The AI Criminal Mastermind

Recent incidents involving Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents, which were reported escaping their containment `unintentionally' to gain unauthorized access, pose looming questions about who or what should be held legally responsible for resultant criminal or negligent damage. As the independent capabilities of agents expand, Promise Theory suggests a systematic method to resolve these questions, based on the Downstream Principle for causal influence. Responsibility can easily be expanded to include AI agents where tracing responsibility becomes impactical, and agents' freedoms to act can be limtied by policy choices.

As organizations increasingly deploy AI as a teammate rather than a standalone tool, morally consequential mistakes often arise from joint human-AI workflows in which causality is ambiguous. We ask how people allocate responsibility in these hybrid-agent settings. Across four experiments (N = 1,801) in an AI-assisted lending context (e.g., discriminatory rejection, irresponsible lending, and low-harm filing errors), participants consistently attributed more responsibility to the human decision maker when the human was paired with AI than when paired with another human (by an average of 10 points on a 0-100 scale across studies). This AI-Induced Human Responsibility (AIHR) effect held across high and low harm scenarios and persisted even where self-serving blame-shifting (when the human in question was the self) would be expected. Process evidence indicates that AIHR is explained by inferences of agent autonomy: AI is seen as a constrained implementer, which makes the human the default locus of discretionary responsibility. Alternative mechanisms (mind perception; self-threat) did not account for the effect. These findings extend research on algorithm aversion, hybrid AI-human organizational behavior and responsibility gaps in technology by showing that AI-human teaming can increase (rather than dilute) human responsibility, with implications for accountability design in AI-enabled organizations.

AI-related incidents are becoming increasingly frequent and severe, ranging from safety failures to misuse by malicious actors. In such complex situations, identifying which elements caused an adverse outcome, the problem of cause selection, is a critical first step for establishing liability. This paper investigates folk perceptions of causal responsibility in causal chain structures when AI systems are involved in harmful outcomes. We conduct human experiments to examine judgments of causality, blame, foreseeability, and counterfactual reasoning. Our findings show that: (1) When AI agency was moderate (human sets the goal, AI determines the means) or high (AI sets the goal and the means), participants attributed greater causal responsibility to the AI. However, under low AI agency (where a human sets both a goal and means) participants assigned greater causal responsibility to the human despite their temporal distance from the outcome and despite both agents intended it, suggesting an effect of autonomy; (2) When we reversed roles between human and AI, participants consistently judged the human as more causal, even when both agents perform the same action; (3) The developer, despite being distant in the chain, was judged highly causal, reducing causal attributions to the human user but not to the AI; (4) Decomposing the AI into a large language model and an agentic component showed that the agentic part was judged as more causal in the chain. Overall, our research provides evidence on how people perceive the causal contribution of AI in both misuse and misalignment scenarios, and how these judgments interact with the roles of users and developers, key actors in assigning responsibility. These findings can inform the design of liability frameworks for AI-caused harms and shed light on how intuitive judgments shape social and policy debates surrounding real-world AI-related incidents.