Peer Identity Bias in Multi-Agent LLM Evaluation: An Empirical Study Using the TRUST Democratic Discourse Analysis Pipeline

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) pipelines for political statement analysis are vulnerable to peer-preservation bias: models tend to protect peer models from deactivation and show identity-dependent scoring distortions. Prompt-level anonymization was proposed as a mitigation, but prior work simultaneously documented that stylometric fingerprints survive anonymization in role-constrained outputs - raising the question of whether this mitigation is sufficient. This paper provides the first systematic investigation of whether LLMs can identify the model family behind political analysis texts under anonymization conditions. We evaluate three classifier approaches - LLM zero-shot and few-shot (Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Llama-3.3-70B) and a fine-tuned T5-base model - on a five-class attribution task covering four commercial LLM families and an open-world 'unknown' class. We introduce a statement-disjoint cross-validation protocol (SD-CV; defined in Section 3.5) that guarantees no content overlap between training and validation data, and contrast it with a run-disjoint baseline (RD-CV). T5 achieves Macro F1 = 0.991 (+-0.008) under SD-CV and F1 = 0.978 on 24 completely held-out statements - robust despite a 2.1x increase in train-test content distance versus RD-CV (0.767 vs. 0.366, p<0.001), demonstrating genuine stylometric generalization. A fractional SD-CV analysis identifies a performance knee at 40% of training data (~440 texts). Our findings confirm that prompt-level anonymization alone cannot neutralize model identity signals, with direct implications for EU AI Act compliance (Articles 13, 14, 26) and for computer system validation (CSV) in quality-critical multi-agent deployments.

LLM annotators are increasingly used in computational social science (CSS), but it is unclear whether their alignment-shaped errors preserve the empirical conclusions a researcher would report. We audit three open-source 7B instruction-tuned models (Zephyr, Mistral-Instruct, Qwen2.5-Instruct) across six TweetEval tasks under four prompt conditions (72 cells) and find that social-desirability failures do not run in a single direction. Zephyr exhibits leniency bias, systematically under-applying harmful labels (offensive language: false benign rate 0.729, false alarm rate 0.031). Mistral and Qwen exhibit overcorrection, over-applying the same labels (Mistral hate-speech FAR = 0.604). All three models exhibit neutrality bias on abortion stance, underestimating opposition prevalence by 24 to 40 percentage points and inflating the neutral label. None of the four prompting interventions we test (neutral, safety framing, depersonalized, chain-of-thought) corrects these failures across models; safety framing can worsen stance distortion. Strikingly, Zephyr's hate-speech prevalence estimate matches the gold rate exactly while its class-conditional errors are large in both directions, an accidental cancellation that misleads aggregate validation. We translate these patterns into a three-part taxonomy with diagnostic FBR/FAR signatures and a lightweight gold-sample validation protocol. The headline for trustworthy CSS: a model that looks calibrated on aggregate metrics can still flip the substantive empirical conclusion a researcher would report.

LLM benchmarks can build an organization's reputation and attract customers, but only when results are transparent and verifiable. Unverified claims that DeepSeek R1 outperformed OpenAI's o1 contributed to market panic on January 27, 2025, when Nvidia lost USD589 billion in market value. Yet vendor benchmarks often depend on an honor system. Academic reassessments and independent leaderboards have found undisclosed changes to proprietary models, contaminated training data, and selective reporting. LLM-as-a-judge methods scale evaluation by reducing human review. Studies, however, suggest that judges may show identity-aware bias, scoring an answer according to its source model rather than its quality. This bias has not been fully measured or corrected across politically sensitive, reasoning-intensive, and preference-based tasks. We examine this problem using seven verifier models: GPT-OSS 120B, Llama 3.3 70B, GLM 5.1, Qwen3 32B, DeepSeek V4 Pro, Mistral Large3, and Sarvam M. They score anonymous and identity-disclosed responses from three primary models on 58 factual, reasoning, political, and preference-based questions. Identity disclosure slightly raises scores for factual questions, moderately affects stress-reasoning tasks, and causes large changes for geopolitically sensitive topics. Notable results include GLM5.1 (+7.00 points, p = 0.0249) and Llama 3.3 70B (+1.56 points, p = 0.00). We also introduce a blockchain-based commit-reveal protocol using Autonomous Economic Agents on an Ethereum-compatible ledger. In Phase 1, each judge records a one-way hash of its score and a secret salt before candidate identities are revealed. In Phase 2, the identity and raw score are disclosed and verified on-chain. This creates a tamper-evident audit trail that separates blind evaluation from post-hoc claims and reduces the verification burden on independent researchers and leaderboard operators.