cs.CRApr 27, 2026

X-NegoBox: An Explainable Privacy-Budget Negotiation Framework for Secure Peer-to-Peer Energy Data Exchange

Authors: Poushali SenguptaSabita MaharjanFrank EliassenYan Zhang

Organizations: Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, Norway · *University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

Abstract

The decentralization of modern energy systems is transforming consumers into prosumers who continuously exchange data with aggregators, peers, and market operators. While such data is essential for peer-to-peer trading, demand response, and distributed forecasting, it can reveal sensitive household patterns and introduce privacy risks. Existing data sharing mechanisms rely on fixed policies or predefined differential privacy budgets, limiting their ability to adapt to variations in reliability, data sensitivity, and request purpose. As a result, prosumers rarely receive explanations for why a request is accepted, rejected, or modified, reducing trust and participation. To address these limitations, we propose X-NegoBox, an explainable negotiation framework for adaptive privacy budgeting and transparent decision making. Each prosumer data is managed locally within a private DataBox, where raw data remain confined. Incoming requests are processed by an Autonomous Privacy Budget Negotiation Protocol (APBNP), which determines an appropriate privacy budget based on trust, feature sensitivity, declared purpose, historical behavior, and risk-aware pricing. When needed, APBNP generates privacy-preserving counter-offers, such as reduced resolution or duration. An Explainable Agreement Layer (X-Contract) produces human- and machine-readable justifications for each decision. After agreement, requester code executes locally in a sandbox, and only sanitized outputs are shared. Experiments on realistic energy market settings show reduced privacy leakage, higher acceptance rates, and improved interpretability.

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