Threat-Oriented Digital Twinning for Security Evaluation of Autonomous Platforms

Autonomous driving systems require reliable safety validation before real-world deployment. However, large-scale road testing is costly, difffcult to reproduce, and inefffcient for exposing rare safety-critical scenarios. Conventional simulation improves repeatability, but an offfine simulator alone cannot continuously connect physical trafffc states, virtual reconstruction, algorithm evaluation, and scenario evolution. This paper proposes a risk-ffeld enhanced closed-loop digital twin framework for autonomous driving safety validation. The framework integrates physical data acquisition, data synchronization, virtual twin reconstruction, risk-aware scenario generation, autonomous driving algorithm evaluation, and safety analysis. A driving risk ffeld is introduced as a uniffed intermediate representation to describe obstacle, lane-departure, road-boundary, time-to-collision, and comfort-related risks around the ego vehicle. The risk ffeld ranks high-risk scenarios in the digital twin scenario library and provides dense safety guidance for reinforcement learning-based driving policies. A simulation-style evaluation protocol is designed to compare conventional reinforcement learning baselines, risk-penalty baselines, and the proposed risk-ffeld guided method. The study indicates that embedding explicit risk structure into digital twins can make autonomous driving validation more targeted, interpretable, and reusable, while its practical effectiveness remains bounded by model ffdelity, risk calibration, and sim-to-real transfer.

Autonomous agent frameworks built upon large language models (LLMs) are evolving into complex, tool-integrated, and continuously operating systems, introducing security risks beyond traditional prompt-level vulnerabilities. As this paradigm is still at an early stage of development, a timely and systematic understanding of its security implications is increasingly important. Although a growing body of work has examined different attack surfaces and defense problems in agent systems, existing studies remain scattered across individual aspects of agent security, and there is still a lack of a layered review on this topic. To address this gap, this survey presents a layered review of security risks and defense strategies in autonomous agent frameworks, with OpenClaw as a case study. We organize the analysis into four security-relevant layers: the context and instruction layer, the tool and action layer, the state and persistence layer, and the ecosystem and automation layer. For each layer, we summarize its functional role, representative security risks, and corresponding defense strategies. Based on this layered analysis, we further identify that threats in autonomous agent frameworks may propagate across layers, from manipulated inputs to unsafe actions, persistent state contamination, and broader ecosystem-level impact. Finally, we highlight potential key challenges, including research imbalance across layers, the lack of long-horizon evaluation, and weak ecosystem trust models, and outline future directions toward more systematic and integrated defenses.

Autonomous AI agents deployed on platforms such as OpenClaw face prompt injection, memory poisoning, supply-chain attacks, and social engineering, yet existing defences address only the platform perimeter, leaving the agent's own threat judgement entirely untrained. We present ClawdGo, a framework for endogenous security awareness training: we teach the agent to recognise and reason about threats from the inside, at inference time, with no model modification. Four contributions are introduced: TLDT (Three-Layer Domain Taxonomy) organises 12 trainable dimensions across Self-Defence, Owner-Protection, and Enterprise-Security layers; ASAT (Autonomous Security Awareness Training) is a self-play loop where the agent alternates attacker, defender, and evaluator roles under weakest-first curriculum scheduling; CSMA (Cross-Session Memory Accumulation) compounds skill gains via a four-layer persistent memory architecture and Axiom Crystallisation Promotion (ACP); and SACP (Security Awareness Calibration Problem) formalises the precision-recall tradeoff introduced by endogenous training. Live experiments show weakest-first ASAT raises average TLDT score from 80.9 to 96.9 over 16 sessions, outperforming uniform-random scheduling by 6.5 points and covering 11 of 12 dimensions. CSMA retains the full gain across sessions; cold-start ablation recovers only 2.4 points, leaving a 13.6-point gap. E-mode generates 32 TLDT-conformant scenarios covering all 12 dimensions. SACP is observed when a heavily trained agent classifies a legitimate capability assessment as prompt injection (30/160).