cs.CLApr 2, 2026

Anchored Confabulation: Partial Evidence Non-Monotonically Amplifies Confident Hallucination in LLMs

Authors: Ashish Balkishan Lathkar

Organizations: M.S. Data Science, Florida State University

Abstract

We identify a previously unknown calibration property of large language models: providing one confirmed intermediate fact toward a multi-step reasoning chain increases the model's confident-wrong-answer rate before full evidence eliminates it. We call this anchored confabulation: a partial anchor commits the model to confident parametric completion of remaining reasoning steps. We formalize it as Parametric Hallucination Confidence (PHC) and establish it across six lines of evidence including a causal injection experiment (PHC 0.613 to 0.656 to 0.595 to 0.536, N=160) and capability scaling across five model families (Spearman rho=0.900, p=0.037). The Anchoring Threshold Law k*(n)=floor(n/3) predicts PHC amplification by hop depth with four confirmed predictions. Applied to RAG routing, a LearnedRouter exploiting PHC closes 81.1% of the oracle performance gap (macro F1=0.426, p<1e-6) on 1,800 queries across four benchmarks with no model fine-tuning and 50x fewer labels than prior RL-based work. An epistemic humility prompt reduces the PHC spike by -0.118; explicit self-rating (PHC=0.684, p<0.001) outperforms lexical confidence as a routing signal.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables44 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Sep 26, 2026

The Alignment Paradox: How Post-Training Amplifies Confident Hallucinations in Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) can produce factually incorrect answers with high confidence, undermining their reliability and limiting the effectiveness of uncertainty-based error detection. While prior research attributes confident hallucinations to factors such as missing knowledge in training data, reasoning errors, or stochastic decoding, we uncover that post-training alignment itself is a primary driver of these errors, a phenomenon we call the Alignment Paradox. Across five model families evaluated on factual benchmarks, unaligned base models produce few high-confidence errors on long-tail factual queries, whereas instruction-tuned models multiply high-confidence errors (p≥0.95p \ge 0.95) by more than an order of magnitude (10×\times to 35×\times). Layer-wise probing with the Logit Lens reveals that this overconfidence emerges in late layers, where wrong-answer margins expand past 4.0 points after remaining near zero across early and intermediate layers. These findings motivate limiting margin growth during post-training. We implement this principle through an entropy-dependent margin bound in direct preference optimization (DPO). In multi-epoch experiments with Mistral-7B, the bounded objective reduces high-confidence errors by up to 35.3% relative to standard DPO while maintaining performance on evaluated general reasoning benchmarks. These results show that bounded margins mitigate confident hallucinations during post-training.
Mar 1, 2026

Self-Anchoring Calibration Drift in Large Language Models: How Multi-Turn Conversations Reshape Model Confidence

We introduce Self-Anchoring Calibration Drift (SACD), a hypothesized tendency for large language models (LLMs) to show systematic changes in expressed confidence when building iteratively on their own prior outputs across multi-turn conversations. We report an empirical study comparing three frontier models -- Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.2 -- across 150 questions spanning factual, technical, and open-ended domains, using three conditions: single-turn baseline (A), multi-turn self-anchoring (B), and independent repetition control (C). Results reveal a complex, model-heterogeneous pattern that partially diverges from pre-registered hypotheses. Claude Sonnet 4.6 exhibited significant decreasing confidence under self-anchoring (mean CDS = -0.032, t(14) = -2.43, p = .029, d = -0.627), while also showing significant calibration error drift (F(4,56) = 22.77, p < .001, eta^2 = .791). GPT-5.2 showed the opposite pattern in open-ended domains (mean CDS = +0.026) with significant ECE escalation by Turn 5. Gemini 3.1 Pro showed no significant CDS (t(14) = 0.38, p = .710), but its Condition C data reveals a striking ECE pattern: without self-anchoring, Gemini's calibration error drops from .327 to near zero across repetitions, whereas self-anchoring holds ECE flat at approximately .333 -- indicating that SACD can manifest as suppression of natural calibration improvement rather than ac
Apr 24, 2026

Calibration Drift Under Reasoning: How Chain-of-Thought Budgets Induce Overconfidence in Large Language Models

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to express calibrated uncertainty is important for safe deployment. Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is widely used to improve accuracy and reliability, but its effect on calibration is not fully understood. We show that this picture is incomplete: in some settings, increasing the reasoning budget beyond a task-specific threshold can cause models to become systematically overconfident, assigning high confidence to incorrect answers. We call this phenomenon Calibration Drift Under Reasoning (CDUR) and study it both theoretically and empirically. We define reasoning budget B and analyze conditions under which Expected Calibration Error ECE(B) follows a non-monotonic pattern: it first decreases as reasoning corrects errors, then increases as longer reasoning produces internally consistent but incorrect explanations. We propose a Hypothesis Lock-In model based on autoregressive generation to explain this behavior. We evaluate Llama-3.1-8B and Llama-3.3-70B on 47 reasoning-trap questions across four reasoning budgets and three seeds (1,368 API calls; 574 valid responses). The 8B model shows non-monotonic calibration behavior, while results for the 70B model are limited to baseline evaluation and are inconclusive for budget-dependent effects. We introduce CABStop, a calibration-aware stopping rule that halts reasoning when confidence diverges from an auxiliary accuracy estimate. These results suggest that increasing reasoning depth does not always improve reliability and should be monitored carefully.