Impact of Task Phrasing on Presumptions in Large Language Models
Authors: Kenneth J. K. Ong
Organizations: AI.DA STC · ST Engineering, Singapore
Abstract
Concerns with the safety and reliability of applying large-language models (LLMs) in unpredictable real-world applications motivate this study, which examines how task phrasing can lead to presumptions in LLMs, making it difficult for them to adapt when the task deviates from these assumptions. We investigated the impact of these presumptions on the performance of LLMs using the iterated prisoner's dilemma as a case study. Our experiments reveal that LLMs are susceptible to presumptions when making decisions even with reasoning steps. However, when the task phrasing was neutral, the models demonstrated logical reasoning without much presumptions. These findings highlight the importance of proper task phrasing to reduce the risk of presumptions in LLMs.
Large language models (LLMs) are widely used in decision-making across diverse domains. Ensuring the generation of safe and reliable responses is critical for the effective deployment of LLM-based applications, particularly in high-stakes domains such as healthcare and finance. Most of these applications typically use carefully crafted prompts to guide response generation; however, the relationship between prompts and the reliability of LLM-generated responses is not yet fully understood. To address this gap, we propose a novel prompt-response concept model that explains the relationship between the amount of task-relevant information (informativeness) provided in the prompt and the LLM-generated response uncertainty by identifying four sources of response uncertainty: prompt underspecification, model quality, task variability, and semantic redundancy. We prove that response uncertainty decreases as prompt informativeness or model quality increases, mirroring the behavior of epistemic uncertainty in probabilistic models. Our experimental results on real-world datasets further validate our proposed model and corroborate the theoretical results.
It is well established that large language models (LLMs) are sensitive to prompt framing, reflecting patterns in their training data or prior prompts. In this study, we investigate the extent to which LLMs reinforce users biases expressed in the prompts and examine the boundary between implicit framing effects and explicit prompt manipulation. Specifically, we evaluate how susceptible LLMs are to direct and suggestive prompts that encourage models to support or challenge particular positions. We evaluate six LLMs using 160 distinct prompts spanning ten topics across opinion-based and factual domains. The prompts systematically vary in prompting strategy, support versus challenge instructions, prompt polarity, users' expressed beliefs, and topic domain, spanning both opinion-based and factual questions. Our results show that LLMs systematically adapt their responses to align with prompt framing, even in factual contexts. This suggests that prompt framing can outweigh factual consistency in model responses. Overall, our findings delineate the extent and boundaries of LLM manipulability. Furthermore, the results imply that LLMs can reinforce subtle user biases and are susceptible to explicit prompt manipulation even in domains where responses should remain factually stable.
Presupposition projection in conditionals is central to theories of meaning and pragmatics, yet it remains largely unevaluated in large language models. We address this gap through a parallel behavioral study comparing human judgments and LLM predictions on a normed dataset of conditional sentences that controls the relation between the antecedent and the projected presupposition. We collect likelihood ratings from 120 participants and four LLMs under matched contextual conditions. Results show that humans integrate probabilistic and pragmatic cues in their judgment, whereas LLMs show variable alignment with human patterns. Using a linguistically motivated checklist within an LLM-as-a-Judge framework, we further evaluate model reasoning. We observe models that best match human ratings often lack coherent pragmatic reasoning, while models with stronger reasoning produce less human-like judgments. These findings suggest that LLMs' performance on such tasks may result from surface pattern matching rather than pragmatic competence. Our findings highlight the importance of benchmarks grounded in linguistic theory for comparing humans and models.