cs.CRMay 2, 2026

Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget

Authors: Yi YangJinyang HuangBinbin LiuFeng-Qi CuiXiaokang ZhouZhi LiuJie ZhangMeng Li

Organizations: School of Computer Science and Information Engineering Hefei University of Technology Hefei, Anhui, China · School of Information Science and Technology University of Science and Technology of China Hefei, Anhui, China · Faculty of Business Data Science Kansai University Japan · RIKEN Center for Advanced Intelligence Project RIKEN Tokyo, Japan · Department of Computer and Network Engineering The University of Electro-Communications Tokyo, Japan · CFAR and IHPC Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) Singapore, Singapore

Abstract

Backdoor attacks threaten the deep learning supply chain by poisoning a small fraction of the training data so that a model behaves normally on clean inputs but misclassifies trigger-carrying inputs to an attacker-chosen target class. Clean-label backdoor attacks are especially dangerous because poisoned samples remain label-consistent and are therefore harder to detect. Yet existing clean-label attacks typically rely on expensive optimization, surrogate-model training, or nontrivial data access. We present Checkerboard, a theoretically grounded, learning-free clean-label backdoor attack that is effective, efficient, and simple to implement. From a linear separability formulation, we derive a checkerboard trigger in closed form, removing the need for surrogate-model training and trigger optimization. For texture-rich datasets, we introduce Complexity-driven Sample Selection, which uses only target-class data to improve trigger-to-background contrast by selecting low-complexity images for poisoning. Across four benchmark datasets, Checkerboard outperforms 8 baseline attacks and achieves state-of-the-art performance under low poisoning budgets. For example, on CIFAR-10, under a trigger perturbation budget of 10/25510/255, poisoning 20 training samples achieves 99.99%99.99\% Attack Success Rate (ASR). On ImageNet-100, a poisoning rate of only 0.46%0.46\% yields over 94%94\% ASR without degrading clean accuracy. The proposed attack also remains effective against state-of-the-art backdoor defenses and shows strong resistance to adaptive defenses.

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