HAAS: A Policy-Aware Framework for Adaptive Task Allocation Between Humans and Artificial Intelligence Systems
Authors: Vicente Pelechano, Antoni Mestre, Manoli Albert, Miriam Gil
Organizations: aValencian Research Institute for Artificial Intelligence (VRAIN), Universitat Politècnica de València, Camino de Vera s/n, Valencia, Spain · bDepartament d’Informàtica, Universitat de València, Valencia, Spain
Abstract
Deciding how to distribute work between humans and AI systems is a central challenge in organisational design. Most approaches treat this as a binary choice, yet the operational reality is richer: humans and AI routinely share tasks or take complementary roles depending on context, fatigue, and the stakes involved. Governing that distribution -- balancing efficiency, oversight, and human capability -- remains an open problem. This paper presents Human-AI Adaptive Symbiosis (HAAS), an implemented framework for adaptive task allocation in software engineering and manufacturing. HAAS combines two coupled components: a rule-based expert system that enforces governance constraints before any learning occurs, and a contextual-bandit learner that selects among feasible collaboration modes from outcome feedback. Task-agent fit is represented through five auditable cognitive dimensions and a five-mode autonomy spectrum -- from human-only to fully autonomous -- embedded in a reproducible benchmark spanning both domains. Three empirical findings emerge. First, governance is not a binary switch but a tunable design variable: tighter constraints predictably convert autonomous AI assignments into supervised collaborations, with domain-specific costs and benefits. Second, in manufacturing, stronger governance can improve operational performance and reduce fatigue simultaneously -- a workload-buffering effect that contradicts the usual framing of governance as pure overhead. Third, no single governance setting dominates across all contexts; moderate governance becomes increasingly competitive as the learner accumulates experience within the governed action space. Together, these findings position HAAS as a pre-deployment workbench for comparing and inspecting human--AI allocation policies before organisational commitment.
We present HAAS Studio, a simulation and decision-support tool for policy-aware adaptive task allocation between humans and AI systems. HAAS Studio turns the HAAS framework into an interactive environment for asking a practical deployment question: before introducing AI into a workflow, how can a team compare allocation strategies, inspect governance tradeoffs, and derive a defensible task-level operating model? The tool combines a five-dimensional cognitive representation of subtasks, a five-mode collaboration spectrum, adaptive allocation with multi-armed bandits (UCB1, Discounted UCB, LinUCB, and Thompson Sampling), oracle counterfactual regret analysis, contract-based governance with four independent guards, and a multi-criteria decision-support layer that separates efficient strategies from deployable options. It also models human-AI coevolution across six layers, monitors deskilling risk through sliding-window exposure metrics and benchmark runners, and supports persistent worker modeling through Live Twin and Planning modules. Three domain packs are included: software engineering, manufacturing, and healthcare. Each provides a task catalog, worker profiles, and KPI vocabulary, while the architecture allows new domains to be added without modifying the simulation core. The release includes 16 company profiles and six governance benchmark suites. This paper focuses on the tool, including its modeling assumptions, layered architecture, interaction workflow, built-in evidence assets, task-oriented recipes, case-study protocols, and a compact reproducible demonstration snapshot. A decision-guidance layer translates benchmark outputs into deployment decisions through structured patterns, heuristics, and a decision matrix.
AI systems increasingly delegate decisions to specialized models, evaluators, tools, and supervisory controllers. The central AI problem is no longer only model accuracy, but uncertainty-aware governance: how much autonomy to grant, which evidence should calibrate trust, what performance ceiling a delegated AI system can sustain, and when human intervention becomes necessary. We propose the Minimum Sufficient Oversight Principle (MSO), a variational principle for principled autonomy delegation: minimize governance burden on the Fisher information manifold subject to a delivery constraint. The resulting Euler-Lagrange solution yields a water-filling allocation of governed delegation across the task space. Building on a revealed-action governed delegation channel model, we prove a capacity theorem for stationary symbolwise review policies, derive a local first-order approximation relating workflow complexity to quality degradation, and give a drift-dominated autonomy-time scaling law linking intervention timing to effective capacity, complexity, and drift. Within this framework, masking appears as a structural AI-governance pathology: corrected performance can hide the competence signal needed to calibrate trust. Synthetic simulations and a semi-real reconstructed workflow support design prescriptions including upstream-first correction, sensitivity-based intervention, and explicit feasibility checks before autonomy is expanded. The result is a computable framework for uncertainty, planning, and oversight in delegated AI systems. A companion Python package is available at https://github.com/crbazevedo/delegation-lab.
Automated AI agents are increasingly capable, yet many scientific and professional tasks require human judgment and contextual expertise. We use simulated shared-workspace human-AI teams as a controlled testbed for studying how collaboration structure shapes team behavior. Using the Collaborative Gym environment with tasks from DiscoveryBench, we vary team compositions and collaboration structures across 1,482 sessions. We find that adding additional collaborators can lower performance when coordination structure is absent. We then evaluate collaboration scaffolding that combines shared group memory with simulated human-in-the-loop (HITL) gates, where selected actions require approval from a designated simulated participant. This scaffolding improves performance, most clearly in three-person teams, with clearer responsibility signals and stronger routing of expertise to team actions. Overall, our results suggest that coordination structure is central to whether available capability improves team outcomes.