Abstract
Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look monotone -- more votes help above the majority threshold and hurt below it. We show that this picture is fundamentally incomplete. Under the de Finetti representation for exchangeable repeated correctness, voting is governed by a latent distribution of per-example correctness probabilities. Even simple latent mixtures can generate sharply different voting curves, including nonmonotone behavior and, in an explicit construction, infinitely many trend changes. The full latent law determines the curve, but the curve does not determine the law. The exact object recovered by voting is a signed voting signature: at each binomial variance scale, it records excess latent mass above rather than below the majority threshold. Our main theorem proves that the complete odd-budget curve and this signature are equivalent: the curve increments are signed Hausdorff moments, and the full curve recovers the signature uniquely. This viewpoint explains shape phenomena, branch-symmetric nonidentifiability, realizability, variation, and endpoint rates. It also separates estimation regimes: direct per-example success-probability information targets the full signature, whereas fixed-depth grouped labels reveal only a finite prefix.
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Aug 7, 2026cs.AI
LLM judge panels are a standard evaluation tool, but prior work reports highly correlated panel errors: nine judges provide roughly the effective information of two independent ones, and aggregation closes only a small fraction of the gap. A natural remedy--a signal from a different evidence source, e.g., executing a test suite--produced no distinguishable change in the panel's effective-vote count at scale (-0.04, 95% CI [-0.10, +0.02]). Aggregate dependence and conditional decision utility are different questions. Elementary majority arithmetic fixes the affected set for single-ballot substitution: only decisions with a one-vote margin can change. The empirical question is whether panel error rates rise and useful substitutions concentrate there. They do: the entire accuracy gain concentrates on these pivotal queries, where it is large (+10.4 to +23.3 percentage points across three headline configurations), and is exactly zero elsewhere. We confirm the pattern across three code benchmarks and four panel sizes (a 9-judge extension and 56 dependent subsampling checks, gain +6.5 to +16.1 percentage points). On HumanEval+/MBPP+, a majority-side replacement rule raises overall accuracy from 82.44% to 85.62% while invoking the signal on 16.2% of queries; signal-only remains stronger at 87.60%. Thus population-level dependence diagnostics and margin-stratified utility are complementary, and the affected-set characterization yields a call-reduction rule for any specified single-ballot substitution policy.
Yang Shu
Jun 22, 2026econ.TH
This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called
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Lawrence S. Moss, Arthur Paul Pedersen
May 5, 2026cs.LG
Repeated sampling is a standard way to spend test-time compute, but its benefit is controlled by the latent distribution of correctness across examples, not by one-call accuracy alone. We study the binary correctness layer of repeated LLM inference under conditional-i.i.d. calls. One labeled call identifies the mean latent success probability; two labeled calls identify its second moment and hence the same-example correctness correlation that separates stable errors from recoverable call-level randomness. From these two moments, every fixed majority-vote budget has a sharp distribution-free two-call interval. The key technical reduction is that the infinite-dimensional moment problem has three-atom extremizers and quadratic dual certificates for every finite budget, so the bounds are exact rather than discretized or parametric. The first useful budget, three votes, has a closed form, width at most
1/8, and a certified-improvement criterion. The infinite-vote endpoint is the limit of majority voting as the number of calls tends to infinity; it is also sharply bounded, but remains threshold-sensitive because it depends on latent mass around
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