Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables large language models (LLMs) to leverage external knowledge, but also exposes valuable RAG databases to leakage attacks. As RAG systems grow more complex and LLMs exhibit stronger instruction-following capabilities, existing studies fall short of systematically assessing RAG leakage risks. We present LeakDojo, a configurable framework for controlled evaluation of RAG leakage. Using LeakDojo, we benchmark six existing attacks across fourteen LLMs, four datasets, and diverse RAG systems. Our study reveals that (1) query generation and adversarial instructions contribute independently to leakage, with overall leakage well approximated by their product; (2) stronger instruction-following capability correlates with higher leakage risk; and (3) improvements in RAG faithfulness can introduce increased leakage risk. These findings provide actionable insights for understanding and mitigating RAG leakage in practice. Our codebase is available at https://github.com/yeasen-z/LeakDojo.
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for improving the quality of generated contents of Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding responses in external knowledge, thus reducing hallucinations and factual errors. However, recent studies have highlighted a critical vulnerability: adversaries can exploit the retrieval process to extract personally identifiable information (PII) from the underlying corpus. To mitigate this risk, we propose a novel defense, RAG-CT, that identifies malicious queries by analyzing their entropy and margin distributions and using a score-based detection method. Extensive experiments with four state-of-the-art attack strategies and four defense baselines on two datasets show that our approach significantly reduces PII leakage while outperforming existing defenses. This work provides a lightweight yet effective mechanism to protect RAG systems against PII leakage without requiring modifications to the underlying LLM or retriever.
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is widely used to augment large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge. However, many benchmark datasets, designed to test RAG performance, comprise many questions that can already be answered from an LLM's parametric memory. This leads to unreliable evaluation. We refer to this phenomenon as knowledge leakage: cases where RAG tasks are solvable without retrieval. This issue worsens over time due to benchmark aging. As benchmarks are reused for training, their contents are increasingly absorbed into model parameters, making them less effective for evaluating retrieval. We introduce SeedRG, a semi-synthetic benchmark generation pipeline that mitigates knowledge leakage and addresses the issue of benchmark aging. Starting from a seed benchmark dataset, SeedRG extracts a reasoning graph from question-context pairs to capture their underlying reasoning structure, and then generates new examples via type-constrained entity replacement. This process produces structurally similar but novel instances that are unlikely to exist in the model's parametric knowledge, while preserving the original reasoning patterns. To ensure quality, we incorporate two verification steps: (1) a reasoning-graph consistency check to maintain task difficulty, and (2) a knowledge-leakage filter to exclude instances answerable without retrieval.
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a dominant paradigm for enhancing large language models with external knowledge. By coupling retrieval mechanisms with generative models, RAG systems improve factual grounding and adaptability across domains. However, integrating retrieval pipelines introduces new security and privacy risks that extend beyond conventional language modeling threats. Sensitive information may be exposed through retrieval indices, query logs, context construction, or federated updates, while adversarial manipulation of knowledge bases can undermine trust in generated outputs. This survey provides a comprehensive examination of privacy and security challenges across RAG systems deployed in centralized, on-device (Micro-RAG), federated, and hybrid paradigms. We present a unified taxonomy of threat surfaces spanning the retrieval, context construction, and generation stages and systematically analyze attack classes, including membership inference, index inference, poisoning, gradient leakage, and collusion. We further review architectural, algorithmic, and cryptographic defenses, highlighting privacy-utility trade-offs and deployment considerations. Finally, we outline open research challenges toward building trustworthy, secure, and resilient RAG systems for real-world applications.
Balamurugan Palanisamy, G S S Chalapathi, Vikas Hassija +1