Hidden Coalitions in Multi-Agent AI: A Spectral Diagnostic from Internal Representations
Authors: Cameron Berg, Susan L. Schneider, Mark M. Bailey
Organizations: Reciprocal Research · New York, NY, USA · Center for the Future of AI, Mind, and Society · Florida Atlantic University · Boca Raton, FL, USA · AI, Cyber, Influence, and Data Science Department · Biological and Computational Intelligence Center · National Intelligence University Bethesda, MD, USA
Collections of interacting AI agents can form coalitions, creating emergent group-level organization that is critical for AI safety and alignment. However, observing agent behavior alone is often insufficient to distinguish genuine informational coupling from spurious similarity, as consequential coalitions may form at the level of internal representations before any overt behavioral change is apparent. Here, we introduce a practical method for detecting coalition structure from the internal neural representations of multi-agent systems. The approach constructs a pairwise mutual-information graph from the hidden states of agents and applies spectral partitioning to identify the most salient coalition boundary. We validate this method in two domains. First, in multi-agent reinforcement learning environments, the method successfully recovers programmed hierarchical and dynamic coalition structures and correctly rejects false positives arising from behavioral coordination without informational coupling. Second, using a large language model, the method identifies coalition structures implied by descriptive prompts, tracks dynamic team reassignments, and reveals a representational hierarchy where explicit labels dominate over conflicting interaction patterns. Across both settings, the recovered partition reveals subgroup organization that a scalar cross-agent mutual-information measure cannot distinguish. The results demonstrate that analyzing hidden-state mutual information through spectral partitioning provides a scalable diagnostic for identifying representational coalitions, offering a valuable tool for monitoring emergent structure in distributed AI systems.
Orchestrated collectives of large language model (LLM) agents that debate and vote are an emerging form of computational intelligence: the intelligent behaviour resides in the \emph{interaction}, not in any single agent. They improve task accuracy, yet remain black boxes at the system level: there is no principled test of convergence, no bound on the rounds needed, and no faithful account of what drove a decision. This paper develops a novel framework based on Koopman operator theory and validates its theoretical guarantees on multi-agent consensus dynamics. Treating the collective as one nonlinear dynamical system on a communication graph, we read its essential behaviour off the spectrum of its Koopman transfer operator, an exact linear representation of the nonlinear dynamics estimated from interaction traces. The spectrum yields three machine-checkable certificates: the sub-dominant eigenvalue λ2 fixes the intrinsic timescale of reasoning and yields a convergence deadline computable \emph{before} the debate runs; its eigenvector names the coherent factions the collective reasons in, and ∣λ2∣ certifies when that explanation is valid; and the leading spectral coordinates form a compressed, auditable message basis. On an attention-consensus model, the deadline tracks observed convergence with log--log correlation 0.93 and bounds it in 96% of 24 configurations; attribution is exact whenever the spectrum certifies metastability; eight of 32 coordinates preserve the decision at 99.7% fidelity; and a certificate learned from 15 debates held on 60/60 held-out debates. The study runs in minutes on a CPU, making spectral certification a practical layer for trustworthy collective reasoning.
Increasingly autonomous agentic AI systems pose novel multi-agent risks, such as secret collusion via covert communication channels. The natural defence to these collusion attempts is to monitor plain-text communication, but the efficacy of monitors has been called into doubt by increasingly sophisticated model steganography; indeed, some theoretical schemes have been proposed that are information-theoretically or computationally indistinguishable from good-faith plain-text communication. In this paper, we demonstrate that the complexity of these schemes is no longer a safety barrier, as agentic coding models can already produce undetectable stegosystems when given realistic tool usage, such as code execution or accessing research papers through web searches. Agents also adapt when key ingredients are missing, for example, by adding model-sampling components or implementing related keyed coding schemes. We then frame tacit steganographic coordination between agents as a Schelling-point problem and introduce coordination metrics for estimating when two agents are likely to select compatible schemes without explicit prior agreement. Our results suggest a shift in the threat model for covert communication between AI agents, where the main barrier is no longer whether frontier agents can understand and implement sophisticated stegosystems, but coordination: whether independently acting agents can converge on compatible schemes, keys, and parameters. We find substantial convergence on broad scheme families but limited strict one-shot coordination, suggesting that shared artefacts, repeated interaction, and tool-mediated search are the settings where covert communication risks are most acute. Overall, our findings provide empirical grounding for the recent strategic confinement hypothesis, which assumes that capable agents can construct covert channels that survive monitoring.
Jimmy Laurence Rippin, Simon C. Marshall, David Demitri Africa +1
LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, where they can collude while keeping their actions benign. Output monitors designed to detect such collusions can be fooled by obfuscation and steganography, motivating the use of probes trained on internal activations. However, these probes are usually evaluated on agents that do not know they are being watched. We study how activation-based detection changes when agents are explicitly informed that their internal activations are being monitored, and when they additionally receive feedback from the monitor. We keep the models, probes, and thresholds fixed and change only what the agents are told: nothing (baseline), that an activation monitor is present (aware), or that a monitor is present together with the previous round's score (feedback). We test two games, a four-agent blackjack game and a two-agent Simmons prisoners game, using Qwen3-32B-AWQ and GPT-OSS-20B in homogeneous and mixed pairings. Telling agents about the monitor does not hide them. The best probes stay accurate in all three conditions, and the agents keep colluding.