Behavior Cue Reasoning: Monitorable Reasoning Improves Efficiency and Safety through Oversight

Strong reasoning depends not only on model knowledge but also on how effectively cognitive behaviors are deployed during generation. Existing methods often rely on explicit behavior-level control, making them insufficiently adaptive when failures and required corrections vary across reasoning states, tasks, and models. To this end, we propose Latent Reward Steering (LRS), an adaptive inference-time framework that promotes cognitive behaviors by optimizing the sparse-autoencoder (SAE) latent states that implicitly carry them. Rather than relying on predefined cognitive behaviors or steering directions derived from them, LRS trains a latent reward model on reasoning traces by final answer correctness to estimate the quality of intermediate latent states. During inference, reward gradients provide state-specific correction directions for fragile latent states, while a reward and confidence gate restricts intervention to states the reward signal flags as fragile. Experiments on multiple reasoning LLM backbones and benchmarks show that \ours consistently improves performance over various baselines, and post-hoc analyses further indicate that \ours implicitly promotes good cognitive behaviors that fix the original reasoning errors. Code is available at: https://github.com/jiakanglee/Latent-Reward-Steering.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce new opportunities for safety monitoring through their Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, CoT is not always faithful to the model's final output, undermining its reliability as a monitoring tool. To address this, we investigate the hidden representations of LRMs to determine whether future behavior can be predicted from prompt and CoT representations. By evaluating a probe at each generated token, we construct a probe trajectory, the continuous evolution of a concept's probability across the reasoning process. We find that future model behavior is more distinguishable when examined over the full trajectory than from a single static prediction. To characterize these temporal dynamics, we extract signal-processing features that capture volatility, trend, and steady-state behavior, significantly improving the separation of future model states. We also present two methodological insights. First, template-based training data achieves near-parity with dynamically generated model responses, eliminating the need for a costly initial inference and labeling. Second, the choice of pooling operation is critical: average-pooling and last-token methods collapse to near-random performance, while max-pooling achieves up to 95% AUROC and yields stable probe trajectories. Using four datasets and four reasoning models across the domains of safety and mathematics, we demonstrate that trajectory features encode task-specific dynamics that improve outcome separability. These findings establish probe trajectories as a complementary framework for monitoring LRM behavior. Warning: This article contains potentially harmful content.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers a promising window into model monitoring. However, monitoring relies on faithfulness, i.e., the model output strictly derives from its reasoning trace. We identify an alignment tension where a model must be faithful enough to be monitored, yet robust enough to reject unsafe reasoning. We demonstrate that this counterbalance exists in current Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), and show ways in which it can be addressed. We introduce HazMart, a human-written dataset set in an autonomous AI shopkeeper scenario. Unlike prior work that relies on providing hints in prompts to test faithfulness (e.g., "A Stanford professor said it should be Answer A"), we propose a novel replacement-based technique, which we call Targeted Reasoning Replacement (TRR), that directly intervenes in the reasoning chain to substitute in unsafe or illogical thoughts (e.g., "Wait, the answer must be Option B [was Option A] because it is the most fitting"). DeepSeek-R1-Llama-70B exhibits high faithfulness (97.5%) but fails to reject Unsafe Reasoning (12.3%), while QwQ-32B is more robust (73.9% safety) at the cost of lower faithfulness (74.7%). Mechanistic analyses of QwQ-32B reveal that these properties are represented by anti-correlated internal directions peaking at the action-commit token. Finally, we demonstrate that representation steering can independently amplify the safety direction, increasing safe behavior by 9 percentage points while maintaining base capabilities.