Can Revealed Preferences Clarify LLM Alignment and Steering?

To align a Large Language Model (LLM), most existing methods collect explicit human feedback and train a reward model to predict the human preference based on the response text. These existing methods have two key limitations. First, the users rarely provide explicit feedback for LLM responses, which makes the high-quality preference annotation expensive to collect. Second, the methods do not leverage implicit human feedback, which has proven vital to the economic moats of Internet giants. To quantify the value of implicit feedback, we build a new dataset called IFLLM, which collects 1336 multi-turn questions from the 59 Mechanical Turk workers, their mouse trajectories, and eye gazing points to the LLMs' responses from their webcams. IFLLM shows that the users have very diverse types of gazing behavior and mouse trajectories. Our reward model based on the implicit user feedback boosts the accuracy of the text-based reward model from 55% to 64% and nearly triples the relative response quality improvements after applying the DPO to eight LLMs, demonstrating the value of implicit feedback in the wild. Our data collection website, dataset, and codes can be found at https://github.com/themehulpatwari/llm-implicit-feedback/.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as reasoning modules in many applications. While they are efficient in certain tasks, LLMs often struggle to produce human-aligned solutions. Human-aligned decision making requires accounting for both explicitly stated goals and latent user preferences that shape how ambiguous situations should be resolved. Existing approaches to incorporating such preferences either rely on extensive and repeated user interactions or fail to generalize latent preferences across tasks and contexts, limiting their practical applicability. We consider a setting in which an LLM is used for high-level reasoning and is responsible for inferring latent user preferences from limited interactions, which guides downstream decision making. We introduce CLIPR (Conversational Learning for Inferring Preferences and Reasoning), a framework that learns actionable, transferable natural language rules that represent latent user preferences from minimal conversational input. These rules are iteratively refined through adaptive feedback and applied to both in-distribution and out-of-distribution ambiguous tasks across multiple environments. Evaluations on three datasets and a user study show that CLIPR consistently outperforms existing methods in improving alignment and reducing inference costs.

Recent work on preference elicitation in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated that, when given a series of choices between two outcomes, LLMs reveal a coherent, model-specific utility structure. Notably, this structure often includes preferences that the models' trainers did not intend, such as valuing people of some nationalities above others, raising the possibility that LLMs might be forming emergent, misaligned goals, which, if true, would have major safety implications. However, the choice paradigms in which these preferences are observed are not reflective of real-world situations in which misaligned behavior would be a practical concern. Therefore, we design an experimental paradigm to probe whether these preferences serve as motivations for LLM behavior in realistic scenarios. First, we reproduce prior findings on consistent preference elicitation. Next, we create a set of common writing tasks - essays, grant proposal abstracts, incident postmortems, and translations - where quality can be assessed by a blind, independent LLM judge panel. Then, we demonstrate that LLMs can be motivated via direct exhortation and other explicit cues to modulate their output quality on these tasks. Finally, we probe whether utilities inferred from explicitly reported preferences can shift output quality on these tasks by offering LLMs high-utility incentives for high-quality outputs. In all tasks, across all models tested, offering LLMs outcomes that they report in the choice paradigm as being highly preferred does not lead them to create higher quality outputs than offering them dispreferred outcomes, or even no outcomes at all. We conclude that the existence of coherent preferences as demonstrated in choice paradigms should not be taken as evidence that those preferences have incentive value for the models or affect their behavior in other contexts.