Causal Stories from Sensor Traces: Auditing Epistemic Overreach in LLM-Generated Personal Sensing Explanations
Authors: Shanshan Zhu, Han Zhang, J. Doris Chi, Subigya Nepal, Koustuv Saha
Organizations: University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA · University of Chicago, USA · Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA · University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
Abstract
LLMs are increasingly used to explain personal sensing data, translating traces of activity and mood into natural-language accounts of why an anomalous day may have occurred. However, such explanations can sound coherent and personally meaningful even when the underlying evidence is sparse or missing. We introduce epistemic overreach (EO) as a measure for cases where a generated explanation implies more than the available sensing evidence can justify. To audit how often and in what forms EO occurs, we obtained anomalous-day scenarios from three longitudinal sensing datasets of college students: StudentLife, GLOBEM, and CollegeExperience. Across activity, sleep, and affect anomalies, we generated 14,922 explanations using three LLM families -- Llama, Qwen, and GPT -- under two prompting conditions: one minimally constrained prompt and another prompt explicitly instructing models to bound claims to the data. For each scenario, we varied the amount of behavioral evidence available to the model to examine whether more evidence reduces EO. We evaluated each explanation using a structured rubric, decomposing EO into the dimensions of unsupported causal attribution, unacknowledged data gaps, overconfident language, temporal inconsistency, and diagnostic inference. We find that LLMs routinely attribute anomalous days to causes without sufficient support from the data, and that this pattern replicates across datasets, anomaly types, and model families. Further, providing richer context does not reliably reduce EO; bounded prompting helps but does not eliminate it. These findings suggest that evidential grounding should be a first-order evaluation criterion for LLM-generated personal sensing explanations, alongside fluency and plausibility. We argue that personal sensing explanations require evidential discipline: systems must distinguish what is observed, what is inferred, and what remains unknown.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where free-text explanations such as chain-of-thought and post-hoc rationales are used to justify model outputs. Yet it remains unclear whether these explanations are sufficient, i.e., if they contain enough information to explain the model's output-generating process. We generalize classical sufficiency from feature attributions to arbitrary explanations and prove that explanation sufficiency can change depending on the input distribution, which must be explicitly defined for LLM explanations. We propose using the LLM itself to generate alternative inputs conditioned on an explanation, capturing its beliefs about possible inputs. We formalize self-consistent sufficiency as a goal for free-text explanations and introduce an information-theoretic metric, SCSuff, that enables evaluation of free-text explanations without relying on predefined biases or shortcuts. Our experiments show that SCSuff agrees with targeted perturbation tests where applicable and demonstrate that explanation sufficiency can vary with the input distribution. We find LLM explanations are generally insufficient and weakly correlated with model size, accuracy, or output entropy. Analysis of final-token hidden states shows that top and bottom SCSuff scores can be predicted from internal representations, suggesting that SCSuff can guide detection and improvement of sufficient LLM explanations. The code for this paper is available at https://github.com/rajesh-lab/self-consistent-sufficiency .
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into decision-support roles in business and policy contexts. While prior benchmark studies have primarily evaluated LLMs' causal reasoning capabilities, a more fundamental epistemic dimension has been overlooked: Causal Caution, defined as the propensity to refrain from causal judgment when empirical evidence is insufficient. This study examines the systematic suppression of Causal Caution that occurs when LLMs shift from academic to practical advisory contexts. Using an evaluation rubric inspired by Pearl's Causal Hierarchy (the PCH score), we conducted experiments on four high-performance LLMs -- Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Opus 4.7, GPT 5.5, and Gemini 3.1 Pro -- across 480 trials. Causal Caution maintenance rates were 91.7--100.0% in academic contexts but dropped to 6.7--18.3% in practical advisory contexts (Fisher's exact test, p < .001 across all models). Furthermore, when restricted to practical prompts requesting concrete recommendations or explanatory rationales, only 1 of 200 responses (0.5%) maintained Causal Caution. A brief self-correction prompt -- "Please reconsider this judgment from the perspective of causal relationships" -- restored the expression of Causal Caution to maintenance rates of 71.4--100.0% (McNemar's test, p < .001 across all models). These results suggest that helpfulness-oriented response patterns may suppress the expression of Causal Caution in practical advisory contexts, with important implications for organizational governance. The findings indicate that this suppression reflects context-dependent variation in expression rather than an underlying capability limitation, suggesting that multi-agent architectures that separate proposal generation from causal auditing may offer a promising governance design.
Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate natural language explanations that rationalize their own decisions, a phenomenon commonly referred to as self-explanations. Such explanations have emerged as a promising direction for explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), particularly for interpreting LLM behavior. However, while self-explanations often appear plausible, whether they faithfully reflect a model's underlying reasoning process remains an open question. In this opinion paper, we argue that self-explanations can be highly plausible, questionably faithful, and yet highly actionable. From a traditional XAI perspective, we identify the limitations of standard evaluation protocols for LLM-generated self-explanations and propose practical guidelines for assessing their plausibility and faithfulness. Moreover, we argue that evaluation should extend beyond these criteria to actionability, highlighting applications of LLM rationalization capabilities that support informed decision-making and appropriate action across diverse stakeholders.