Organizations: University of Padova · FondazioneLucianoBrunoSerafiniKessler · Fondazione Bruno Kessler
Abstract
In the animal kingdom, mirror self-recognition is a canonical probe of higher-order cognition, emerging only in some species. We ask whether an analogous functional capability emerges in embodied vision-language model (VLM) agents: can they recognize themselves in a mirror? We introduce a controlled 3D benchmark where a first-person VLM agent must infer a hidden body attribute from its reflection and select the matching target, while avoiding self-other misattribution. To separate mirror-grounded self-identification from shortcuts, we test mirror removal, misleading cues, and occluded reflections. We also evaluate the decision process through mirror seeking, temporal ordering, self-attribution, and reasoning-action consistency. Our experiments show that mirror-based self-identification emerges mainly in stronger VLMs. These models can use reflected evidence for action, whereas weaker models often inspect the mirror but fail to extract self-relevant information or misattribute their reflection. Language-vision conflict further shows that self-referential language alone is not evidence of grounded self-identification. Overall, mirror-based evaluation provides a diagnostic for whether embodied self-grounding is causally rooted in perception and action rather than priors, prompt compliance, or confabulation.
Recent progress in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has demonstrated remarkable advances in perception and reasoning, suggesting their potential for embodied intelligence. While recent studies have evaluated embodied MLLMs in interactive settings, current benchmarks mainly target capabilities to perceive, understand, and interact with external objects, lacking a systematic evaluation of self-centric intelligence. To address this, we introduce MirrorBench, a simulation-based benchmark inspired by the classical Mirror Self-Recognition (MSR) test in psychology. MirrorBench extends this paradigm to embodied MLLMs through a tiered framework of progressively challenging tasks, assessing agents from basic visual perception to high-level self-representation. Experiments on leading MLLMs show that even at the lowest level, their performance remains substantially inferior to human performance, revealing fundamental limitations in self-referential understanding. Our study bridges psychological paradigms and embodied intelligence, offering a principled framework for evaluating the emergence of general intelligence in large models. Project page: https://fflahm.github.io/mirror-bench-page/.
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) often produce self-reflective statements like "let me check the figure again" during reasoning. Do such statements trigger genuine visual re-examination, or are they merely learned textual patterns? We investigate this via VisualSwap, an image-swap probing framework: after a model reasons over an image, we replace it with a visually similar but semantically different one and test whether the model notices. We introduce VS-Bench, 800 image pairs curated from MathVista, MathVerse, MathVision, and MMMU-Pro. Experiments on Qwen3-VL, Kimi-VL, and ERNIE-VL reveal a striking failure: models overwhelmingly miss the swap, with accuracy dropping by up to 60%. Counterintuitively, thinking models are nearly 3x more vulnerable than their instructed counterparts, and scaling offers no mitigation. Multi-turn user instructions restore visual grounding, but self-generated reflective statements during continuous generation do not. Attention analysis explains why: user instructions substantially elevate attention to visual tokens, whereas self-reflection does not. Current VLMs tend to say rather than actually see when claiming to perform visual re-examination. Our code and dataset are available at the project page: https://visualswap.github.io
Reflexion-style agents rely on self-generated reflections as memory, implicitly assuming that agents can accurately diagnose their own failures. We show that this assumption can fail systematically: across ALFWorld and HumanEval, agents store confident but incorrect interpretations of the task and continue acting on them across trials, even though the environment resets to the correct task each time. We call this failure mode memory confabulation and introduce the Reflection Repetition Rate (RRR), a log-based metric that detects repeated reliance on incorrect reflective content. Using RRR, we identify 16 frozen environments in ALFWorld, where 0 of 121 reflections mention the correct target object, and 4 analogous cases in HumanEval. Our mitigation replaces open-ended self-diagnosis with programmatic extraction of trajectory-level failure signals, increasing correct object mention from 0% to 86%, reducing RRR from 0.64 to 0.10, and solving 3 of 16 frozen ALFWorld environments, suggesting that reflective memory can reinforce false beliefs rather than correct them.