Do Linear Probes Generalize Better in Persona Coordinates?

Large language models exhibit a growing range of misaligned behaviors such as strategic deception, sandbagging, and self-preservation. As they are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, it is critical to reliably detect such behaviors to ensure safe and responsible use. In this work, we propose to monitor misalignment by decomposing it into fine-grained cognitive processes -- misalignment indicators -- and detecting their presence in a model's internal activations via linear probes. We develop a taxonomy of 18 indicators spanning different misaligned behaviors, paired with an automated, meta-plan-guided pipeline that generates multi-turn training conversations. To rigorously evaluate generalization, we construct an out-of-distribution suite combining automated behavioral elicitation, established misalignment benchmarks, and natural benign conversations. Across 5 misaligned behaviors, our probes match a strong LLM judge with 0.935 AUROC on out-of-distribution benchmarks while keeping a low false positive rate on benign traffic. We further perform in-depth analysis to understand the probes and the model's internal representations of misalignment indicators.

What a language model will and will not do is largely set during post-training, but which behaviors it expresses, hides, or resists is not revealed by prompting alone. Persona vectors, behavioral directions in activation space, can probe this organization, but prior work covers only a handful of traits. We present the first systematic application of persona vectors at this scale, compiling a 53-trait inventory across four behaviorally distinct domains and labeling every trait in two open-weight models as natural (expressed at baseline), steerable latent but amplifiable, or intractable (resistant to standard extraction). Both models default to helpful, task-oriented behavior: all nine agentic traits are natural, and their default clinician behavior matches a board-certified psychologist's independent desirability judgments on 16 of 17 traits. Steering produces its largest gains on traits these defaults exclude: hyperbole, hallucination, and sycophancy. The same asymmetry holds across all 171 generic-trait pairs: two steerable traits can collapse the composition, but pairs involving a default never do. Where standard extraction fails on a trait like "evil," a vector transferred from a fine-tuned variant still recovers it, with the residual refusals appearing inside the model's chain-of-thought. Persona vectors are most informative not as a set of controls but as a probe of behavioral organization.

How large language models internally represent high-level behaviors is a core interpretability question with direct relevance to AI safety: it determines what we can detect, audit, or intervene on. Recent work has shown that traits such as evil or sycophancy correspond to linear directions in the internal activations, the so-called persona vectors. Although these vectors are now routinely utilized to inspect and steer model behavior in safety-relevant settings, how these representations are formed during training remains unknown. To address this gap, we trace persona vectors across the pretraining of OLMo-3-7B, finding that persona vectors form remarkably early -- within 0.22% of OLMo-3 pretraining -- and remain effective for steering the fully post-trained instruct models. Although core representations are formed early on, persona vectors continue to refine geometrically and semantically throughout pretraining. We further compare alternative elicitation strategies and find that all yield effective directions, with each strategy surfacing qualitatively distinct facets of the underlying persona. Replicating our analysis on Apertus-8B reveals that our findings transfer qualitatively beyond OLMo-3. Our results establish persona representations as stable features of early pretraining and open a path to studying how training forms, refines, and shapes them.