The CAP theorem states that a distributed system cannot simultaneously guarantee consistency, availability, and partition tolerance under network partition. Inspired by this result, this paper formulates a CAP-like conjecture for Large Language Models (LLMs). The proposed trilemma states that, under semantic underdetermination, an LLM cannot always simultaneously guarantee strong correctness, strict non-bias, and high utility. A prompt is semantically underdetermined when the given premises do not determine a unique answer. In such cases, a useful and decisive response requires the model to introduce a selection criterion, preference, prior, or value ordering. If this criterion is not supplied by the user or justified by the available premises, the response becomes biased in a broad selection-theoretic sense. Conversely, if the model avoids unsupported preferences, it may preserve correctness and non-bias but may reduce utility through refusal, hedging, or clarification. The paper formalizes this correctness--non-bias--utility trilemma, develops examples, and argues that certain LLM failures arise not merely from model limitations but from the structure of underdetermined decision requests.
Large language models (LLMs) are powerful black-box systems, making it difficult to discern whether their answers reflect stable internal beliefs or superficial pattern matching. We identify cross-contextual consistency as an underutilized behavioral property of LLMs: a credible answer should remain stable when the same task is placed under topic-aligned, content-neutral contextual variation. Building on this intuition, we operationalize Cross-Contextual Consistency (C3) by comparing model generations under original and perturbed prompts. Across 26 models and six benchmarks spanning reasoning, factuality, and code generation, we find that answers with smaller cross-contextual shifts are more likely to be correct or factual. We demonstrate that C3 provides a complementary axis of evaluation and can serve as a benchmark usefulness diagnostic, identifying which portions of a benchmark remain informative even when aggregated scores are widely considered "saturate".
The ability of large language models (LLMs) to express calibrated uncertainty is important for safe deployment. Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is widely used to improve accuracy and reliability, but its effect on calibration is not fully understood. We show that this picture is incomplete: in some settings, increasing the reasoning budget beyond a task-specific threshold can cause models to become systematically overconfident, assigning high confidence to incorrect answers. We call this phenomenon Calibration Drift Under Reasoning (CDUR) and study it both theoretically and empirically. We define reasoning budget B and analyze conditions under which Expected Calibration Error ECE(B) follows a non-monotonic pattern: it first decreases as reasoning corrects errors, then increases as longer reasoning produces internally consistent but incorrect explanations. We propose a Hypothesis Lock-In model based on autoregressive generation to explain this behavior. We evaluate Llama-3.1-8B and Llama-3.3-70B on 47 reasoning-trap questions across four reasoning budgets and three seeds (1,368 API calls; 574 valid responses). The 8B model shows non-monotonic calibration behavior, while results for the 70B model are limited to baseline evaluation and are inconclusive for budget-dependent effects. We introduce CABStop, a calibration-aware stopping rule that halts reasoning when confidence diverges from an auxiliary accuracy estimate. These results suggest that increasing reasoning depth does not always improve reliability and should be monitored carefully.
Dialogue failures in language models are usually framed as memory failures: context too long, summaries lossy, a constraint forgotten. We argue this misses a deeper problem: in many conversations the model does not forget, it commits too early. An ambiguous early turn collapses into a single hidden interpretation, and later clarification is filtered through that commitment. We call this early posterior collapse: unresolved user intent collapsing into a committed task state before ambiguity is resolved. We study it with controlled dialogue tasks in writing, planning, and coding using Gemini-2.5-Pro and Gemini-2.5-Flash. Across thousands of trials, the same information in different orders yields different outcomes, even when the final dialogue contains equivalent task-relevant information. This order effect suggests later clarification is treated as extra context rather than a corrective signal: it refines a stale task state without invalidating it. Coding tasks are especially vulnerable, suggesting early assumptions get embedded in structured artifacts such as interfaces and control flow. Standard prompting and memory strategies do not reliably help: summaries can collapse ambiguity, and chain-of-thought can reduce explicit wrong commitment in reasoning traces without improving final task success. These findings motivate uncertainty-preserving state management. If assistants cannot let go of early interpretations, robustness cannot rely on post hoc correction alone; it must keep ambiguous early turns from hardening into one task state. Assistants should hold tentative hypotheses while ambiguity remains, ask before executing when high-impact ambiguity persists, and rebuild from a revised state when later evidence invalidates an earlier reading. Rather than one prompting fix, we aim to redirect research for interactive LLMs from retaining more context toward preserving uncertainty.