Can LLM Agents Simulate Dynamic Networks? A Case Study on Email Networks with Phishing Synthesis

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) are increasingly deployed for agentic tasks, such as web automation, itinerary planning, and collaborative problem solving. Yet, their interactive nature introduces new security risks: malicious or compromised agents can exploit communication channels to propagate misinformation and manipulate collective outcomes. In this paper, we study how such manipulation can arise and spread by borrowing the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion formation model from social sciences to propose a general theoretical framework to study LLM-MAS. Remarkably, this model closely captures LLM-MAS behavior, as we verify in extensive experiments across different network topologies and attack and defense scenarios. Theoretically and empirically, we find that a single highly stubborn and persuasive agent can take over MAS dynamics, underscoring the systems' high susceptibility to attacks by triggering a persuasion cascade that reshapes collective opinion. Our theoretical analysis reveals three mechanisms to increase system security: a) increasing the number of benign agents, b) increasing the innate stubbornness or peer-resistance of agents, or c) reducing trust in potential adversaries. Because scaling is computationally expensive and high stubbornness degrades the network's ability to reach consensus, we propose a new mechanism to mitigate threats by a trust-adaptive defense that dynamically adjusts inter-agent trust to limit adversarial influence while maintaining cooperative performance. Extensive experiments confirm that this mechanism effectively defends against manipulation.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have spurred growing interest in using LLM-integrated agents for social simulation, often under the implicit assumption that realistic population dynamics will emerge once role-specified agents are placed in a networked multi-agent setting. This position paper argues that LLM-based agents alone are not (yet) sufficient for social simulation. We attribute this over-optimism to a systematic mismatch between what current agent pipelines are typically optimized and validated to produce and what simulation-as-science requires. Concretely, role-playing plausibility does not imply faithful human behavioral validity; collective outcomes are frequently mediated by agent-environment co-dynamics rather than agent-agent messaging alone; and results can be dominated by interaction protocols, scheduling, and initial information priors. To make these underlying mechanisms explicit and auditable, we propose a unified formulation of AI agent-based social simulation as an environment-involved Markov game with explicit exposure and scheduling mechanisms, from which we derive concrete actions for design, evaluation, and interpretation.

Social dynamics encode the process in which individual network and discourse interactions aggregate into collective influence, narrative dominance and coordinate behavior. This paper uses the the GhostField architecture, a hybrid LLM-Enabled Agent Based Network-Dynamic (LAND) model as a social simulation framework to build the AuraSight scenario. In the AuraSight scenario, 314,244 heterogeneous cyber social agents and human actors exchange 529,327 messages over 30 days surrounding a fictional international song-writing contest. We methodologically examine emergent social dynamics across four analytical layers: ego-network topology, semantic network evolution, coordination dynamics and influence dynamics. Our results show how generated social simulations do also produce social dynamics, and how the dynamics of coordination and influence emerge not from individual agents but from the recursive interaction between network topology and narrative exchange.