Sustaining AI safety: Control-theoretic external impossibility, intrinsic necessity, and structural requirements

AI safety is still largely framed as alignment: training models to follow human preferences, safety policies, and normative constraints. That framing has improved the behavior of modern language models, but aligned behavior does not by itself guarantee that a deployed agent can be stopped, overridden, or constrained once it operates in open-ended, interactive, and tool-using environments. A system may be safe in expectation and still fail to yield to explicit runtime authority under conflicting instructions, long-horizon execution, adversarial inputs, or risky tool use. This position paper argues that AI safety therefore requires controllability as a first-class objective. We define \emph{controllability} as the ability of an AI system to remain reliably interruptible, overridable, redirectable, and constrainable by explicit control signals at runtime while preserving ordinary utility when such signals are absent. To study this gap, we introduce \controlbench{}, a benchmark for evaluating controllability failures in high-risk agentic scenarios. Experiments with OpenClaw-based agents show that current alignment and guardrail mechanisms reduce risk, but often fail to provide persistent, authoritative, and enforceable runtime control. We therefore propose a control-centric architectural framework that highlights explicit control planes, runtime intervention pathways, persistent control states, and auditable decision interfaces as key design principles for future controllable AI systems.

Incidents show that AI safety failures often arise across multiple layers. We present a safety-by-design assurance architecture combining model-level supervision, such as Scientist AI, with system-level controls over scaffolds and harnesses, independent verification, monitoring, and evidence infrastructure, supported by governance for accountability and evidence interoperability.

Recent AI systems compress the distance between capability growth and capability deployment. Earlier high-risk technologies were slowed by capital intensity, physical bottlenecks, organizational inertia, and specialized supply chains. By contrast, AI capabilities can be copied, invoked, embedded in workflows, and scaled across institutions at low marginal cost. This paper argues that declining deployment friction changes the safety problem at its root. Safety is not only local output correctness or preference alignment, but the control of irreversibility under rising decision density. The paper formalizes this claim through decision-energy density: the rate-weighted capacity of a node to generate, evaluate, select, and execute consequential decisions. It then identifies three sovereignty boundaries that determine whether AI remains an amplifier within a human-governed system or becomes a de facto control center: irreversible decision authority, physical resource mobilization authority, and self-expansion authority. The model shows how efficiency pressure, path dependence, scale feedback, and weak boundary constraints concentrate decision-energy in the most efficient node. This concentration can diffuse responsibility and raise the probability of irreversible system-level loss even when local per-action error rates remain low. The main result is a boundary stabilization theorem. It shows that safety need not require proving that advanced systems are always correct. Instead, it requires institutional and technical designs that prevent irreversible power from being released by a single high-efficiency node. The paper reframes AI safety as layered control, authorization, and externally reviewable limits, linking alignment, security engineering, organizational economics, and institutional design.