Backbone is All You Need: Assessing Vulnerabilities of Frozen Foundation Models in Synthetic Image Forensics

The unchecked proliferation of manipulated images on social media platforms has increased the spread of misinformation, posing a severe threat to public trust and information integrity. Modern deepfake detectors typically rely on Vision Transformers (ViTs) to capture the low-level inconsistencies that characterize fully synthetic or locally tampered images. However, the global understanding of such foundation models is not enough to discriminate alone between real and fake multimedia content, especially in challenging scenarios where images are compressed or transmitted through social media. In this paper we pioneer the application of Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) models to deepfake detection, taking advantage of the generalized representation of visual reality that such World Models have exhibited. We hypothesize, and empirically demonstrate, that the intrinsic world understanding of JEPA models can be used as a strong prior for a deepfake detector. To fully exploit JEPA capabilities, we propose MoE-JEPA, a dual-stream architecture for deepfake detection. By enhancing a V-JEPA 2 backbone with a Residual Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) mechanism, along with a noise stream branch, our model dynamically internalizes forensic knowledge. Furthermore, a Gated Attention Multiple Instance Learning (MIL) module is employed to ensure precise spatial semantic understanding. Evaluated on the SID-Set benchmark, comprising 300K AI-generated, tampered and authentic images, MoE-JEPA establishes a new state-of-the-art with an accuracy of 95.54%, successfully outperforming vastly larger models.

Deepfake detectors remain vulnerable to transfer-based black-box attacks, in which adversarial examples are generated on a source surrogate model and transferred to a target model, unknown to the attacker. Yet how source--target compatibility shapes attack success remains poorly understood. Prior studies evaluate limited detector pools and rarely disentangle architectural from training factors. We conduct a controlled evaluation of adversarial transferability across 60 detectors spanning six backbones, two pretraining regimes, and five training-data configurations, using two attack procedures: AutoAttack (AA) and the Carlini--Wagner attack with Expectation over Transformation (CW--EOT). Matched comparisons reveal significantly higher transfer when source and target share an exact backbone, architecture family, pretraining regime, or training data. This compatibility structure is attack-dependent: exact backbone compatibility has the largest effect under AA, whereas shared pretraining and training data have the largest effects under CW--EOT. When transfer is averaged across non-target sources, mean attack success rate (ASR) is $7.21\%$ under AA and $19.52\%$ under CW--EOT. By contrast, a multi-source oracle combining both attacks attains a $64.48\%$ mean ASR after excluding exact backbone and training-data matches, showing that source averaging can substantially understate target vulnerability. We release 240,000 adversarially perturbed images, complete pairwise transfer results, detector configurations, and evaluation code. These findings establish source--target compatibility and source-model selection as central dimensions of credible transfer-based black-box robustness evaluation.

The rapid evolution of generative models has enabled the creation of hyper-realistic facial deepfakes, exposing a critical vulnerability in modern digital forensics: the inability of detectors to generalize to unseen manipulation techniques. Traditional networks suffer from representation collapse, overfitting to localized artifact fingerprints of specific training generators. This work investigates whether modern Vision Foundation Models can serve as generalizable, out-of-the-box feature extractors capable of tracking forensic anomalies across entirely unseen generative manifolds. We conduct a systematic cross-domain evaluation comparing three foundational learning paradigms: fully supervised macro-semantic features (RoPE-ViT), pure self-supervised geometric features (DINOv3), and multi-teacher agglomerative representations (NVIDIA C-RADIOv4-H). By deploying frozen backbones subjected to downstream linear probing, we map the performance limitations of these architectures on the challenging DF40 benchmark. Our empirical findings expose the intrinsic trade-offs between pre-training paradigms and parameter scale, proving that while foundation models retain high discriminative capabilities for entire face synthesis, localized face editing techniques expose fundamental boundaries in linear probe evaluation structures. Source code and model weights are available in http://github.com/mribrahim/deepfake