Cattle Trade: A Multi-Agent Benchmark for LLM Bluffing, Bidding, and Bargaining

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.

Agentic commerce is moving from concept to deployed infrastructure: payment networks, retailers, and AI platforms are setting the stage for agents to transact on behalf of merchants and consumers. Yet whether the LLMs behind these agents can price competently in real markets, where customer preferences are hidden, competitors adapt in real time, and demand can shift without warning, has not been systematically tested. We introduce Bazaar, a dynamic sealed-bid benchmark for multi-attribute auction under these conditions. Despite its dynamics, the benchmark is grounded in closed-form customer utilities, enabling exact evaluation. Across 11 frontier LLMs from four providers, the leading agents on customer acquisition (e.g. Gemini 3.1 Pro) are often not the leading agents on profit (e.g. Opus 4.6). The ranking shifts again under demand shocks: agents that learned fastest pre-shock are typically the slowest to revise their beliefs afterwards, while Gemini 3.1 Pro recovers fastest despite not leading on profit. However, even the strongest agent captures less than a third of hindsight-optimal profit, suggesting current LLMs are progressing in agentic commerce but leave substantial headroom.

Evaluating LLM agents requires dynamic environments that go beyond static reasoning and zero-sum games. Real-world economic interaction is often open-ended and mixed-motive: agents must negotiate, create positive-sum surplus, compete for scarce assets, and plan under delayed returns. We introduce SidConArena, a new benchmark framework for evaluating LLM agents in open-ended, positive-sum bargaining. SidConArena formalizes a multi-player economy as a finite-horizon partially observable stochastic game with three coupled phases: natural-language negotiation with binding trades, deterministic converter-based production, and sealed-bid auctions for long-term assets. The framework combines structured observations, phase-aware agent dispatching, a neural-symbolic action interface, and asynchronous execution, enabling free-form interaction while preserving rule-grounded evaluation. Across homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments, stronger frontier models achieve higher economic outcomes, yet agents still misvalue resources, bargain passively, and remain limited in long-horizon investment planning.