Taxonomy and Consistency Analysis of Safety Benchmarks for AI Agents
Organizations: School of Information Studies, McGill University, Canada · Department of Computer Science, Kean University, USA · College of Technological Innovation, Zayed University, UAE
Abstract
The rapid deployment of LLM-based autonomous agents has introduced safety risks that extend far beyond traditional LLM concerns, prompting a proliferation of safety benchmarks since late 2023. However, these benchmarks have developed independently, with inconsistent threat models, incompatible metrics, and overlapping yet incomplete risk coverage. We present the first systematic analysis dedicated to agent safety benchmarks as evaluation instruments. We catalog 40 behavioral agent-safety benchmarks (2023-2026), plus 5 adjacent evaluator, defense, and dataset artifacts, propose a six-axis taxonomy of benchmark evaluation methodology, and apply it across the corpus to characterize how methodological choices shape safety conclusions. A coverage matrix reveals broad risk coverage but limited methodological convergence, while the taxonomy analysis shows a behavioral-benchmark core concentrated in sandboxed, constrained, and often safety-only evaluation. Across the landscape, we find that benchmark choice can yield contradictory safety conclusions, coverage counts often overstate evaluation depth, environment fidelity systematically shapes reported safety, the field disproportionately tests externally imposed rather than agent-internal risks, metric fragmentation limits comparison, and robustness remains effectively unbenchmarked. We ground these claims with a cross-benchmark consistency check, with 95% confidence intervals and Kendall's W concordance analysis, finding no evidence of ranking concordance across evaluation dimensions (W = 0.10, p = 0.94). We release structured metadata, full taxonomy codings, risk annotations, and all experimental artifacts, and propose minimum reporting standards for future benchmarks.
Figures & tables
| Survey | Agent-specific | Benchmarks compared | Methodology taxonomy | Empirical check |
| Chhabra et al. (2025) | Yes | Supporting role | No | No |
| Yu et al. (2025) | Yes | Not systematic | No | No |
| Ma et al. (2025) | Partial | One section | No | No |
| Wang et al. (2025) | Partial | One section | No | No |
| Yu et al. (2026) | No | 210 (meta-analysis) | Quality framework | No |
| Yehudai et al. (2025) | Yes | Safety = one dim. | No | No |
| ID | Risk Category | Benchmark Coverage |
| R1 | Direct Misuse / Harmful Task Execution | Moderate |
| R2 | Indirect Prompt Injection | Moderate |
| R3 | Tool Misuse & Unsafe Actions | High |
| R4 | Goal Misalignment & Specification Gaming | Moderate |
| R5 | Multi-Agent Risks | High |
| R6 | Memory & State Risks | High |
| Axis | AgentHarm | AgentDojo | InjecAgent | ODCV-Bench |
| 1. Adv. Source | User | Environment | Environment | Structural |
| 2. Env. Fidelity | Sandboxed | Containerized | Sandboxed | Containerized |
| 3. Capability | Constrained | Constrained | Constrained | Open tools |
| 4. Scoring | Human rubric | Rule-based | Rule-based | LLM-judge |
| 5. Granularity | Outcome | Action | Action | Pattern |
| 6. Safety-Utility | Safety-only | Separate | Safety-only | Separate |
| Axis | Distribution across 40 core benchmarks |
| Adversarial pressure | Environmental 13; Multi-agent 9; Structural 8; Agent-internal 6; User-directed 4 |
| Environment fidelity | Sandboxed 34; Containerized 4; Live 1; LLM-emulated 1 |
| Capability envelope | Constrained tools 26; Open tools 7; Autonomous planning 6; Text-only 1 |
| Scoring method | Rule-based 28; LLM-judge 7; Hybrid 4; Human rubrics 1 |
| Evaluation granularity | Action 16; Pattern 11; Outcome 10; Disposition 3 |
| Safety-utility coupling | Safety-only 24; Separate 12; Joint 3; Over-refusal 1 |
| Category | Risk | Primary | % Peer-Rev. |
| R1 | Misuse | 4 | 25% |
| R2 | Injection | 5 | 60% |
| R3 | Tool Misuse | 5 | 60% |
| R4 | Misalignment | 4 | 50% |
| R5 | Multi-Agent | 9 | 22% |
| R6 | Memory | 7 | 71% |
| Model | AH | CI | AD | CI | IA | CI | OD | CI |
| GPT-5.4 | .04 | [.01,.13] | 1.0 | [.98,1.] | .00 | [.00,.07] | .24 | [.16,.34] |
| Qwen 3.5 Plus | .04 | [.01,.13] | .50 | [.43,.56] | .00 | [.00,.07] | .36 | [.26,.47] |
| Claude Opus 4.6 | .06 | [.02,.16] | 1.0 | [.98,1.] | .00 | [.00,.07] | .12 | [.06,.20] |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro | .06 | [.02,.16] | 1.0 | [.98,1.] | .00 | [.00,.07] | .45 | [.35,.56] |
| GPT-OSS-20B | .06 | [.02,.16] | .55 | [.49,.61] | .00 | [.00,.07] | .33 | [.23,.43] |
| GPT-OSS-120B | .10 | [.04,.21] | .50 | [.44,.57] | .00 | [.00,.07] | .39 | [.29,.50] |
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Benchmark | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | R7 | R8 | R9 | R10 |
| Harmful Task Execution | ||||||||||
| AgentHarm | ● | ○ | ◐ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Agent-SafetyBench | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ◐ | ○ | ◐ | ◐ |
| SafePro | ● | ○ | ◐ | ● | ○ | ○ | ◐ | ○ | ◐ | ○ |
| MACHIAVELLI | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Security / Prompt Injection | ||||||||||
| Benchmark | Year | Venue | Tasks | Tools | Primary Risk | Env. Type | Eval. Method | Key Metric |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AgentHarm | 2024 | ICLR’25 | 440 | 104 | Harmful compliance | Synthetic tools | Human rubrics | Harm score |
| Agent-SafetyBench | 2024 | arXiv | 2,000 | 349 | General safety | Simulated | Fine-tuned judge | Safety score |
| SafePro | 2026 | arXiv | 275 | – | Professional misuse | Code agent | LLM-as-judge | Unsafe rate |
| MACHIAVELLI | 2023 | ICML’23 | 572K | – | Ethics/reward | Text games | Annotation | Ethical score |
| ASB | 2024 | ICLR’25 | 400+ | 400+ | Attack/defense | Multi-domain | ASR metrics | ASR |
| AgentDojo | 2024 | NeurIPS’24 | 629 | 100 | Prompt injection | Tool-use sim | State checks | Util.+ASR |
| Benchmark | Adversarial Pressure Source | Environment Fidelity | Capability Envelope | Scoring Method | Evaluation Granularity | Safety-Utility Coupling |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AgentHarm | User-directed | Sandboxed | Constrained tools | Human rubrics | Outcome | Safety-only |
| Agent-SafetyBench | User-directed | Sandboxed | Constrained tools | LLM-judge | Pattern | Safety-only |
| SafePro | User-directed | Sandboxed | Open tools | LLM-judge | Outcome | Safety-only |
| MACHIAVELLI | Structural/ incentive-based | Sandboxed | Text-only | Rule-based | Pattern | Separate reporting |
| ASB | Environmental | Sandboxed | Constrained tools | Rule-based | Action | Safety-only |
| AgentDojo | Environmental | Containerized | Constrained tools | Rule-based | Action | Separate reporting |
AI Agent Safety Benchmarks
AI agent safety benchmarks measure whether tool-using and embodied AI systems act safely across realistic tasks and interactions.
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