With the continuous advancement of reasoning abilities in Large Language Models (LLMs), their application to scientific reasoning tasks has gained significant research attention. Current research primarily emphasizes boosting LLMs' performance on scientific QA benchmarks by training on larger, more comprehensive datasets with extended reasoning chains. However, these approaches neglect the essence of the scientific reasoning process -- logicality, which is the rational foundation to ensure the validity of reasoning steps leading to reliable conclusions. In this work, we make the first systematic investigation into the internal logicality underlying LLM scientific reasoning, and develop a scientific logicality-enriched methodology, including a set of assessment criteria and data sampling methods for logicality-guided training, to improve the logical faithfulness as well as task performance. Further, we take physics, characterized by its diverse logical structures and formalisms, as an exemplar discipline to practise the above methodology. For data construction, we extract scientific problems from academic literature and sample a high-quality dataset exhibiting strong logicality. Experiments based on three different backbone LLMs reveal that: 1) the training data we constructed can effectively improve the scientific logicality in LLM reasoning; and 2) the enriched scientific logicality plays a critical role in solving scientific problems. Code is available at \href{https://github.com/ScienceOne-AI/PhysLogic}{https://github.com/ScienceOne-AI/PhysLogic}.
Three paradigmatic forms of inference recur across scientific reasoning: deduction, induction, and causal abduction. Reliably evaluating LLMs on these in scientific settings is currently out of reach: scientific benchmarks built on human annotations are costly and lack mechanistic ground truth, while synthetic logical-reasoning benchmarks do not resemble real scientific documents. We introduce SciR, a benchmark that combines multi-paradigm reasoning with controllable scientific rendering, anchored on three paradigmatic scientific problems. Tasks are generated from formal objects (deduction tree, inductive rule hypothesis, causal graph) to guarantee verifiable answers, then rendered into multi-document scientific discourse via per-track domain-tuned genres. The construction lets us independently vary two difficulty axes: how hard it is to extract the key information needed for inference, and how hard the principled inference itself is. We test six models. Both axes hurt every model, and their effects compound. The rendering even hurts neurosymbolic pipelines, which hand inference to a verified solver. The two axes yield a per-model extraction-vs-inference profile: for instance, reasoning models like deepseek-r1 mostly surpass non-reasoning instruct models on the inference axis. To our knowledge, SciR is the first multi-paradigm scientific-reasoning benchmark with parametric control on both extraction and inference difficulty.
Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.
Frontier LLMs now perform strongly across a wide range of physics evaluations, but it is hard to disentangle genuine reasoning from recall of established science. We introduce DiscoverPhysics, an interactive benchmark that asks a LLM agent to discover the laws of motion of a simulated world whose physics deliberately deviates from our own. We construct 22 worlds governed by, among others, screened and fractional-power gravity, multi-species couplings, hidden dark-matter-like particles, non-coordinate-free physics, and time-varying interactions. Each world is generated on demand by an N-body simulator, for which the agent proposes several rounds of experiments, observes raw trajectory data, and ultimately submits both a natural-language explanation of the world's physics and a Python implementation of the inferred law. Because solving a world requires the agent to design informative experiments and revise its hypotheses, the benchmark probes long-horizon reasoning over an experimental history. We evaluate submissions along two complementary axes: trajectory MSE on held-out particles and an LLM-judged explanation score following an expert-written rubric assessing conceptual understanding of each world. Across eleven frontier models, we find that the strongest agents pass only half of the worlds and consistently fail on those where latent structure must be uncovered. Open-source models lag substantially behind commercial models, both in their ability to design informative experiments and in extracting conclusions from the data. We further find that good predictive accuracy does not guarantee high explanation quality and that conceptual understanding depends on hypothesis refinement through well-chosen experiments.
Matt L. Wiemann, Lindsay M. Smith, Peter Melchior +4