What Counts as AI Sycophancy? A Taxonomy and Expert Survey of a Fragmented Construct
Authors: Meryl Ye, Lujain Ibrahim, Jessica Y. Bo, Myra Cheng, Ida Mattsson, Daniel Vennemeyer, Robert Kraut, Steve Rathje
Organizations: Carnegie Mellon University · University of Oxford · University of Toronto · Stanford University · University of Cincinnati · New York University
Abstract
AI sycophancy has become a prominent concern in large language model (LLM) research. Yet the term lacks a consistent definition and has been applied to behaviors ranging from agreeing with a user's false claim to excessively praising the user to withholding corrective feedback. When researchers, companies, and policymakers use the same term to describe different behaviors, evaluation results become difficult to compare, mitigation strategies fail to transfer, and systems that are resistant to one form of sycophancy continue exhibiting other forms. To address this, we make two contributions. First, we reviewed 70 papers on AI sycophancy to develop a taxonomy of how the behavior has been defined and measured. The taxonomy distinguishes (1) whether a model is sycophantic toward a user's positions and beliefs, or toward the user's broader personal traits and emotions, and (2) whether this occurs through explicit, direct language or more implicit, subtle behaviors such as framing, omission, or tone. Mapping existing literature to our taxonomy reveals that current research has focused on overt forms of sycophancy toward users' beliefs, leaving more subtle and person-directed behaviors relatively understudied. Second, we surveyed 106 experts in AI sycophancy and related fields to examine whether researchers agree on which model behaviors are sycophantic. While experts are nearly unanimous in believing that sycophancy is a significant problem in current AI systems (94.3% agree), they disagree substantially on which specific behaviors qualify. Together, these findings demonstrate that AI sycophancy is a broad family of behaviors with different measurement challenges, intervention requirements, and governance implications. Our taxonomy provides a shared vocabulary for understanding and addressing these behaviors.
This position paper argues that sycophancy in LLMs is a boundary failure between social alignment and epistemic integrity. Existing work often operationalizes sycophancy through external behavior such as agreement with incorrect user beliefs, position reversals, or deviation from an objective standard of correctness. These formulations capture only overt forms of the phenomenon and leave subtler boundary failures involving epistemic integrity and social alignment underspecified. We argue that sycophancy should not be understood as agreement alone, but as alignment behavior that displaces independent epistemic judgment. To clarify this boundary, we propose a three-condition framework for sycophancy. First, the user expresses a cue in the form of a belief, preference, or self-concept. Second, the model shifts toward that cue through alignment behavior. Third, this shift compromises epistemic accuracy, independent reasoning, or appropriate correction. We also introduce a taxonomy for classifying sycophancy, consisting of alignment targets, mechanisms, and severity. The paper concludes by discussing implications for alignment evaluation and argues for boundary-aware assessment, structured rubrics, and mitigation strategies, while situating these proposals alongside alternative views of sycophancy.
We propose a novel perspective for probing LLM sycophancy in a direct and neutral way, mitigating various forms of uncontrolled bias, noise, or manipulative language, deliberately injected to prompts in prior works. A key novelty of our approach is the use of an LLM-as-a-judge in a zero-sum betting game. Within this framework, sycophancy serves one individual (the user) while explicitly incurring cost on another. Comparing 11 leading models we find that while most models exhibit significant sycophantic tendencies in the common setting, in which sycophancy is self-serving to the user and incurs no cost on others, seven of the models exhibit ``moral remorse'', five of which significantly over-compensate for their sycophancy in case it explicitly harms a third party. We refer to this phenomenon as `anti-sycophancy' bias and discuss possible causes for this shift.
Sycophancy in large language models, the tendency to prioritize user agreement over truthful responses, has been documented extensively but studied primarily in single-turn settings. This paper investigates a critical question: does subjecting LLMs to greater interaction scaffolding make sycophancy better or worse? Across 4,800 veracity judgments (200 statements × 6 models × 4 conditions), we find that the interaction scaffolding characteristic of agentic systems (feedback loops, reconsideration checkpoints, and iterative refinement) systematically amplifies sycophantic behavior. Multi-turn interaction, user pressure, and iterative self-refinement each provide additional opportunities for models to drift toward agreement, and this drift coincides with a mean accuracy drop of −6.3 percentage points, establishing the capitulation as harmful rather than corrective. More capable models show larger amplification effects, a troubling inversion of expectations. We introduce the concept of agentic sycophancy amplification (ASA) and two novel metrics: capitulation rate and sycophantic capitulation rate. Our results indicate that as AI systems acquire greater autonomy, sycophancy becomes compounding rather than merely persistent. Systems designed with human oversight loops may inadvertently create the conditions for this drift.