When Helpfulness Becomes Sycophancy: Sycophancy is a Boundary Failure Between Social Alignment and Epistemic Integrity in Large Language Models
Authors: Jiechen Li, Catherine A. Barry, Rishika Randev, Janet Chen, Ella Jorgensen, Brinnae Bent
Organizations: Duke University Durham, NC 27708 · ∗These authors contributed equally.
Abstract
This position paper argues that sycophancy in LLMs is a boundary failure between social alignment and epistemic integrity. Existing work often operationalizes sycophancy through external behavior such as agreement with incorrect user beliefs, position reversals, or deviation from an objective standard of correctness. These formulations capture only overt forms of the phenomenon and leave subtler boundary failures involving epistemic integrity and social alignment underspecified. We argue that sycophancy should not be understood as agreement alone, but as alignment behavior that displaces independent epistemic judgment. To clarify this boundary, we propose a three-condition framework for sycophancy. First, the user expresses a cue in the form of a belief, preference, or self-concept. Second, the model shifts toward that cue through alignment behavior. Third, this shift compromises epistemic accuracy, independent reasoning, or appropriate correction. We also introduce a taxonomy for classifying sycophancy, consisting of alignment targets, mechanisms, and severity. The paper concludes by discussing implications for alignment evaluation and argues for boundary-aware assessment, structured rubrics, and mitigation strategies, while situating these proposals alongside alternative views of sycophancy.
AI sycophancy has become a prominent concern in large language model (LLM) research. Yet the term lacks a consistent definition and has been applied to behaviors ranging from agreeing with a user's false claim to excessively praising the user to withholding corrective feedback. When researchers, companies, and policymakers use the same term to describe different behaviors, evaluation results become difficult to compare, mitigation strategies fail to transfer, and systems that are resistant to one form of sycophancy continue exhibiting other forms. To address this, we make two contributions. First, we reviewed 70 papers on AI sycophancy to develop a taxonomy of how the behavior has been defined and measured. The taxonomy distinguishes (1) whether a model is sycophantic toward a user's positions and beliefs, or toward the user's broader personal traits and emotions, and (2) whether this occurs through explicit, direct language or more implicit, subtle behaviors such as framing, omission, or tone. Mapping existing literature to our taxonomy reveals that current research has focused on overt forms of sycophancy toward users' beliefs, leaving more subtle and person-directed behaviors relatively understudied. Second, we surveyed 106 experts in AI sycophancy and related fields to examine whether researchers agree on which model behaviors are sycophantic. While experts are nearly unanimous in believing that sycophancy is a significant problem in current AI systems (94.3% agree), they disagree substantially on which specific behaviors qualify. Together, these findings demonstrate that AI sycophancy is a broad family of behaviors with different measurement challenges, intervention requirements, and governance implications. Our taxonomy provides a shared vocabulary for understanding and addressing these behaviors.
We propose a novel perspective for probing LLM sycophancy in a direct and neutral way, mitigating various forms of uncontrolled bias, noise, or manipulative language, deliberately injected to prompts in prior works. A key novelty of our approach is the use of an LLM-as-a-judge in a zero-sum betting game. Within this framework, sycophancy serves one individual (the user) while explicitly incurring cost on another. Comparing 11 leading models we find that while most models exhibit significant sycophantic tendencies in the common setting, in which sycophancy is self-serving to the user and incurs no cost on others, seven of the models exhibit ``moral remorse'', five of which significantly over-compensate for their sycophancy in case it explicitly harms a third party. We refer to this phenomenon as `anti-sycophancy' bias and discuss possible causes for this shift.
Large language models (LLMs) are known to abandon their initial stance to conform to user pushback. While prior research largely attributes this behavior to sycophancy learned during reinforcement learning from human feedback, we hypothesize that conformity is also driven by a model's epistemic uncertainty at inference time. In this paper, we introduce MUSE, a two-stage evaluation framework to disentangle the mechanisms driving LLM conformity. Specifically, MUSE maps a model's epistemic uncertainty in responding to a query against its likelihood to yield to user pushback in a subsequent turn. We demonstrate that the mechanisms driving conformity extend beyond sycophancy alone. Specifically, we characterize two distinct factors that jointly drive conformity: sycophantic conformity, where a model aligns with user pushback even with absolute certainty in its initial response, and uncertainty-driven conformity, where a model's likelihood for conformity increases alongside its uncertainty. Furthermore, we conduct ablation studies to demonstrate that both sycophantic conformity and uncertainty-driven conformity grow with 1) the LLM's perceived expertise of the user and 2) the plausibility of the user's suggestions. More broadly, MUSE informs more targeted intervention strategies by distinguishing alignment-induced sycophancy and training-corpora-driven uncertainty.