The origin of agriculture represents a major evolutionary transition and a paradigmatic example of how complex collective behaviors emerge from simple interactions. Here we introduce an artificial society of reinforcement learning agents embedded in a dynamic ecological environment to identify general principles underlying this transition. Within this system, agricultural practices emerge spontaneously - without explicit instruction - through the coupled dynamics of learning and environmental modification. We show that this transition is governed by four key ingredients: individual planning through the valuation of delayed rewards, social vulnerability to cheaters, stabilization via social learning, and an emergent lock-in effect that renders agriculture effectively irreversible once established. In particular, we demonstrate that social learning acts as a "firewall" that suppresses cheater invasion and enables the propagation of successful strategies, leading to sustained population growth and nonlinear amplification of domesticated resources. Together, these results reveal universal mechanisms linking individual decision-making, social interactions, and ecological feedbacks. More broadly, they highlight the potential of artificial societies as experimental platforms to study the emergence of cultural innovations and major evolutionary transitions.
How does cooperation evolve in complex agentic systems? Prior work in evolutionary game theory studies why individuals are incentivized to cooperate by isolating social interactions from the physical costs of behavior, while artificial life models traditionally study emergent self-replication without formalizing the dilemma between acquiring resources and preserving the shared energy needed to reproduce. In contrast, we introduce Autopoietic Game Theory, a computational model where social interactions, replication mechanisms, and their associated computational costs are endogenous and simultaneously co-evolving. We study these dynamics using a computational substrate of randomly initialized programs in Z80 machine code, showing empirically, and motivating with a simplified theoretical model, that embedding a social dilemma directly into the physics of computation can favor the emergence of self-replicating, cooperative strategies. When resources are scarce, our analysis shows that defection can become self-limiting even in well-mixed populations: parasitic stealing destroys shared energy, slows execution, and can prevent reliable replication. Empirically, evolved programs suppress stealing across several Z80 environments, while spatial assortment further supports structural complexity and task performance. We further show that the framework can incorporate exogenous pressures, such as math tasks structured as sequential social dilemmas, when rewards are tied to computation budgets. These results suggest that coupling an agent's capacity for computation to its available energy transforms cooperation into a dominant scaffolding for building sustainable, self-organizing systems.
Kunal Jha, Francesco Cicala, Blaise Agüera y Arcas +4
Self-improving language agents are typically evaluated in isolation: an agent attempts a task, receives feedback, and iteratively refines its own behavior. Yet agents increasingly operate alongside peers whose strategies and outcomes are publicly visible. This raises an under-studied question: when does shared experience produce improvements that self-improvement alone cannot achieve? We introduce SAGE (Social Agent Group Evolution),an evaluation framework that compares two compute-matched conditions: SocialEvo, where agents from five distinct model families co-evolve with access to all peers' histories; and SelfEvo, where each agent receives the same number of task attempts but sees only its own past, which is conventional in self-improving agent studies. We instantiate SAGE in three arenas: open-ended ML research, long-horizon economic planning, and strategic multiplayer play, evaluated across multiple evolutionary rounds. We find that group history is not a universal amplifier: the strongest agent does not exceed its self-evolution ceiling. However, agents that plateau under self-improvement can achieve significant breakthroughs when peer experience is available. In competitive settings, counterfactual controls reveal that agents improve generally rather than developing opponent-specific strategies. Across different forms of shared history, filtered peer traces and reflective summaries often outperform raw logs, indicating that social gains depend on abstraction rather than exposure volume. These findings reveal that peer-history gains are agent-specific, arena-dependent, and contingent on the capacity to abstract transferable knowledge from public traces.
Multi-agent simulations are widely used to study complex social and ecological systems, where rich and often unexpected emergent behaviors arise from local interactions. A large body of prior work has focused on analyzing such emergent dynamics across domains. In this paper, we move beyond analyzing emergent behavior and introduce a learning-based mechanism for actively shaping it via social reward modeling. We introduce Multi-Agent Reward Prediction (MARP), a simple framework that extends preference-based reward modeling to multi-agent reinforcement learning. While the framework is designed to be applicable across multi-agent settings, the present empirical validation is limited to a single environment, and we therefore present MARP as a proof of concept within the studied domain. Rather than relying on handcrafted rewards, MARP learns a shared reward model from episode-level evaluations of collective outcomes, enabling decentralized agents to align their behavior with global social objectives. We study MARP in the Harvest Game, a canonical sequential social dilemma modeling common-pool resource management and related real-world challenges. Our results show that MARP can be tuned to produce behavior that is more closely aligned with target social metrics than standard reward-based baselines, while the learned reward model captures subtle environmental structure without explicit programming. Crucially, MARP supports multiple and composite social objectives within a single training regime. By modifying only the high-level evaluation metric, the same framework seamlessly aligns agent behavior with diverse goals, including sustainability, equality, and peace, as well as combinations of individual and group-level objectives. These findings demonstrate that emergent multi-agent behavior can be treated not only as a phenomenon to study, but as a target of principled, data-driven regulation.