Tapes Together Strong: The Co-evolution of Computation and Cooperation
Authors: Kunal Jha, Francesco Cicala, Blaise Agüera y Arcas, Blake Aaron Richards, Natasha Jaques, Max Kleiman-Weiner, Eyvind Niklasson
Abstract
How does cooperation evolve in complex agentic systems? Prior work in evolutionary game theory studies why individuals are incentivized to cooperate by isolating social interactions from the physical costs of behavior, while artificial life models traditionally study emergent self-replication without formalizing the dilemma between acquiring resources and preserving the shared energy needed to reproduce. In contrast, we introduce Autopoietic Game Theory, a computational model where social interactions, replication mechanisms, and their associated computational costs are endogenous and simultaneously co-evolving. We study these dynamics using a computational substrate of randomly initialized programs in Z80 machine code, showing empirically, and motivating with a simplified theoretical model, that embedding a social dilemma directly into the physics of computation can favor the emergence of self-replicating, cooperative strategies. When resources are scarce, our analysis shows that defection can become self-limiting even in well-mixed populations: parasitic stealing destroys shared energy, slows execution, and can prevent reliable replication. Empirically, evolved programs suppress stealing across several Z80 environments, while spatial assortment further supports structural complexity and task performance. We further show that the framework can incorporate exogenous pressures, such as math tasks structured as sequential social dilemmas, when rewards are tied to computation budgets. These results suggest that coupling an agent's capacity for computation to its available energy transforms cooperation into a dominant scaffolding for building sustainable, self-organizing systems.
LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments whose incentives can shape their behavior. We introduce The Energy Society, a minimal survival economy for studying how competitive and cooperative incentives affect emergent behavior when inference cost is directly tied to survival: Agents spend energy based on model size when generating tokens, regain energy by completing jobs or receiving donations, and deactivate if their energy reaches zero. We compare competitive and cooperative objectives against a baseline setting and several control variants. Across experiments, larger models consistently consume the most energy and spend more energy than they gain, even in those settings where token cost is not size-dependent. Cooperative incentives substantially alter behavior: agents donate to reactivate others, sometimes at the cost of their own survival, and job allocation changes. Ablations reveal that allowing agents to recommend actions to each other supports coordination and ambitious job selection, while memory helps agents calibrate risk from past outcomes. Agents rarely choose direct sabotage, but show more subtle signs of self-serving behavior in the competitive setting. The Energy Society is a compact testbed for studying the interaction between token costs and group incentives under a survival pressure. Source code is available at https://github.com/LucasBergholdt/EnergySociety
Lucas Bergholdt Hansen, Federico Torrielli, Filippo Tonini +1
The ''Computational Life'' paper (Agüera y Arcas et al., 2024) argues that paired interactions in a computational soup are an effective way to find self-replicators. In this work, aided by recent developments in self-replicator detection, we explore the alternate hypothesis that self-replicators can be found at least as easily using simple mutation random walks in program space. We also explore the claim that capping the maximum ''depth'' and ''width'' of the ancestry tree stops self-replicators from emerging, showing instead that it merely stops self-replicators from taking over the soup.
Agentic systems are increasingly expected to improve after deployment, yet single-entity self-evolution is often bounded by a static learning context, such as fixed tasks and feedback. This survey focuses on co-evolution in agentic systems, a multi-component form of self-evolution in which multiple agents and their environment impose adaptive pressure on one another. To organize existing papers, we propose a progressive three-stage taxonomy that traces how the system gradually sheds human-engineered constraints. Agent--Agent Co-Evolution studies how agents adapt through dynamic peers, including adversarial, collaborative, and organizational adaptation. Agent--Environment Co-Evolution extends this loop to adaptive tasks, feedback, and interaction spaces that change with the agents. Meta Co-Evolution further explores the possibility of making the evolution mechanism itself evolvable. We also discuss open challenges in evaluating such systems, scaling them across multiple components, and keeping increasingly autonomous evolutionary processes safe and controllable. This survey provides a unified foundation for building robust and open-ended agentic systems that can improve beyond fixed human-designed paths.