Represented Is Not Computed: A Causal Test of Candidate Algorithmic Intermediates in a Transformer
Authors: Ishita Darade, Sushrut Thorat
Organizations: MKSSS’s Cummins College of Engineering for Women, Pune 411052, India · Institute of Cognitive Science, Osnabrück University, Osnabrück 49069, Germany
Structured prompts require integrating components according to task-relevant relations. How a network implements this integration is often hard to judge in language or vision, where those relations are rarely specified precisely enough to define a candidate internal algorithm. Arithmetic offers a cleaner setting. We study a Transformer trained on base-digit extraction: given N, B, and D, it must report the coefficient of BD in the base-B expansion of N. The closed-form solution, ⌊N/BD⌋modB, provides explicit candidate algorithmic intermediates. Across three seeds, the model reaches 99.83% exact-answer accuracy on held-out number-base intersections, establishing reliable task competence. Linear probes decode the intermediates, making staged arithmetic computation plausible. Causal tests then separate representation from use: within the localized route from the stream with D as input to the output positions, behavior depends on early D-selective communication, independent of N and B. Relatedly, a sparse circuit search finds mostly separate N, B, and D routes that combine late rather than the staged route suggested by the probes. Thus, the model represents the intermediates that make the closed-form solution plausible, but the identified localized causal route does not transmit them to the output stream. This case shows that probe-based conclusions can diverge sharply from causal observations, even when explicit algorithmic hypotheses are available.
What types of decision problems can a causally masked, finite-precision transformer solve for inputs of arbitrary length? Existing answers often rely on idealized arithmetic, but under finite precision, rounding and evaluation order can change what information attention retains and therefore what the model can compute. We develop an algebraic formalization that derives expressivity directly from the model's implemented dynamics. Its central object is its memory; the finite internal state computed by attention that summarizes the information from the prefix available to all future queries. Each attention head updates its own state independently within a layer, while layers compose hierarchically, providing a uniform route from model assumptions to expressivity bounds. Applying this method to transformers without positional embeddings, we obtain an expressivity hierarchy governed by the attention type under specific numerical semantics. Width-one sliding-window attention supports bounded-suffix memory, while a modified form of soft attention supports irreversible, checklist-like state, and combining the two mechanisms provides an interplay of both. Ordinary left-to-right floating-point soft attention can realize more expressive memory operations than any of the above. Algebraically, the four cases correspond to definite, R-trivial, locally R-trivial, and aperiodic semigroups. Under an explicit free-wiring assumption, all four bounds are tight.
Do transformers, when trained on sequential reasoning traces, build internal models of the underlying task? And if so, does the structure of those internal representations mirror the structure of the domain? We train an 8-layer transformer on Sudoku solving traces and perform a mechanistic analysis of its internal computation. We establish two results. First, the model builds a substructure world model: it does not represent the board state cell by cell, as a human analyst would expect, but organizes information around the rows, columns, and boxes that Sudoku's constraints act on. Second, we identify a naked-single circuit: a small set of dedicated neurons in the final MLP layer, each individually detecting when exactly one digit remains possible for a specific cell, and reliably promoting that digit. These findings show that the geometry of an emergent world model is shaped by the constraint algebra of the domain, not its surface presentation, and that the resulting decision circuit is sparse, monosemantic, and fully interpretable. More broadly, they demonstrate that mechanistic interpretability tools can recover an end-to-end algorithmic account of how a transformer solves a combinatorial reasoning task.
Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting is necessary for arithmetic in small language models, yet shuffling its steps preserves most performance. What does CoT contribute if not logical sequencing? In three 1-3B instruction-tuned LMs on GSM8K, we isolate the answer-readout stage via prefix completion and identify a positional shortcut: the model copies whichever number occupies the trailing position before the answer delimiter, regardless of intermediate reasoning. Gold-answer presence accounts for 54-92 pp of accuracy (89-92% of each model's teacher-forcing ceiling); even on incorrect items, the final answer matches the last CoT number 95-96% of the time. The copy channel takes precedence over retained-context completion: replacing the trailing number with a wrong value collapses accuracy to near-zero despite correct intermediates, yet removing it recovers 5-32 pp above that floor--even single-step arithmetic the model can otherwise perform is suppressed when a copyable number is present. Qwen and Llama copy novel distractors 87-95% of the time; Gemma gates selectively. Head-level ablation implicates architecture-specific head sets; the effect replicates on GSM-Symbolic. On non-arithmetic BBH tasks, shuffle retention drops sharply; at 7-8B, content-selective gating emerges. Step-level faithfulness evaluations risk conflating positional answer transport with genuine computation--a failure mode for CoT-based oversight.