The Cognitive Kardashev Scale: Quantifying the Material Envelope of Civilisational Computation

Demand for AI accelerators is rapidly increasing rack power density, with projections approaching 1MW per deployment by 2027. This poses a major challenge for datacenter power delivery designers. As power densities increase, a datacenter designed for a different target density may strand power, i.e., may be unable to use all the power that its delivery hierarchy has provisioned. Designs must remain efficient over long datacenter lifetimes and multiple hardware generations. Power utilization is particularly important as grid power capacity is a scarce resource in the AI era. Designing an efficient power delivery hierarchy for the long run is difficult because rack placement feasibility, workload impact, and cost depend jointly on electrical topology, deployment granularity, placement policy, power oversubscription, and workload mix. Moreover, each of these factors evolve over time, have inter-dependencies across multiple resource dimensions, and generally do not lend themselves to closed-form analysis. To address this challenge, we develop a framework for evaluating datacenter power delivery designs using throughput, power, and cost metrics over realistic arrival, oversubscription, and decommissioning sequences. The framework combines projection models for GPU, compute, and storage deployments with operational factors grounded in production data from Microsoft Azure. Our results show that multi-resource stranding materially changes deployable capacity, effective capital expenditure, and delivered performance, and quantify how rising density from rack- and pod-scale AI systems shapes these outcomes. For AI datacenter design, the relevant planning objective is not installed megawatts, but deployable capacity over time.

As exponential compute scaling continues, will the capabilities of frontier AI models outstrip what is accessible to developers on a small fixed budget? Or will capabilities converge, with "meek models inheriting the earth"? Building on Gundlach et al. (2025b), we show that the answer depends on how we value and measure AI capabilities. We discuss conventional performance measures and show that, while validation loss shows a shrinking gap, on other metrics frontier models grow their lead forever. Classifying performance metrics by their functional forms in relation to training (and inference) compute, we provide tight mathematical conditions for determining which metrics favor meek models, and show that bounded performance metrics always do. But careful interpretation of performance metrics is essential: we show that many common bounded metrics have closely-related counterpart metrics that are unbounded (and vice versa). Determining the apt metric in a domain is a prerequisite for policy, since bounded and unbounded metrics may suggest opposing policy responses. If a particular capability -- like software engineering, synthetic biology, or rhetorical persuasiveness -- is unbounded when measured in the terms we care about, frontier-level capability will likely be concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy actors. Conversely, if that capability is instead bounded, frontier-level capabilities proliferate through meek models into the hands of the many.

We introduce a framework called LAPITHS (Language model Analysis through Paradigm grounded Interpretations of Theses about Human likenesS) and use it to show that several major claims advanced by models such as CENTAUR, proposed as an artificial Unified Model of Cognition, are not theoretically or empirically justified. LAPITHS provides a principled reference point for counteracting the current behaviouristic tendency in AI research to interpret the human level performances of transformer based language models as evidence of human like underlying computation and, by extension, as signs of cognitive abilities. The novelty of LAPITHS lies in making explicit the arguments grounded in two quantitative assessments: (i) the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a theoretically motivated method for estimating the cognitive plausibility of artificial systems, and (ii) a behavioural comparison showing that results similar to those reported for CENTAUR like models can be reproduced by other systems that do not satisfy the structural constraints typically associated with cognitive plausibility, and whose outputs do not provide independent explanatory insight into human cognition.