How Hard is it to Rig a Benchmark? A Social Choice Analysis of Leaderboard Robustness
Authors: Polina Gordienko, Georg Schollmeyer, Frauke Kreuter, Christoph Jansen
Organizations: Department of Statistics, LMU Munich · Social Data Science Center, University of Maryland · School of Computing & Communications, Lancaster University Leipzig
Multi-task benchmarks have become a central pillar of machine learning research, yet their growing influence has incentivised benchmark gaming -- strategic actions taken to improve the leaderboard rank of a specific model. Treating datasets as voters and models as candidates, we consider benchmark-specific training -- the inclusion of benchmark data in training -- as a form of election manipulation. For any ordinal benchmark, the problem of choosing datasets to train on so that a target model becomes top-ranked corresponds to shift bribery, a class of manipulation problems from computational social choice. Leveraging this identification, we show that the benchmark-specific training problem is NP-hard under Borda count and mean win rate. Complementing this worst-case perspective, we introduce the instance-level robustness, the minimum number of datasets a model developer must include in training to top a given leaderboard, and derive expressions for it under arithmetic mean, median, mean win rate and pairwise majority. We evaluate these expressions on MMLU under HELM and on BIG-Bench Hard (BBH) under the Open LLM Leaderboard. Across both suites, mean win rate is hardest to manipulate: this gap is clear on BBH (24 tasks, 4507 models), where its median robustness is 22 tasks (92%), compared with 13 (54%) under arithmetic mean and 12 (50%) under median and pairwise majority.
Evaluation leaderboards such as LMArena play a central role in benchmarking large language models by aggregating pairwise human preferences into model rankings, yet the robustness of these rankings remains poorly understood. We present a unified perturbation framework for analyzing Bradley-Terry leaderboards under structured data modifications using influence-based approximations. Our framework studies three match-level perturbations -- Drop, Add, and Flip -- together with player removal, and evaluates their effects on top-k membership, global ranking consistency via Kendall's tau, and confidence-interval-based uncertainty. Across Chatbot Arena and six additional pairwise-comparison datasets, we show that modern leaderboards are non-robust across all three objectives: sub-1% targeted perturbations can change the top-ranked model, degrade Kendall's tau, and alter confidence intervals. Beyond robustness auditing, we show that the same influence scores enable efficient targeted perturbations, promoting or demoting specific models and reducing target-model uncertainty with fewer actions than previous manipulation and active-sampling baselines. By summarizing these effects with normalized dataset-level robustness scores, our framework provides a practical and helpful tool for auditing leaderboard stability and motivating more robust evaluation protocols.
Benchmark hacking refers to tuning a machine learning model to score highly on certain evaluation criteria without improving true generalization or faithfully solving the intended problem. We study this phenomenon in a generic machine learning contest, where each contestant chooses two types of effort: creative effort that improves model capability as desired by the contest host, and mechanistic effort that only improves the model's fitness to the particular task in contest without contributing to true generalization. We establish the existence of a symmetric monotone pure strategy equilibrium in this competition game. It also provides a natural definition of benchmark hacking in this strategic context by comparing a player's equilibrium effort allocation to that of a single-agent baseline scenario. Under our definition, contestants with types below certain threshold (low types) always engage in benchmark hacking, whereas those above the threshold do not. Furthermore, we show that more skewed reward structures (favoring top-ranked contestants) can elicit more desirable contest outcomes. We also provide empirical evidence to support our theoretical predictions.
Benchmarks of machine learning models often include many datasets, making evaluation expensive. For efficiency, it is preferable to perform evaluations on small, representative datasets instead. The selection of such subsets typically relies on heuristics and is rarely analyzed for the robustness of the resulting model rankings. We introduce a framework to perform the task of selecting datasets subsets with an evaluation of how different selection strategies preserve the global model rankings. Our framework includes bootstrap aggregation, which provides valid confidence intervals, allowing a principled comparison of selection strategies. We consider clustering, design criteria (A/D-optimality), random baselines, and greedy farthest-first (FAFI). For the latter, we derive upper bounds on selection quality in terms of ranking errors as a function of the number of selected datasets. Empirically, in time series classification (TSC, 112 datasets) and in a supplementary natural language processing benchmark derived from MTEB (57 tasks), several selection strategies improve rank preservation compared with random subsets, including simple FAFI. In contrast, in recommender systems (30 datasets), the improvement of strategies over random selection is small and typically statistically insignificant. For TSC, our best-performing strategy achieves a Spearman correlation of 0.95 with the full benchmark model rankings using only five selected datasets. Additional experiments indicate that the effectiveness of selection approaches depends on both the quality of dataset representations and the scale of the benchmarking regime.