Truthful Online Preference Aggregation for LLM Fine-Tuning in Mobile Crowdsourcing
Authors: Shugang Hao, Lingjie Duan
Abstract
To better serve users' demands in mobile applications (e.g., navigation), mobile crowdsourcing platforms can iteratively align large language model (LLM)-generated content (e.g., AI-generated traffic condition predictions) with human feedback collected from crowdsourcing workers (e.g., mobile users). However, workers may strategically misreport their online preference feedback to maximize their influence or payment. Existing pipelines in mobile crowdsourcing (e.g., EM-based weight estimation) fail to identify the most accurate worker in this online setting, resulting in a linear regret O(T) over T time slots. In this paper, we study truthful online preference aggregation for LLM fine-tuning in mobile crowdsourcing. We formulate a new dynamic Bayesian game to model the multi-agent online learning process between the platform and strategic mobile workers. We propose a novel online weighted aggregation mechanism that dynamically adjusts each worker's weight in the preference aggregation according to their feedback accuracy. We prove that our mechanism ensures truthful feedback from strategic workers and achieves a sublinear regret O(T) over T time slots. We further extend our mechanism to a challenging scenario with limited worker feedback per time slot, still guaranteeing a sublinear regret O(T). Experiments on LLM fine-tuning with real-world datasets further demonstrate significant performance gains of our mechanisms over benchmark schemes.
Crowdsourcing platforms coordinate large pools of online workers who strategically choose which contests to enter and how much effort to invest. This self-selection can leave important contests with too few participants or too little effort, while workers may regret entering contests that leave them worse off than available alternatives. We study how platforms can recommend contests to workers using self-selection in Tullock contests (SSTC), a two-stage model in which workers first choose contests and then compete within them. We introduce GRAF, a greedy polynomial-time framework that constructs self-selection outcomes by ordering workers according to a score vector, with guarantees of zero worker regret and platform optimality in special cases of SSTC. Because effective orderings are difficult to design under worker heterogeneity, we propose LLMScore, an LLM-driven evolutionary framework that automatically designs GRAF's scoring algorithm. LLMScore addresses two challenges: jointly optimizing platform utility and worker satisfaction, and evaluating worker regret when exact computation is intractable. Trained only on small instances of one setting, it transfers to larger and structurally different settings; moreover, its output is human-readable code that platform operators can inspect and modify. Across 1,000 synthetic instances spanning four settings, GRAF with LLMScore consistently achieves high-quality, often near-optimal, outcomes with low worker regret, benefiting both platforms and workers.
To align a Large Language Model (LLM), most existing methods collect explicit human feedback and train a reward model to predict the human preference based on the response text. These existing methods have two key limitations. First, the users rarely provide explicit feedback for LLM responses, which makes the high-quality preference annotation expensive to collect. Second, the methods do not leverage implicit human feedback, which has proven vital to the economic moats of Internet giants. To quantify the value of implicit feedback, we build a new dataset called IFLLM, which collects 1336 multi-turn questions from the 59 Mechanical Turk workers, their mouse trajectories, and eye gazing points to the LLMs' responses from their webcams. IFLLM shows that the users have very diverse types of gazing behavior and mouse trajectories. Our reward model based on the implicit user feedback boosts the accuracy of the text-based reward model from 55% to 64% and nearly triples the relative response quality improvements after applying the DPO to eight LLMs, demonstrating the value of implicit feedback in the wild. Our data collection website, dataset, and codes can be found at https://github.com/themehulpatwari/llm-implicit-feedback/.
It is increasingly common to aggregate predictions from multiple LLMs, each with domain expertise or access to private tools and data, to improve collective prediction performance. In decentralized settings, aggregation weights need to be determined without access to models' private information and should remain robust to strategic reporting. We propose a family of advantage-aligned wagering mechanisms for LLM aggregation (WALLA), in which each model reports a prediction and a learned wager, and predictions are aggregated using wagers as weights. WALLA introduces a leave-one-out baseline into the net payout function, yielding three desirable properties: (1) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of prediction under arbitrary belief structure, (2) advantage--wager alignment, where the optimal wager is proportional to the model's expected score advantage, and (3) prediction-agnostic wager optimization, enabling decentralized learning of wager policies without requiring optimal predictions. We further instantiate two mechanism variants that trade off normality and no-arbitrage while maintaining a bounded worst-case deficit for the mechanism. Experiments on question-answering and forecasting benchmarks across heterogeneous models and private-information settings show that WALLA matches centralized aggregation methods in predictive performance, while simultaneously achieving decentralized learning, advantage-aligned aggregation weights, uncertainty awareness, and incentive-compatible prediction.