Hypothesis Generation and Inductive Inference in Children and Language Models
Authors: Jeffrey Qin, Wasu Top Piriyakulkij, Zhuangfei Gao, Mia Radovanovic, Jessica Sommerville, Kevin Ellis, Marta Kryven
Abstract
Real world decision-making requires constructing mental models under uncertainty over evidence, over the underlying causal rules, and over the state of the world itself. Which computational principles underpin human inference under such conditions, and do LLM-based agents exhibit similar behavior given matching constraints? We address these questions using an inductive inference Box Task in which participants, human children and LLM-based agents, infer a latent cause through sequential interaction with an uncertain environment. We formalize this task as program induction with Bayesian particle-based inference, admitting two complementary interpretations: (1) as a constraint satisfaction process over hypotheses, and (2) as a program synthesis problem in which hypotheses are executable programs evaluated against evidence. Using the constraint-based formulation, we show that children's behavior is best explained by a combination of subjective evidence reliability and online hypothesis generation, accounting for both their evidence-seeking patterns and their dissociation between task completion and rule generalization. Using the program synthesis formulation, we treat LLM-based agents as model organisms: controllable systems that allow systematic manipulation of task conditions. Across backends, LLM-based agents replicate children's responses to changes in evidence reliability and observability, including discounting unreliable evidence, seeking to resolve partial information, and dissociating between task completion and causal generalization. At the same time, LLM-based agents tend to over-observe and over-comply with instructions relative to children. These results suggest that while children and LLM-based agents adapt similarly to environmental structure, their information-seeking behavior exhibits distinct underlying costs and inductive biases.
How humans grow and maintain abstract knowledge from the sparse, streaming noisy data of experience is a longstanding challenge in cognitive science. Any computational account must satisfy at least three desiderata: It must be (1) data-efficient and compute-efficient, (2) capture gradations of uncertainty to support intelligent inquiry and information gathering, and (3) be flexible enough to mentally represent the endless range of concepts people can learn and think about. Here we introduce a computational model that captures these three properties, by encoding symbolic knowledge as mental programs that combine natural language with source code, and sequentially inferring mental programs using LLM-guided Bayesian learning algorithms. Across a range of behavioral studies this model successfully reproduces quantitative signatures of human inductive learning and active inquiry, such as anchoring, garden-pathing, and other effects. In contrast, pure LLMs and classic Bayesian models either fail at the underlying task, or do not reproduce human behavior, or succeed only at exorbitant computational cost. These results suggest that one way humans continually grow their knowledge is by mentally representing many hypotheses spanning language-like and program-like representations, then revising those hypotheses to approximate Bayesian updates, while a bottom-up neural mechanism (an LLM) makes inference both tractable and learnable.
Wasu Top Piriyakulkij, Sam Acquaviva, Cassidy Langenfeld +2
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly help people solve problems, from debugging code to repairing machinery. This process requires generating plausible hypotheses from partial descriptions, then updating them as more information arrives. Yet how LLMs perform this form of inference, and how close it is to optimal, remains unclear. We study this question in the number game, a controlled setting in which a learner infers the hypothesis supported by a few positive integers, such as {16,8,2,64}: a rule like powers of 2 or an interval like numbers near 20. We measure the posterior over hypotheses using three complementary probes: posterior prediction, hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis generation. We then compare LLM behavior with an optimal Bayesian model and human behavior, and test whether the same posterior is expressed across probes. LLMs are often well described by a two-parameter Bayesian fit, but with systematic offsets: by default they show a strong-sampling assumption that creates an implicit Occam's razor, favoring narrower hypotheses, while thinking mode shifts them toward greater prior reliance. We also find a robust evaluation--generation gap: LLMs select more correct hypotheses during hypothesis evaluation but generate simpler, more rule-like hypotheses. Finally, this Bayesian-with-bias pattern does not extrapolate. Models can behave as if they hold rule-like hypotheses over observed examples, yet generalize poorly to parts of the hypothesis domain not covered by those examples. Our results highlight a limitation of LLMs as general problem solvers, especially for scientific inference, where hypotheses must go beyond the data.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in scientific tasks. Yet whether these systems can effectively engage in forms of inductive reasoning relevant to scientific discovery remains an open question. In this work, we introduce FALSIFYBENCH, an evaluation framework for hypothesis-driven reasoning inspired by the classic Wason 2-4-6 task, in which agents must discover hidden semantic properties by iteratively proposing examples and receiving feedback. This task captures key elements of scientific reasoning: hypothesis generation, evidence gathering, and belief revision in response to both confirming and disconfirming evidence. Our evaluation of 12 LLMs across model families and scales shows that reasoning models are generally stronger scientific reasoners than instruction-tuned models, although no model comes close to optimal performance. The primary driver of success is the capacity for negative testing: models that actively seek to falsify their hypotheses consistently outperform those that primarily seek confirmation. Moreover, a fine-grained turn-level analysis, neglected in previous work, reveals that failure is tied to identifiable patterns in how models navigate the hypothesis space.