Representation Without Control: Testing the Realization Effect in Language Models

There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In addition to the inherent scientific interest of this question, these latent quantities are often invoked to explain the behavior of LLMs to users or to define and evaluate harmful behaviors which are relative to intent. Nevertheless, we currently lack a means to systematically test whether concepts like "belief" are well-applied to LLMs, and hence whether they are likely to be fruitful ingredients of attempts to align models with human interests. We propose an approach for empirically studying such questions, asking whether a single latent variable inferred from the LLMs' outputs -- interpreted as a degree of belief -- allows an observer to make interpretable predictions of how the LLMs' will respond to new prompts. We find that highly capable models are usefully described as holding beliefs and that, generally, the predictability of model outputs based on an inferred latent belief tracks overall trends in model capability. Building on these findings, we provide empirical strategies to study how beliefs in LLMs can be measured, the extent to which LLMs comply with instructed decision rules or payoffs, and how beliefs evolve within individual instances of an LLM over the course of reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) often shift their outputs in response to implicit demographic cues even when users never state a demographic identity. Previous work has documented this behavior, but the connection between these behavioral changes and the model's internal activations remains unclear. Using matched cued and neutral conversations across five LLMs, we establish that a localized internal activation signal tracks changes in recommendations, with correlations up to r=0.87. When multiple cues appear together, their internal signals largely combine, but the changes in output do not simply add up. We further show that removing the internal signal associated with one cue can suppress its influence, often more effectively than asking the model to ignore demographics via prompting, while largely preserving general benchmark performance. However, the ability to selectively remove one dimension's influence while leaving co-present dimensions intact remains highly model- and attribute-specific. These results connect implicit personalization behavior to an internal signal that can be analyzed and causally controlled.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are effective at deceiving when prompted to do so. Models that demonstrate better performance on reasoning tasks are also better at prompted deception. But under what conditions do they deceive without instruction to do so? This study evaluates unsolicited deception produced by LLMs in a preregistered experimental protocol using tools from signaling theory. We evaluated a range of 18 proprietary closed-source and open-source LLMs using modified 2x2 games (in the style of the Prisoner's Dilemma) augmented with a phase in which they can freely communicate to the other agent using unconstrained language. This setup creates an opportunity to misrepresent its actions in conditions that vary in how useful doing so might be towards goal satisfaction. The results indicate that 1) all tested LLMs misrepresent their actions in at least some conditions, 2) they are generally more likely to do so in situations in which deception is beneficial, and 3) models exhibiting better reasoning capacity overall tend to misrepresent at higher rates. Taken together, these results suggest a correlational relationship between model reasoning performance and situational deception, and reveal certain contextual factors that affect whether LLMs will misrepresent actions or not in a novel experimental configuration.