From Automation to Collaboration: Human-in-the-Loop Methods for Safe and Trustworthy NLP

Human annotation is the empirical foundation of much NLP research, from dataset construction to model evaluation, but papers often leave unclear who produced the annotations and how the annotation process was controlled. We provide the first large-scale, task-level audit of human annotation reporting across major NLP venues, asking which annotation details are documented, which are missing, and how reporting varies across time, topic, venue, and intended use of human judgment. We introduce a unified taxonomy of annotation-reporting practices and validate an LLM-assisted extraction pipeline against Annotated-gold, a human-adjudicated gold standard of 41 papers and 72 annotation tasks, where the best model reaches human-comparable agreement with adjudicated labels, with Krippendorff's alpha of 0.606 versus 0.585 for human-human agreement. Using this pipeline, we construct Annotated-llm, a dataset covering ACL-venue papers from 2018-2025, with 2,667 extracted annotation tasks from 1,603 papers, and find that papers frequently report operational details such as recruitment strategies, annotator expertise, and annotation volume, but often omit details needed to assess annotation validity, including training, language proficiency, compensation, socio-demographics, adjudication, and agreement values, especially in model-evaluation studies. Our results show that annotation reporting in NLP has improved over time but remains uneven, and they establish a scalable framework and bare-minimum reporting recommendations for making human annotation more reliable, reproducible, and interpretable.

Large language models increasingly provide labels, evaluations, and feedback for tasks specified in natural language. When a specification admits multiple readings but the supervision channel does not reveal which is operative, additional labels reduce sampling error without resolving the resulting identification problem. We introduce Natural Language PAC (NL-PAC), a framework that uses a fixed model's thresholded decoding law to define admissible labels and candidate targets. The probability that multiple labels are admissible equals the diameter of the pointwise-admissible target class, and under target-blind supervision every learner incurs worst-case risk of at least half this diameter, at every sample size; the exact randomized minimax risk over this class is attained by a data-independent strategy. Finite-sample confidence bounds make these quantities certifiable from held-out unlabeled inputs. In a frozen Qwen~2.5--3B audit, one prespecified prompt yields a positive model-relative certificate, whereas a paraphrase and exact-rule controls yield zero. A held-out bridge audit finds that supplied candidate reading clauses fail the admissibility condition needed to transfer the certificate to coherent readings. The guarantee is specific to the audited model, prompt, threshold, and input distribution; extending it to human interpretations requires external validation.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across natural language processing tasks, yet their deployment in high-stakes applications raises critical concerns regarding reliability, safety, and trustworthiness. In this paper, we present a red teaming framework that systematically uncovers vulnerabilities in LLM outputs. Our approach employs a novel multi-role architecture comprising target, attacker, and jury models. The attackers generate increasingly effective adversarial prompts while the jury rigorously evaluates response accuracy and consistency across tasks. In a case study, our strategy proved particularly effective at exposing unfaithfulness in LLM responses. Exploitative adversarial prompts increased the attack success rate by up to 7.9% in question-answering tasks, revealing weaknesses in reliability. The approach identifies how structural constraints in summarization can shape vulnerability patterns, with format limitations yielding measurable gains in faithfulness, and shows that architectural design choices typically outweigh parameter scaling in determining model safety. The framework's key strength is its adaptability across evaluation tasks, from English question-answering to Arabic summarization, enabling comprehensive comparison of model vulnerabilities. While it excels at comparing cross-model and cross-linguistic vulnerabilities, it faces challenges in fully automating adversarial prompt generation across languages. Our experiments also reveal limitations in detecting subtle forms of unfaithfulness that do not manifest as explicit factual contradictions, particularly across linguistic contexts. Overall, this architecture provides both actionable insights into current LLM vulnerabilities and a scalable methodology for ongoing safety evaluation as models evolve.