The Sensation Modulating Network:Haltability as the architectural ground for object-directed phenomenology

This paper proposes a minimal architecture for body-grounded perspective formation in artificial agents. Extending prior work, the model introduces an interoceptive viability signal, a Fisher-style metric over fused exteroceptive-interoceptive states, and a conative alignment mechanism linking bodily tendency to action readiness. In a reward-free gridworld, conation converts learned bodily tendency into stable body-directed behavior, while body-to-perspective routing allows bodily perturbations to leave a recoverable geometric residue in the perspective latent. This study shows how minimal structural conditions for artificial subjectivity can be operationalized in the phenomenological sense, through the embodied organization of how a world is given to an agent.

This article presents a mathematical model of the Motivated Emotional Mind cognitive architecture developed for embodied intelligent systems. Such a system learns to maintain its homeostasis through a generalized form of reinforcement learning based on its internal motivations, termed motivated learning (ML). The principal contribution of this article is a rigorous formalization of the re-entrant loop integrating feedforward processing, lateral interactions, and feedback pathways, together with the representational selection mechanisms that govern adaptive system responses. The model specifies how ongoing exteroceptive and interoceptive signals, bodily-motivational context, and memory traces are bound into associative memory structures termed semblions, which compete for access to further processing and top-down reconstruction. The formalization encompasses secondary perception, representational competition, curiosity, procedural gaps, and action selection directed toward limiting allostatic violations. Within this framework, motivated learning is tailored to embodied systems whose dynamics are shaped by needs, affect, and the current regulatory state. Unlike standard reinforcement-learning models, the proposed approach incorporates need thresholds, goal generation and shifting goals, bodily state, resource constraints, and action uncertainty, thereby providing a more adequate account of response selection under regulatory pressure. Global affect functions as a central control signal, modulating the learning rate, representational valence, and the balance between exploration and exploitation. The model presented here is a step toward a more rigorous formalization of cognitive phenomena and may provide a basis for further theoretical analysis, computer simulation, and implementation in artificial-intelligence systems inspired by biological processes.

An agent must act on the situation before it, learn what it cannot yet represent, and model other agents well enough to coordinate. These faculties are usually realized by separate mechanisms, yet they share a failure mode: the situation can exceed what the agent can currently represent, and the honest response is then a principled refusal that says what was missing. We develop a small cognitive architecture in which these limits arise from a single quantity. An Interpretation-Decision Unit (IDU) interprets a content vector through a family of regimes - local representational frames with private bases - and decides which actions it licenses; a scalar residual of the content against the active regimes' representational scope drives the unit. Low residual with a clean licensing emits an action; otherwise the unit re-interprets, attempts a description-length-justified expansion, or halts with a typed, witnessed terminal. We prove the unit is total and deterministic: for any content and fixed configuration it halts in finitely many bounded-cost steps with a unique terminal witness, so abstention carries its cause by construction. By binding the architecture's open parameters without changing its mechanics, the same residual-against-scope constraint recovers three documented phenomena at three scopes: the typology of not-knowing (typed abstention); a forced misunderstanding between agents, localized to one shared concept and invisible to the agent committing it (bounded empathy); and prerequisite dependence in learning derived from a bounded focus window rather than posited (developmental prerequisites). Each instantiation is worked for a natural and an artificial agent and states a falsifiable prediction, so one constraint can model limits in both human and machine cognition. The account contributes a unification and a notion of accountable abstention, typed and witnessed by construction.