In strategic classification, an institution (e.g., a bank) anticipates adaptation from users who change their features to increase utility in a classification task (e.g., loan repayment). Since a key challenge is the distribution shift induced by users, we turn to causal models, which have been shown to bound the worst-case out-of-distribution (OOD) risk, and establish several new results that link causality and strategic classification. First, we show that causal classification leads to optimal classification error after any sufficiently large adaptation, when the noise is bounded in a certain way. Second, when these assumptions do not hold, we show OOD cross-entropy risk of optimal classifiers decomposes into an OOD bias term and a term arising from not using all observable features, allowing us to understand when causal classifiers have an advantage. Finally, we show that the use of causal features can allow alignment of long-term incentives between institutions and users, contrasting with previous work that highlights social costs of such approaches. We validate our theory empirically on synthetic data, finding that our results predict behavior in practice.
Strategic classification studies settings in which agents respond to a deployed classifier by modifying observable features at a cost. Classical models typically treat such responses as cosmetic: features may change, but true labels remain fixed. We study an improvement-aware variant in which strategic responses can induce genuine changes in outcome-relevant features. Agents choose post-deployment feature vectors strategically, and labels are then generated according to a stable conditional outcome law that preserves the relationship between features and outcomes. We formalize this problem for linear classifiers under a single-index qualification model and linear-decomposable costs. We show that the strategic-optimal classifier is obtained by a parallel shift of the Bayes-optimal decision boundary, and that it provides a better surrogate for the improvement-aware objective than the Bayes classifier. Since improvement-aware learning requires post-deployment labels, which are typically unavailable before deployment, we provide PAC-style guar- antees under an oracle model, propose a practical plug-in algorithm, establish its generalization bound, and evaluate it on synthetic and real-world datasets.
Siddharth Shrivastava, Mahvith Akshintala, B Vamsha Vardhan Reddy +3
Algorithmic recourse aims to provide individuals with actionable changes to improve their predicted outcomes in high-stakes classification settings, such as loan and mortgage applications. However, most existing approaches focus only on flipping a model's prediction, without accounting for whether the recommended changes lead to genuine improvement in an individual's true qualifications or merely enable strategic gaming of the classifier. Consequently, deployed recourse policies can induce behavioral responses that degrade predictive accuracy and become ineffective after model retraining. In this work, we formalize this failure mode through a causal performative framework for recourse. We model how recourse actions propagate through a structural causal model, capturing interactions among features as well as their effect on the true label. These causal responses induce a non-convex optimization problem, even under standard convex losses. We characterize conditions under which performatively stable solutions exist and can be efficiently computed via simple iterative dynamics. Our analysis reveals that recourse policies that ignore causal structure can induce large, misaligned behavioral responses, whereas causal recourse leads to stable equilibria that reduce incentives for gaming. Experiments on both semi-synthetic and real credit datasets demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms standard empirical risk minimization while reducing the need for repeated model retraining to accommodate distribution shifts caused by strategic agent behavior.
Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly than genuine efforts. Prior works have demonstrated a fundamental inability to get out of this conundrum by only focusing on the design of a classifier. We note that prior work also heavily focuses on either one-shot settings or repeated interaction with the same classifier. Real-world decision making is often multi-stage, involving a sequence of potentially different classifiers as an agent progresses. This paper introduces a sequential, stochastic, multi-stage model of strategic classification, by capturing how agents adapt their behavior, through improvement actions (enhancing both observable features and true attributes) and gaming actions (enhancing only observable features), over multiple levels of classification with increasing difficulty as well as reward. For each level, we adopt a selective classifier that can abstain from making a prediction at low confidence. Consequently, a positive (resp. negative) outcome leads to promotion (resp. demotion) of the agent to the next higher (resp. lower) level, while abstention keeps the agent at the same level. We fully characterize the agent's optimal instantaneous action under selective classifiers and compare the long-term properties and utility of the agent repeatedly following an optimal myopic policy of either no-improvement (never choose the improvement action) or no-gaming (never choose the gaming action). We further examine design principles over the sequence of classifiers that yield higher long-term utility for the latter policy, thereby effectively incentivizing genuine effort in the long run.