Visual inputs are often assumed to improve language understanding in multimodal models. We examine this assumption by asking whether vision-language models (VLMs) can distinguish useful visual evidence from incidental image context in lexical judgments. We use human concreteness and imagery ratings because they span words with varying expected visual relevance, from abstract and low-imagery words to concrete and high-imagery words. We find that real-image contexts do not yield consistent gains and often hurt alignment with human ratings, most sharply when visual evidence is least relevant. Through probing and canonical correlation analysis, complemented by an attribution case study, we find that real-image contexts are associated with representational shifts and greater sensitivity to spurious visual cues, coinciding with weaker recoverability of the targeted lexical properties. We further show that instructing models to focus solely on textual content at inference time can reduce this degradation, with the clearest gains on these vulnerable subsets. Our findings suggest that current instruction-tuned VLMs need better calibration of when visual context should inform lexical judgments.
Benchmark accuracy is often implicitly assumed to reflect grounded visual understanding in vision-language models (VLMs), yet it remains unclear to what extent such scores truly reflect reliance on visual evidence. Motivated by a surprising observation that removing a substantial fraction of image tokens only degrades model performance very slightly on a widely used hallucination benchmark, we systematically investigate this mismatch in a set of open-source VLMs. Our analysis spans multiple levels of granularity, spanning global visual degradation, localized occlusion, question reformulation, answer-space expansion, and decision-level analyses beyond standard accuracy. We further complement these behavioral results with a layer-wise analysis of vision-token geometry. Throughout the experiments, we find that although VLMs do incorporate visual input, their predictions are less sensitive to the loss of fine-grained visual evidence that standard accuracy should have suggested. Even when the final prediction remains unchanged, the model's internal support for the correct answer may already be weakened. We further complement a representation-level analysis, which shows increasing similarity among visual tokens in deeper layers, providing a possible explanation for our findings. Together, these results suggest that current benchmarks are not sufficient to reliably evaluate fine-grained visual grounding in VLMs.
Vision-language models are evaluated by aggregate accuracy on multimodal benchmarks, a practice that implicitly assumes the model uses its visual input. We show this assumption fails on 40%--97% of samples across six VLMs and three perceptual benchmarks: blurring the question-relevant visual region leaves the next-token distribution nearly unchanged. We name this phenomenon the Visual Insensitivity Gap and quantify it with a per-sample Visual Sensitivity Index (VSI). The gap is a property of samples, not of models: VSI ranks correlate across models (grand-mean Spearman rho=+0.40, permutation p<10^-3), so the same samples are flagged insensitive by VLMs sharing no architectural detail beyond a contrastively pretrained vision tower. The mechanism is concrete: on the insensitive samples, a linear probe on each model's own vision tower distinguishes perturbed from clean images at 0.72--0.79 accuracy, yet the model's argmax token changes on only 2%--11% of the same samples, an encoder--LLM gap above 0.65 on every model. Mapping VSI's diagnostic utility cell by cell surfaces a strong regime (multi-choice reasoning on capable VLMs: AUROC=0.85--0.87) and a weak regime (well-calibrated factuality, where softmax confidence already leads). VSI is not a universal best abstention signal; it is a sample-intrinsic indicator of vision-ignoring failure, best used as a conditional ensemble component.
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed where answers must follow from what is in the image, yet they often answer from textual priors, the question's phrasing together with memorized world knowledge, rather than from the image itself, which inflates benchmark scores and yields confident but ungrounded answers. Existing benchmarks rarely isolate this behavior, since each image is usually paired with a single fixed question. To measure the reliance, we build a 540-image benchmark across six reasoning categories and generate four question variants over the same images, so that phrasing rather than image content is the controlled variable. The hardest variant is written directly from the image to minimize text leakage. We benchmark eleven VLMs spanning small open-weight models to large closed-source systems: every model degrades on the hardest variant, and open models fall furthest. Our central diagnostic is a no-image ablation, which collapses the open-weight models to their text-only floor (1 to 9 percent). Three further analyses, LLM-rated difficulty, low base-to-final textual similarity, and human re-annotation, corroborate genuine image-dependence. In-context exemplars that match how a variant was built recover the most accuracy, and GRPO post-training of a small VLM yields consistent gains across all four variants that transfer to a held-out out-of-distribution set. Textual-prior reliance is measurable and partly trainable away.